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THE
ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHERHOOD
AND
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Charles Walston

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To.

A. Rickford

from

Chatsworth,

wishing

many happy returns!

Burton Hall, May 6 1921.

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THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
BROTHERHOOD
AND
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
BROTHERHOOD
AND
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY

SIR CHARLES WALSTON (WALDSTEIN),

M.A., Litt.D., Cambridge and Columbia Universities, etc.; Fellow of King's College and late Professor and Reader in the University of Cambridge and Director of the American Arch. School, Athens; Author of *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, *Patriotism—National and International, Truth—an Essay in Moral Reconstruction, etc.*

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1919

L'esprit des temps rejoint ce que la mer sépare;
Le titre de famille est écrit en tout lieu.
L'homme n'est plus Français, Anglais, Romain, Barbare,
Il est concitoyen de l'empire de Dieu!
Les murs des nations s'écroulent en poussières,
Les langues de Babel retrouvent l'unité,
L'Evangile refait avec toutes ses pierres
Le temple de l'humanité!

Réjouissons-nous donc dans le jour qu'il nous prête;
L'aube des jours nouveaux fait poindre ses rayons,
Vous serez dans les temps, monts à la verte crête,
Un Sinaï de paix entre les nations!
Sous nos pas cadencés faisons sonner la terre,
Jetons nos gants de fer et donnons-nous la main,
C'est nous qui conduisons aux conquêtes du Père
Les colonnes du genre humain!

LAMARTINE.

Two verses from a Toast at a National Banquet of Gauls and Bretons
at Abergavenny, September 25, 1838.

TO THE MEMORY OF MY FRIENDS

CHARLES ELIOT NORTON

AND

JOHN HAY

WHO, EACH IN HIS OWN WAY, INFLUENCED

AMERICAN LIFE IN HIS TIME,

BOTH OF THEM PERFECT AND REPRESENTATIVE TYPES

OF

THE AMERICAN GENTLEMAN



PREFACE

SINCE the outbreak of the war, and more especially since the conclusion of the armistice, I have been advised to republish my book, *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, which was first published in 1899 and has long since been out of print. It has been considered that that book throws some important light on the early conditions leading to the war, as well as on the momentous problems now before the world and approaching their final solution. The republication of that early work may also be justified, not only because it anticipates the foundation of a League of Nations, but because it looks to this consummation primarily through the intervention of the United States in the world's affairs, and, more especially, through the closer understanding and co-operation between the great English-speaking democracies. Furthermore, it may be maintained that some of the remarks on the foreign relations of the several European States and the position which the United States ought to take in the foreign affairs of the world, made at that time and under the conditions then prevailing, may be of some importance at the present juncture.

I should again¹ like to publish here two letters from personal friends whom I consider to have been at that time the most representative of the two broadly differing, if not opposed, conceptions of America's position in the foreign affairs of the world, John Hay and Charles Eliot Norton.

¹ Portions of these letters have already been republished in the Preface to the First American edition of my book *Aristodemocracy, etc.*

John Hay wrote from the Department of State, Washington, October 21st, 1899 (in the privately printed publication of the *Letters of John Hay*, 1908, p. 100, this letter is wrongly dated as 1897 instead of 1899):

DEAR WALDSTEIN,

Last night for the first time since your book (*The Expansion of Western Ideals*) arrived, I found a quiet hour to read it, and I must thank you most sincerely for a great pleasure. It is a charming treatise, handling a grave subject with an elevation and grace of style which make it as agreeable to read, as it is weighty and important in substance.

What can be the matter with poor dear S—, who set forth at C— the other day with this preposterous program:

1. Surrender to Aguinaldo.
2. Make the other tribes surrender to him.
3. Fight any nation he quarrels with.

I think our good friends are wiser when they abuse us for what we do, than when they try to say what ought to be done.

I wish you would lend some of your wisdom to certain of our German friends who seem to think that peace with England means war with Germany.

We are brutally busy nowadays and there seems to be no hope of any improvement till next summer....

Yours faithfully,

JOHN HAY.

Charles Eliot Norton wrote as follows (*Letters of Charles Eliot Norton*, 1913, II, p. 290):

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

November 18th, 1899.

DEAR WALDSTEIN,

I have read your little volume on the *Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace* with great interest.

As you are aware, your position and my own differ widely on the fundamental question which underlies your essays. But I read with genuine sympathy your very able statement of your own views. I do not think that you do quite justice to the opinions of the men who regard the present policy of America as a misfortune. It is not that

we would hold America back from playing her full part in the world's affairs, but that we believe that her part could be better accomplished by close adherence to those high principles which are ideally embodied in her institutions,—by the establishment of her own democracy in such wise as to make it a symbol of noble self-government, and by exercising the influence of a great, unarmed, and peaceful power on the affairs and the moral temper of the world. We believe that America had something better to offer to mankind than those aims she is now pursuing, and we mourn her desertion of ideals which were not selfish nor limited in their application, but which are of universal worth and validity.

She has lost her unique position as a potential leader in the progress of civilization, and has taken up her place simply as one of the grasping and selfish nations of the present day. We all know how far she has fallen short in the past of exhibiting in her conduct a fidelity to those ideals which she professed, but some of us, at least, had not lost the hope that she would ultimately succeed in becoming more faithful to them.

There are many points in your two papers, which, were you here, I should be glad to talk over with you. But it is hardly worth while to write of them. Your presentation of the Imperialistic position has this great value at least, that it shows that men who hold it are cherishing ideals which, if they can be fulfilled, will make the course on which America has entered less disastrous than we who do not hold them now fear....

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES ELIOT NORTON.

As will be seen in the preface (see below, pp. 43 seq.) it consists of two parts. The first (The English-Speaking Brotherhood), an address, was delivered at the Imperial Institute, London, July 7th, 1898, and is placed in this book ahead of the essay written in America in 1899. My immediate purpose in delivering this address was not only to impress the necessity for a closer understanding and co-operation between the United States and Great Britain, but, above all, to counteract what I considered then and

would still consider the disastrous effects of any proposal for an "Anglo-Saxon Alliance." For such a phrase and the ideas it conveyed I suggested as a substitute the title of my lecture, "The English-Speaking Brotherhood." I felt at the time that the term alliance would naturally and rightly evoke the opposition of representative statesmen in America; and, above all, I was convinced that the term "Anglo-Saxon" would arouse the strenuous and justified opposition of all Americans not of direct English origin. More directly still I then felt that it would, for instance, throw those citizens of the United States of German origin into the arms of the disaffected Irish element and thus establish a powerful centre of antagonism in the United States against any closer understanding between the English-speaking nations of the world. Moreover, the fundamental fallacy and the evil consequences of that conception of nationality, based upon race instead of on political, moral and social factors, were one of the main evils against which I had been contending before and have been fighting ever since, and to which the first and new essay in the present book is specially devoted. The warnings I then gave have since proved only too well-founded. If these were my immediate aims in delivering the Imperial Institute address and in publishing the book twenty years ago, my more remote aims were, in the first instance to urge upon the citizens of the United States, who had hitherto stood in the very forefront of democratic nations in the political education of the people as regards domestic politics, to supplement their political education by the study and the understanding of foreign politics, of their own relations to other civilised countries and their duties to the civilised world as a whole. I maintained—and I believe rightly—that in this respect they

were far below, even their own educational standards and I now venture to believe that this is so even in the present. I maintained, and I still maintain, that the people of the United States must take their place in the politics of the world and their share of the moral burden of carrying further afield into the darker regions the torch of civilisation, of liberty, and, above all, of justice. They are perhaps the one nation most fitted to counteract the evil influence of the older racial conception of nationality; and it is not a mere accident that, among so many statesmen of the democratic powers of the world, the President of the United States has been the foremost protagonist in the crusade against the older diplomacy with its heritage of internecine wars, and for the victory and secure establishment of the League of Nations, the only foundation for a lasting peace.

But, in the second instance, the ultimate aim of my efforts at that time and ever since has been, through the closer understanding and the co-operation of the two leading democratic nations of the world (who, moreover, are united by a common language, common laws, customs, ways of living and ideals of life, with so many traditions of the past in common), to obtain the adhesion of other democracies and that the League of Nations or, as I prefer to hope, the establishment of a Supernational Court backed by Power, will be carried to realisation.

Of course, the political conditions prevailing in Europe and in America at that time and the relations between the several Powers in 1898 and 1899 differed from what they subsequently were in the following years, especially after the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian autocracy with the fixed tradition and policy of its Foreign Office, which simply aimed at extension of power in every direction and could

use with perfect freedom all the nefarious ways of the older diplomacy, unhampered by democratic control and publicity, was in those days the chief disturber of the world's peace and stood in the way of all of the ideals for which I was then contending. But Germany had already begun its tortuous and all-pervading activities to secure world-power and, ultimately, world-domination. It did this then, of course, through the Triple Alliance, especially through Austria; but it did not hesitate at times to use and to co-operate with Russia (as in the case of the Turco-Greek War) in spite of the general clashing of interests between these two autocracies. More especially was Germany concerned with Russia at that time to prevent an understanding between the United States and Great Britain and the united front which would by such an understanding be called up against its aggressive militarism. The passage in John Hay's letter referring to this policy on the part of Germany is significant and is confirmed by the passages in my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals, etc.* (see below, pp. 62, 64, 65, 68, 71, 80).

With regard to the account given in these pages concerning the action of the Powers, especially Germany and Russia, there is one point which it may now be of interest to bring forward in view of subsequent events and especially the great war.

The far-seeing policy of the Wilhelmstrasse—most probably of the Kaiser himself who led it after the dismissal of Bismarck—identified the interests of Germany in the East with those of Austria, realising that sooner or later, if not by the ultimate absorption of Austria into the German Empire, then by a most effective political and commercial alliance between these two empires, their interests would be

identical. Now, in Austria's Eastern ambitions, the *Drang nach Osten* (the push towards the East), Salonika has ever been recognised as the most important point of transit and junction. It will readily be seen how—especially with the development of railways—the direct line of communication from Hamburg and Berlin through Austria to Salonika would be of supreme importance. Salonika, moreover, was again the point of junction from the North to the East and Constantinople, and from the West and South-west to the Adriatic and to the Piraeus. As a railway terminus, furthermore, with its splendid harbour, it was the vital point of communication by sea to all ports of Asia Minor and Egypt, in fact the whole of the East. We can therefore well understand why this harbour should not have been allowed to fall into the hands of the Greeks, who at that time, so far from showing any signs of subserviency to Austro-German interests, inclined more in their own interests and sympathies to Great Britain and the Western Powers. Of course, in subsequent years, with the concession for the construction of the Baghdad Railway to Germany, these interests and the consequent policy were more fully developed and defined.

Now, during the early stages of the Turco-Greek War in 1897 I was in constant, almost daily, communication—as a private friend—with the late King George of Greece. He was very emphatic and indignant at the brutal action of the Kaiser in opposing every attempt on the part of Greece either to save her face and to retire without loss of national interests or prestige from the Cretan imbroglio or, when war had been declared, successfully to carry it to a victorious issue. In those early days of the war King George, originally a sailor by profession, was most hopeful of the victorious activity of the Greek fleet, which, compared with that of

Turkey, was undoubtedly in a state of marked superiority. He even spoke to me of a plan, in the success of which he had great faith, of forcing the Dardanelles. Now, despite all the information he gave me in the many long conversations we had and which should have furnished ample opportunity for forming an opinion on the events of that war, there is one problem which has never been satisfactorily solved or explained: Why did the Greek fleet remain comparatively inactive when, by sailing into the harbour of Salonika and occupying that important strategic position, the communications of the Turkish army in Thessaly and Epirus could easily and effectively have been cut and the enemy been taken in flank and rear? The subsequent explanation that the Greek fleet was wanting in the necessary ammunition will not for a moment hold water. I may be justified in putting forth the hypothesis that, if not directly through the action of the Kaiser and the Austrian Foreign Office, then through the European Concert, which they well knew how to manipulate in their own interests, the Greek fleet was compelled to remain inactive.

As with Greece, so with Armenia. In 1887 it was probably Russian influence which neutralised the efforts of England, who with the support of Italy and the consent of Germany and Austria, was honestly striving to settle the Armenian question when the Venezuelan question intervened. In 1896 England had the strong support of America in preventing further Armenian massacres, when again the Venezuelan question opportunely arose and nearly led to war between England and America. The subsequent attitude of Germany as regards the Armenian question is clearly before us all. In the light of what has since happened we cannot be wrong in our surmise that many

of the essential objectives of German *Welt-politik* which led to the great war were already fully conceived in the minds of the Kaiser and his advisers towards the close of the last century. Sir Valentine Chirol, than whom there is no more competent student of German affairs, assures me that "he has it on the authority of one of Bismarck's most intimate confidants that one of the first serious differences between him and William II arose over the latter's visit to Constantinople the year after his accession and the far reaching schemes which he coupled with it." These schemes became more definitely formulated with his theatrical visit to Constantinople, Jerusalem and Damascus in 1898. Let us then hope that this whole system of aggression and grab is now a thing of the past, and that the establishment of a League of Nations with the active co-operation of the United States of America will put an end to all this antiquated spirit of conquest for purely selfish ends of national aggrandisement.

One of the greatest dangers to the peace of the world and an obstacle to the firm establishment of a League of Nations or a Supernational Court backed by Power, is to be found in the stereotyping of racial nationalities in envious rivalry and hatred as fully-developed neighbour-states, such as we are especially likely to have in the future in the South-east of Europe and in Asia Minor. With this question the first essay on Nationality and Hyphenism here deals. But beyond this danger there looms before us another broader corporate sub-division of civilised humanity which, as a logical consequence of the development of racial nationality, began to show itself in the first half of the 19th century and to present itself as a practical aim and ideal in the political life of Europe after the Congress of Vienna. Already in those early days Pan-Slavism and Pan-Hellenism

were fixed in the minds of thinkers and patriots as factors in practical politics. With the unification of Germany and the foundation of the German Empire, and its rapid growth in prosperity and power, Pan-Germanism naturally and logically arose before the eyes of ambitious German patriots, who, smarting in envious rivalry under the colonial expansion, the growth and world-supremacy of the British Empire, never rested until their aims and aspirations were fixed and formulated in the programme of the powerful Pan-German party, appealing to the racial Chauvinism of the whole people (even of those not members of such a party), and ultimately acting as the central force in producing the great war.

It is well for us to remember that signs were not wanting in the past that patriotic Englishmen and subjects of the British Empire in every one of its constituent parts were nurturing in their hearts, and endeavouring to formulate, the ideals of Anglo-Saxon supremacy for the whole world; and it was to a great extent to counteract the dangers arising out of such ambitious racial nationalism that, in 1899, I wrote the book which is here reprinted. Even during the war, when on the grounds of justice, humanity and liberty, we were all hoping for the entrance of the United States into the conflict, there were those in England who urged this just claim on the grounds of community of blood, descent and race. In a letter to *The Times* (August 28th, 1915) I felt moved to oppose such arguments and to point out the dangers which they implied at that early stage of the conflict. Even now I feel it right to strike a further note of warning. I was heartily gratified to find that my old friend, Major Putnam, in America and Mr J. Evelyn Wrench in England have given practical effect to

my own early hopes for an English-speaking Brotherhood in founding the English-speaking Union in America and in England. The choice of their designation emphatically shows that their Union is not based upon principles of racial nationality. So long as it clearly and solely implies, in the first place, the union of all free peoples who adhere to the English-speaking laws and traditions, moral, political and cultural, and, in the second place, as it is subordinated to the higher ultimate aim of a wider union and league of all free peoples, whatever their nationality and language, who stand for the peace of the world and the advancement of liberty and civilisation, there can be no danger to our true ideals in such a union—on the contrary it can but work for the good of humanity. But if it were to imply and to develop an antagonistic attitude towards all nations who do not use the English language, its influence would be wholly for the bad. In my book *Aristodemocracy, etc.* I emphasised the importance of an international language to facilitate and accelerate the union of all civilised peoples. In case no new language, such as Esperanto, was evolved and accepted, I advocated the adoption of Latin for reasons which seemed to me valid, highly advantageous, and not unpractical. Let us hope that the interests, rivalries and antagonisms among the civilised States may in the future never lead to a Latin Union to defend or to assert the common interests which for the time may marshal the Latin nations against the rest of the world.

There is, finally, another danger of the same order of spiritual and material interests against which it may not be untimely to raise a warning voice. During the Spanish-American War the then Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Count Goluchowski), for reasons which

must be patent to every student of politics, warned the European world against the prospective predominance of America, i.e. the United States, over Europe, and advocated a union of the European States to guard against such a danger. It may be a mere coincidence that another Austrian, of a very different, if not opposed, order of thought and political conviction, namely, the Pacifist, Dr Alfred H. Fried, in a recent article¹ advocates a *Zweckverband Europa* (European Interests Combine) as a set-off to the Pan-American Union. We may thus in the future be threatened with the contending forces of Pan-Americanism and Pan-Europeanism, and the clashing of these opposed world-interests will not be conducive to the peace of the world or the advancement of civilisation.

We must inevitably come to the conclusion, and declare our conviction, that no federation or confederation of States is justified and enduring, unless it is based upon moral principles of justice, liberty and progress for mankind and hence for every nation. We shall then find that on the essential grounds of material interests of practical and business advantage (as enumerated by Dr Fried and upon which I have also laid some stress)² these lasting moral principles of union are confirmed, are in fact urgently called for. We may go further and say that no corporate social grouping, even in business and in politics, can stand unless it can bear the ultimate test of moral principles and aims established by civilised society.

In fine I must admit, and it may be rightly urged, that

¹ *Problems of the International Settlement* (London, 1918) III—International co-operation as the foundation for an international administration of justice (pp. 14 seq.).

² *Aristodemocracy, etc.* pp. 153, 161.

all principles of social and political betterment to secure the peace of the world and the progress of civilisation which we can devise on political or on economic grounds, will not secure our great purpose unless we can change and mend the heart of man. Only then can peace be assured. We must first remove the all-pervading force of envy and jealousy, leading to hatred, and ending in strife. I have stated elsewhere¹ that few people can forgo the emotional luxury of hatred or at least of a 'pet aversion.' The passion of envy among individuals and nations cannot be totally eradicated; nor can the comparatively milder vice or weakness—kindred to envy and hatred—of vanity. I have endeavoured to show² how potent a factor was this national vanity in leading Germany into the war. Anyone daring to hope that he can totally eradicate these nefarious forces from the heart of individual man and the soul of nations would indeed be rash. But what we can do is, as far as possible, to remove the conditions favouring their growth and strengthen the forces arrayed against them. And we may hope, by insisting upon those universal and potent qualities of human nature which war against these evil instincts in man and beast—or rather in the beast in man—and by establishing and strengthening the conditions which make for the dominance of humanity and justice, to control and overcome, even extirpate, the powers of evil.

A few words more on the sub-divisions of this book:

(1) The lecture on *Nationality and Hyphenism* was given in the Arts School of the University of Cambridge on May 29th of this year. It was especially designed for our guests,

¹ *Aristodemocracy, etc.* p. 67; *Jewish Question, etc.* p. 12, 2nd ed.; *Patriotism, etc.* pp. 43 seq.

² *Aristodemocracy, etc.* p. 103; *Patriotism, etc.* pp. 36-41.

the American officers as well as the British Naval officers, who were for the time enrolled as students. With the exception of a few enlargements and references the lecture is here published as delivered.

(2, 3) The chief subject of this volume, in fact the actual reason for its publication, is the re-issue of my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*. I have referred above to the conditions under which it is here republished.

(4) The essay on *The Next War, Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism*, was published in the Autumn of 1918 before the signing of the Armistice. I wish to make it unequivocally clear that in writing and publishing it—especially in view of its second title—I in no way intended or desired to trench upon American party politics. I regarded President Wilson as the most prominent representative of those striving for the establishment of something in the nature of a League of Nations. I discerned at an early date that in Europe as well as in America there was definite opposition to this movement and it was this opposition that I desired to combat. I have expressed my opinion of President Wilson's attitude in the war in the preface to the second edition of *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, recently published.

As a matter of fact the question of a League of Nations cannot be made a party question either in Europe or America—at least not on the old lines of party demarcation as existing down to our day. It is important to remember that John Hay was chief of President Roosevelt's Cabinet at the time he wrote the letter here published and approved of the plan advocated in my book, while in many other ways he manifested the strongest sympathy with the plans for international organisation to secure peace. President

Taft, also at that time a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, has ever since been a single-minded and active supporter of some form of a League of Nations. The *Open Letter to Mr Roosevelt* which formed the preface to that essay, and is here reprinted, must now be read in the light of the letters which, before his death, that great American statesman addressed to the Hon. Oscar Strauss and to Major G. H. Putnam, in both of which his attitude towards a League of Nations was essentially modified from what the speech I refer to would have led the public to believe.

(5) Finally, the article on *A Supernational Jury and Police Force*, here reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century and After* of February, 1919, was one of three articles written in reply to Sir Herbert Stephen's article on *A League of Dreams* published in the previous month in that review. Sir Herbert Stephen replied to his critics in the March number of the same review.

I must again acknowledge the efficient help given me by my wife in the revision of both manuscript and proofs.

C. W.

NEWTON HALL, NEWTON,
CAMBRIDGE.

July 19, 1919.



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I

NATIONALITY AND HYPHENISM

A LECTURE DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE, MAY 29, 1919



I

NATIONALITY AND HYPHENISM¹

IN the Preface to my book *Aristodemocracy*², written at the beginning of the war, I made the following statement:

The war will, I venture to predict, prove to be the swan-song of the older conception of nationality; for it is the misconception of nationality which has in great part produced it. Ultimately a new conception of nationality and internationality will be ushered in, in which loyalty to the narrower relations will in no way prevent loyalty to the wider. It will be the Era of Patriotic Internationalism. Not so very many years ago, as human history goes, the Scotsman, for instance, could not have conceived it possible to have loyally upheld the interests of a great British Empire, even at the sacrifice of Scottish local or personal interests, as he is now prepared to do. The same, I believe, will be true as regards the wider international unit of the future in its relation to the nations of to-day.

Let me at once clear the way and remove all possible misunderstandings as to what I meant then and mean now by these terms:

By the older conception of Nationality, which I hope will now be modified and superseded, I do not mean loyalty and self-suppression to the State, to our country, our laws,

¹ A Lecture delivered in the Arts Schools of the University of Cambridge on May 29, 1919, and especially addressed to the United States Army Officers and the British Navy Officers at the time students of the University.

² *Aristodemocracy, From the Great War back to Moses, Christ and Plato*, London, John Murray, 1916 and 1918, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1916 and 1919.

Nationality and Hyphenism

institutions and customs, all of which give individual character and distinctiveness to the British people. Our action in attempting to modify the conception of this term in no way implies a weakening of our sense of duty as citizens, including also our duty to fight in the defence of our country ; and, if the religious convictions, which we held before the outbreak of war and which were admitted and recognised by the State, forbade us from taking life, it still includes our duty to serve our country and even to sacrifice our lives in saving the lives of our fighting fellow-citizens or in mitigating the sufferings of those who are fighting for the self-preservation of the nation. Our conception of nationality encourages the love of our country and its people —in one word, our Patriotism. More than this, I hope to show you how, with the removal of the old conception of the term Nationality, this Patriotism and all that it implies will be intensified and made more secure and lasting, because it will rest on a moral, and not on an accidental, groundwork. While it is thus conceived as favouring and encouraging patriotism, it actually means the disfavouring and the extinction of what is called *Chauvinism*, which the current misconception of Nationalism has, if not produced, at all events favoured in its rapid growth, destructive of all peace and good-will among men. Now, Patriotism means love of one's own country and its people; while *Chauvinism* means hatred of other countries and other people. Patriotism is a positive quality of the soul and arises out of love, generosity and admiration. Chauvinism is a negative quality and springs from hatred, envy and vanity.

The conception of Nationality, from which true patriotism emerges, is based upon rational, moral and intellectual grounds, which are not a matter of accident. It must

necessarily appeal to our intelligence, our spirituality, our sense of justice and charity, our unselfishness and devotion to a great idea, which we can and which, at all events, we ought to have in common. But Chauvinism rests upon that conception of nationality which is accidental, which bases corporateness and social groups on the accidents of birth, inherited sectarian differences in religion, class or locality, in each of which the citizens of even the smallest States differ individually from one another and are frequently, if not always, opposed to one another in their interests, tastes, and aspirations. So far from leading to cohesion, Chauvinism encourages disunion, and, when causes for dissension arouse wounded vanity, culminating in envy, passion supervenes leading to hatred and conflict among the citizens of each State.

Through the individual, such a false conception of Nationality has the same influence upon the international relations of the communities and States to one another. But let me here at once remove a further misunderstanding, the realisation of which is of the utmost importance. It concerns our conception of the term International, upon which I shall have more to say as we proceed.

In using the term international I in no way mean the Marxian conception of Internationalism, which aims at uniting all people in the world, not only against the State, as the upholder of the present order of civilised society, but also the so-called labouring classes within each State against the other classes, aiming at the final domination of that particular class, self-styled the *proletariat*. Furthermore, in this conception of class-warfare the scale of moral and intellectual values, on which our present ethics and our future ideals of progress are based, is denied and opposed. We

have quite recently had the tragic attempt at realising such ideals in the conception of internationalism in the unspeakably and grotesquely disastrous rule of the Russian Bolsheviks.

Nor does our conception of Internationality in any way coincide with that of those people for whom our late lamented friend, Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, invented the term *Gosmobolidan*—the type he met especially in some parts of the Near East, who professed no adhesion nor fealty to any State or country; who, neither in their principles nor in their occupations, recognised or lived up to any duties to the State in which they were born and of which they were nominally citizens; but who flippantly and with gross ignorance adopted and used the shibboleths of humanitarian internationality without understanding its true meaning and import and without realising that the schooling through which we reach or approach the higher ultimate ideals of humanity as a whole, runs through the humble teaching and discipline of unselfishness and sacrifice in the performance of the duties that lie immediately before us in the family, the community in which we live, and the country of which we are citizens.

Our conceptions of Internationality and of Nationality have nothing to do with such people.

Let me at once anticipate and say to you in simple words that, at least as regards the civilised and democratic states of the West, to which practically all of us here belong, Nationality means the corporate unity of the free citizens of a State, whether single and self-contained, or united into a wider whole as a confederation, a federation or an empire, on the grounds of political, legal, social, moral and intellectual unity of the people of such States and their common ideals.

Internationality for us thus means the relationship, tending towards closer union and organisation, of these several States as units, while retaining their complete independence and "sovereignty," on the ground of the positive moral agreement between them all, however different the separate manifestations in the character of each one may be. These physical and moral properties, towards which they all strive, are moreover directly furthered in their common interest for the good of humanity as a whole.

But I am sorry to say that many people, and even many serious and thoughtful writers on political and social problems, do not agree with such definitions of nationality and internationality as I have here suggested. On the contrary, we shall see that the term Nationality has been, and is, used with very different meanings. You will find, the more you study the voluminous literature of writers on this subject, not only that they differ among each other, but also that the several significations in which they have each applied and still apply this term, have been used for them to uphold the most varied opinions on important matters of State in practical politics and in diplomacy, even at one and the same time to justify one course or its direct opposite, and finally you will realise that the term is so fluctuating, composed of so many discordant elements in meaning and in fact, that it becomes useless to the serious searcher after truth and that we almost feel inclined to expunge it from our modern vocabulary¹.

Before giving you a glimpse into the tortuous web and labyrinth of this term and the history of its influence in modern politics (and I cannot give more than a glimpse in

¹ Cf. in support of this contention, Johannet, *Le Principe des Nationalités*, pp. xxi and xxxi seq.

this single lecture) I wish, however, to clear away one definite view which to my mind has been, and is, misleading. It is the conception that Nationality in no way depends for its meaning upon the idea of the State, that it is not a truly political conception. This view is upheld by many serious and distinguished writers. Quite recently it formed an essential part in the reasoning of an ingenious and scholarly writer, Mr Alfred E. Zimmern, in his book *Nationality and Government*. Now I maintain that the connotation of the term Nationality, including all its denotations, in whatever sense we may apply it to peoples, groups of people, or individuals, must always imply some relation to a State, to whatever rudimentary or embryonic form the political bodies of the remote past may have attained. The conception of a State may, it is true, only have existed in the past, nay in the remote past, or in the future, as an ultimate aim or ideal; but the tangible corporate cohesion of the groups of people claiming nationality must look backward or forward to such a social or political organisation which is called a State¹.

It will perhaps also assist in the clearer understanding of this treatment of the problem before us if I again anticipate, what will receive fuller exposition as we proceed,

¹ As to the very complicated question concerning the position of the Jews in their dispersion through all civilised States of the East and West, I must refer the reader to my book *The Jewish Question and the Mission of the Jews*, published many years ago, and to my recent article on "Is a Jewish State desirable?" in the *Menorah Journal*, New York, Feb. 1919. That a common racial origin, including even a common and distinctive language, is not enough to produce a nation becomes quite clear when we consider the case of the gypsies. Though they possess both a language of their own and a comparatively pure and exclusive racial origin, I doubt whether anybody would apply to them collectively the term *Nation*.

and at once insist upon the difference between our use of the term "Nationality" in the Western democratic States and the term "racial or historical origin." When, while travelling in foreign countries, any citizen of one of these States is asked to register his name by the administrative or police authorities and to reply to the question concerning his nationality, no citizen of the British Empire, of the United States of America, of France, Italy, and even of Germany (in spite of what will shortly be said below concerning the distinctive meaning given in German to Nation and People), would think of recording his racial or historical origin in lieu of the citizenship of the country or State of which he is a citizen. Race, religion, or historical origin will never constitute in the minds of these people their nationality. Whatever race or country the immediate or remote ancestors of any citizen of the United States may have sprung from, and even if, as a naturalised citizen, he himself may have been born in a foreign country, not only would he never hesitate thus correctly to declare his American nationality; but, if he did give the country or race from which his family or he had sprung in lieu of his adopted one, his statement would be incorrect, misleading—in fact a direct untruth. The same would apply to any Englishman of Huguenot, or more recent French, Flemish, Dutch, and even German origin, as also to those Germans of French, or Frenchmen of German, origin. As regards the ordinary usage of language and the unequivocal ideas which they convey, Mr A. E. Zimmern and those who agree with him are decidedly mistaken in fact if they give any other definition to nationality and use it in lieu of origin or ancestry, racial or historical. In the same way Mr Zimmern cannot be right in endeavouring to convey the true meaning of "international" and "internationality" by

reminding the English reader of the use of that term when speaking of an International football-player. In such a case the term is used in a quasi-figurative sense in order to indicate the widest corporate body in contradistinction to the narrower local bodies (village, town or county clubs as opposed to English, Scotch, Welsh or Irish clubs). The more the different Nations (and I can find no other word to indicate the French, German, Belgian, American, etc. units) organise and develop football teams to play regularly against ours, the sooner will the term "international" in this sporting connection be restored to its correct meaning and will no longer incorrectly be applied to these minor sub-divisions within the United Kingdom or the British Empire. Surely he must admit that in common parlance and in common sense the term International in the English language and in all European languages, in contradistinction to National, indicates, as do the terms international and municipal law, the relationship between the inhabitants of the several States of the modern world. Nevertheless, even the various authors who have made the most accurate and searching study of the problem of Nationality, will confuse the different meanings of the term, with the result that some of their conclusions and inferences are materially affected by such vacillation of meaning with far-reaching consequences to momentous conclusions in matters of State, as well as national and international life. Even Lord Acton, in that very suggestive and illuminating study on Nationality¹, appears to me not always to bear this essential distinction clearly in mind. Thus he condemns "the theory of nationality" as "a retrograde step in history" (p. 298); and again when he says:

¹ *The History of Freedom and Other Essays*, pp. 270-300.

But nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this.... Although, therefore, the theory of nationality is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of socialism, it has an important mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and therefore the end, of two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom—the absolute monarchy and the revolution (pp. 299–300).

In these statements he seems clearly to realise the proper meaning of nationality in modern life. But in other passages, especially when he appears to plead for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he seems to me to have in mind the racial or German conception of nationality, which he himself elsewhere considers to be the outcome of merely accidental and physical causes instead of the reasonable and moral idea of nationality as an elective principle leading to liberty and to political progress.

I must further anticipate here and ask the reader to cast out of his mind and ignore for the moment the problem of the oppressed nationalities of the East. He will then come to the conclusion that nationalities in the case of democracies, and especially the Western nationalities as represented by the present Allies (Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy), each of whom have one national language, a solidarity in their laws, customs and morals, are essentially different in their conception of nationality from the Balkan States, Turkey, and the Austrian and Russian Empires. In these Western democracies the elective, and not the physical,

principle of nationality must predominate, however much as a matter of historical continuity, piety and sentiment, other elements, the outcome of race, country, common historical past, may intensify and give an organic life—a tangible soul—to the unity of moral conditions in a true nation. But all corporate activities arising out of social and business organisations, including also religious congregations, must be given full freedom, provided always they conform to the constitution and laws of the country and do not contravene their form and spirit. Such smaller bodies and groupings within the State, and the members belonging to them, must never be subject to repression or persecution. Now, though the conditions of Eastern Europe have for the time enforced upon the Western Allies, in redeeming their pledges to secure freedom and autonomy for the suppressed nations, the Eastern conception of nationality in dealing with them, and though they are thus bound to consider as essential conditions to such freedom and autonomy, racial, geographical (regional), as well as religious principles of nationality, they must, when once the arduous, almost impossible, task of defining and fixing these newly-constituted and free States on a just basis has been fulfilled, return to our conception of elective nationality. We may even hope for these newly-formed States that, when once their own freedom is established and they are secure from repression or persecution on the grounds of their racial origin or religious professions, the narrower conception of nationality which has prevailed among them, and has produced violent antagonism and hatred between them, will die away and be abandoned and make way for the full establishment of our own conception of nationality with the consequent political and social attitude of mind towards all the inhabitants within

their newly-formed State and even towards the citizens of the neighbouring States and of the wider world.

Now, when we endeavour to fix the definition of the words Nation and Nationality, as well as the ideas they convey to us, it is of little or of no use to consider their etymology¹ from the Latin *Natio*, or birth, in which the common descent would no doubt be an essential element in the composition of the term. But even in Latin, in the use made of it by Cicero², it sometimes does convey the larger grouping of people independently of birth. Nor will it help us much, for the purpose we are pursuing, to study the historical development of the terms Nation and Nationality and the political ideas they conveyed in the history of bygone ages. For such studies I may refer you to the very interesting account given by Johannet of the development of the principle of Nationality in France and elsewhere in the Second Book of his interesting and comprehensive work *Le Principe des Nationalités*³. In a smaller compass and from a narrower point of view you will find an interesting discussion of these historical problems in Lord Acton's essay on that subject, published first in 1862 and since incorporated in his more recent work on *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* published in 1909. I may also single out the thoughtful and suggestive discourse of Renan "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" published in his *Discours et Conférences* in 1887.

It is important and instructive for us to realise that in

¹ We might as well use the etymology of State from *Status* (manner of standing, attitude, position, etc.) to define the modern conception of the political body called State.

² *Mur.* 69.

³ I would also refer the reader to the exhaustive literature, especially of French writers, on the whole subject of Nationality to be found in that work.

modern times the meaning of the term Nation, as distinguished from that of People or Peoples, differs in Germany and in Eastern Europe from its use in England and the West. Bluntschli in his *Staats-Recht* and in his *Staats-Wörterbuch*¹, referring in general to the fluctuating meaning of these terms everywhere, draws attention to the difference between the use in France and England of the word *Nation*, where in Germany the expression *Volk* (People) would be applied; while *Peuples* and People would be used by us where the Germans would speak of *Nation*. The Germans would thus consider Nation a natural product or one indicative of the general *Kultur* of the people, while the *Volk* (People) would have a political signification. However, I could cite many instances from writers in Germany and Eastern Europe, as well as in England and in France, where these terms are used indifferently with the one or the other meaning. In France the current definition would be that of *Littré* in which "the principle of nationality is the principle according to which the parts of the human races tend to constitute themselves into a single political body"; while the dictionary of the French Academy, with equal brevity and clearness, defines the nation as "the totality of persons born or naturalised in one land and living under the same Government." But a more specific meaning in various directions has been given to the term from the second half of the eighteenth century to our own days, directly influenced by the peculiar history of those times. We cannot here dwell upon the interesting light thrown upon these ideas by the theories of Rousseau, Burke, the leaders of the French Revolution, by the writings of Mme de Staël, by the political aims and pronouncements of Napoleon, by the predominant

¹ Vol. VII. pp. 152 seq.

activity of Metternich in the Congress of Vienna, and by the traditional attitude (rightly traditional ever since those days) of England, represented chiefly by Canning and his successors.

It must suffice for our purpose to point to the fact that the idea of Nationality as a determining political factor in modern times dates from the dismemberment of Poland¹, as well as the partial dismemberment of Italy², when, especially through Mazzini, it received its most definite formulation and has since become a powerful factor in the formation of States internally and externally, with which diplomacy has juggled ever since, and with which it is even juggling at this moment to the detriment of peace and prosperity throughout every country of Europe.

In a characteristic passage, in which Mazzini develops his *Giovine Italia* into a *Giovine Europa* (thereby already in 1847 recommending the foundation of an International League of Nations), he said "The people is penetrated with only one idea, that of unity and nationality.... There is no international question as to forms of government, but only a national question." But it will readily be seen (and is most instructive for us during the present critical period of the world's history), and we must realise at the same time to what such an exaggeration of the national principle inevitably leads, when we find that even in those early days after the Congress of Vienna we first hear of *Pan-Slavism* and *Pan-Hellenism*, the natural and logical sequel to every form of national imperialism. It is also essential to the right

¹ According to Stubbs (*Med. and Mod. History*, p. 236) "the partition of Poland was the event that forced the idea of nationality upon the world." See also Acton, *o.c.* p. 275.

² See Actor, pp. 284 seq.

understanding of our subject that we should realise—and we may almost lay this down as an axiom—that “Nationality,” as it was then, became dominant (and has been dominant with the specific nationalists ever since), only arises in this aggressive form, as it did with the Poles and in Italy, when any political body or State possessed of independence and sovereignty is dismembered and its freedom-loving citizens are driven into exile, or when one social group, distinct by origin, customs and traditions, within a given State is oppressed and persecuted. It is such dismemberment or persecution which produces the aggressive form of nationalism.

What exactly were, and are, the component elements in this complex idea of nationality? They are numerous, confusing, and often conflicting¹. The elements which are thus supposed to unite people into a definite corporate body, possessing a nationality of their own, are: first, a common race or origin; second, a common country; third, a common language; and, fourth, a common religion; to which have also been added a common dynasty, even the possession of great men in common (concerning the uniting power of which Bagehot has written an interesting essay in his *Physics and Politics*); common laws and customs—nay, generally a common expression of higher civilisation.

¹ Bagehot (*Physics and Politics*, p. 20) well expresses the apparent simplicity and actual complexity of the term Nation when he says: “Again, the primitive man could not have imagined what we mean by a nation. We, on the other hand, cannot imagine those to whom it is a difficulty; we know what it is when you do not ask us; but we cannot very clearly explain or define it. But so much as this is plain, a nation means a *like* body of men, because of that likeness capable of acting together, and because of that likeness inclined to obey similar rules; and even this Homer’s *Cyclops*—used only to sparse human beings—could not have conceived.”

Now it has been shown, with regard to most of these essential points, by many writers (notably by Johannet) that not one of the great civilised States of Europe (not to speak of America) possesses all these essential characteristics in the creation of any national unity among its citizens. Germany, in which the racial conception of the Nation, both in the theoretical as well as in the practical principles of the State and of the empire, is predominant, is a singularly composite body within its constituent States as regards racial origin, quite apart from the convulsive changes of history from the Middle Ages onwards. The racial difference between the North Germans, especially the Prussians, and the South Germans is not only marked but has led to bloody warfare.

It may be enlightening if I tell you that, when as a boy I passed through Germany on my first visit to that country in 1867, immediately after the Prusso-Austrian War, I can still vividly recall the intense hatred of people in Hanover, Frankfort and Munich against the Prussians and their German allies—a hatred perhaps as intense as that now felt by the Germans against each one of their allied enemies. That antagonism lasted for many years and the hatred of those days may not be wholly spent at the present time.

But even the Prussians, who are distinctly un-Germanic, are a mixture of Borussi, of Poles, of Teutons, of Celts, of Serbs, and of Obotrites. At one time in the army of Frederick the Great there were 20,000 Frenchmen, most of whom eventually settled in Prussia and are now good Germans. I cannot refrain in this connection from pointing out the fact, which ironically speaks volumes in regard to the political capital which is made out of the unity of national descent, that, among many other men of great distinction in Prussian

and German history who were and are of French descent, the Prussian Minister of War less than twenty years ago was named Verdy Duvernois, at the time when the Minister of War in France was Zurlinden; while in the first great push towards Amiens in the Spring of 1918 the most prominent figure among the German generals was von Hutier (of quite recently French origin), at the time when the Chief-of-Staff of Marshal Foch was General Weygand. Remember too that some of Napoleon's most prominent and successful generals (Marshals Ney, Kleber, etc.) were Alsatians of German race. It may also be as well to point out at this juncture that among the political founders of the United States of America were some of German name and origin, while, in the reports we received here of the glorious advance of the American Army about Château Thierry, one regiment which especially distinguished itself consisted of forty-two per cent. of Americans of immediate German origin and name.

As to unity of race, the same applies to Italy with its stupendous racial mixtures, to England with its aborigines, Britons, Picts and Scots, Celts and Saxons, Danes and Normans, and its accretion of Huguenots, Flemings and Dutch; while in France, Proudhon distinguishes twelve "nationalities." No, the question of racial unity as the basis of nationality is a mere figment.

Next we come to Country, which has played, and always will play, such an important part.

The stirring verses of Sir Walter Scott's appeal to all who love their home and the political and social atmosphere in which we live from childhood upwards; but the land, the country itself, is the tangible centre of all these associations:

Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,

This is my own, my native land !
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned,
As home his footsteps he hath turned
From wandering on a foreign strand !
If such there be, go, mark him well;
For him no Minstrel raptures swell;
High though his titles, proud his name,
Boundless his wealth as wish can claim;
Despite those titles, power and pelf,
The wretch, concentrated all in self,
Living, shall forfeit fair renown,
And doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonoured and unsung.

There can be no doubt that the country, especially the country of our youth, of our school-days—provided always that the experiences of our youth may not have been unhappy within such surroundings—go far and deep down to establish the sense of nationality and the passion of patriotism within us. But even a common country is not exclusively essential to the establishment of nationality. If other proof were required, the experience of this great war has shown that the inhabitants of the most diverse countries, remote from one another, have not lost their sense of true and passionate nationality and patriotism as regards the British Empire in whatever country they may have been born. To what lengths of separatism, leading to the disruption of practically all the existing modern States and nations, the consideration of our actual country as the essential basis for nationality may lead us, is brought home by the advocacy of M. Flach¹ of what he called “Regional” nationality during the Third Congress of Nationalities at Lausanne in June,

¹ Quoted by Johannet, *o.c.* pp. xxi–xxii.

1916. He claimed "Regional Nationality" in France for Bretons, Corsicans, French-Flemings, Basques, Provençaux, and the inhabitants of Savoy and of Montbéliard. The citizens of other great countries in Europe and of America must all know the readiness with which geographical subdivisions (North, South, East and West, as well as the Middle District) are established, if not as separate countries, at all events as à basis for asserting a quasi-national separateness within the nation and State as a whole. In England the "county" feeling might in this respect in some instances almost be considered of the same strength and intensity as are those feelings based upon the difference of nationality. Everyone familiar with village life will probably be able to record instances in which the inhabitants of one village consider those of a neighbouring village as "foreigners" and treat the new-comer who settles among them as such, even though they themselves may not have dwelt there more than one generation. These incidents, which often have serious consequences in the social and political life of a community, show to what absurd conclusions we are logically driven when the actual land is made the essential condition of nationality.

The next essential constituent element in Nationality is a common language. I have always felt the strength of its claim. In fact I felt it so strongly over twenty years ago that, when during the Spanish-American War I delivered, and subsequently published, an address on the English-speaking Brotherhood at the Imperial Institute in London, with a view to uniting more closely the two great peoples of Great Britain and the United States, I gave to this address the title "The English-Speaking Brotherhood" in order especially to counteract the dangerous effects produced by

those who spoke of an Anglo-Saxon Alliance and thereby laid stress upon the racial elements as a uniting power. I pointed out then that one of the immediate effects of encouraging a *rapprochement* or union of those of Anglo-Saxon descent would inevitably lead to a fatal and severing movement in the United States. I maintained that it would tend to throw all those citizens of the United States who were not immediately of Anglo-Saxon race or origin into direct opposition to a closer union between the two great nations. More definitely still it would result in throwing those of German descent, by opposition to such racial English pretensions, into the arms of the disaffected Irish element. My words have proved prophetic. I am also happy to find that at the present day my friend, the veteran Major Putnam in America, and Mr J. Evelyn Wrench in England, have accepted my suggestion of over twenty years ago, and have founded in both countries the English-Speaking Union on the solid ground of this linguistic union of our common civilisation. The result of such an association can only be good. But I may be allowed to give a timely warning in the direction of moderation as regards our final objects, against allowing such a movement to create and to diffuse widely the aims of what might be called Pan-Anglicanism, corresponding to the nefarious and destructive influence of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism in the immediate past. There can be no doubt that, in as much as language is the chief vehicle of thought, it carries with it, for social and political groupings of men, the spiritual characteristics, aims and ideals, of laws, morals, customs and aspirations which are truly and effectively uniting elements in human society. Nevertheless, language is not an essential and exclusive factor in the composition of modern nationality; for, in countries like Switzer-

land, Belgium and Canada, which socially, as well as politically, present us with united and distinctive nationalities, we have elements and groupings speaking at least two different languages.

Nor does a common religion form the essential factor in the production of nationality, to whatever internecine wars in the past sectarian differences may have led. None of the great Nations, States and Empires of the civilised world is made up of the adherents of only one religious faith. The variety of thought and the development of toleration in men's hearts, springing from the diversity in sectarian beliefs, can only lead to the advancement of intellectual and moral aspirations and to the ultimate furtherance of religious sentiment in the aggregate.

The same applies *a fortiori* to the other elements I have adduced as being supposed to be essential to the conception of Nationality. As regards these elements: all modern civilised States are composite and, as Lord Acton has pointed out, it is good that they should be so—the fusion of races and tradition gives vitality and growth to every nation.

True unity in nationality is to be found in the political unity of each State and Empire, and this political unity is based upon the maintenance of the political constitution of each free country, its laws, its customs. The natural factor, such as racial origin; a common country; the historical evolution of a country, a society, a State; the common past which it creates; the language which has been evolved—all these may be, and generally are, contributory to this great moral union. They support and intensify this union *so long as they do not each assert themselves with exclusiveness, leading to the persecution of minorities.*

Each nation has risen out of, has begun its corporate existence with, its physical conditions: its aboriginal ethnical basis and the subsequent ethnical struggles and changes; the soil and climate; the configuration of that soil,—plain or mountain, river-beds or sea-shore; primitive occupations determined by climate and soil, whether nomadic or agricultural, hunting or sea-faring; comparative wealth or poverty of the inhabitants; language and rudimentary forms of religion evolved—all these are no doubt basic factors in the differentiation of nationalities. But there are many other co-efficients, contributory to the physical and social factors which have gone to the making of every nationality, to be found in the civilised world of the West. These may not be so manifest as are the broadly physical elements, but they have been none the less efficient in the making of every Western civilised nation. To indicate but a few of these, we must begin with the influence of the Roman Empire before, and even after, its decline, when it spread its civilisation throughout the whole of Western Europe. Then followed the varied tangle of ethnical, social and political influences during the migration of the peoples, to be followed again by the introduction and diffusion of Christianity, of what might broadly be called Hebraism, as contained, above all, in the spirit and ethics of the Old and New Testaments and their teaching; and this is succeeded by the Italian Renaissance, the reformation and the spread of humanism—the spirit continuously carried into the actual life of Western nations since the Italian Renaissance through the humanists down to our own days. Thus the Hellenic spirit, indirectly diffused in an attenuated form through the Roman Empire, was in later days fused with the spirit of Hebraism and both together produced the main current of our civilisation. We

may then single out the French Revolution and what it meant for the political life of all Western nations. To these formative forces must be added; not only discoveries and inventions which thinkers and men of action gave to the world, modifying the mental horizon as well as the daily life of every class of dwellers in Western lands, as it shifted the relations between these classes themselves; nor must we pass over the great law-givers, from Hammurabi and Moses, Solon and Lycurgus, the philosophers and moralists of ancient Greece and Rome, those among the Schoolmen, like St Thomas Aquinas, down to Rousseau and the political teachers of modern times, their teaching made directly effective in the framing of constitutions such as that of the United States of America; the national heroes, of action and of thought, the poets and artists who stamp the mentality of each age and of each nation and act as models and beacon lights to the peoples who worship their example and their memory; and, finally, the intensely efficient influence of national occupations, of industry and commerce, of wealth or poverty, which affect the personality of the wealthy leader or the humble toiler. Every nation and, through its national, political and social life, all citizens have been subjected to these influences which become transformed and varied according to the social and political soil in which they grow.

Now, *all* these currents of influence are fused into unity. To attempt to dissolve this unity into its component parts and to isolate one element or one group of influences destroys the very essence of nationality as a factor in practical politics. Almost every chemical body in practical chemistry is composed of several elements. To dissolve any one of them into its components and to isolate these destroys the chemical

body itself. Still more is this the case with organic bodies, with organisms, and with things of the mind and spirit. However complex a nation may be, it is the unity of its component elements which makes it a nation—the unity which produces, what Renan has called, *L'âme d'une nation*.

This soul of the nation gives distinctive individuality to each one of the several States and nations in the civilised modern world. There can be no doubt of this marked distinctiveness in the *truly* national character of the various States and countries of the Western world, though they may each be made up of several distinct races, and even when two States or countries in the main spring from the same racial and historical stock. I need hardly remind this audience consisting of British subjects and citizens of the United States that, whatever intimate relationship and harmony there be between our fundamental moral, legal and political principles and habits of mind, we each have our own individuality, even in the pronunciation and use of our identical mother tongue; and no neutral observer with discrimination would fail to detect our separate nationalities. Merely cross the Channel or the North Sea from England, whether to France, Belgium or Holland, to Italy or to Spain, to Germany or to Austria, not to mention the States of the East of Europe, and, with the first step you take on foreign shores, you will find that in looks, in dress and in the manners of these several peoples—quite apart from the difference of language—the cut of their clothes and caps and boots, their gestures and mode of accost—they differ not only from similar types in England, but amongst each other. Look at the distinctive physiognomy, of Paris and Berlin, even of Brussels and The Hague—though racially and historically the inhabitants may in great part have been related, sprung

from similar races and influenced by the same historical movements—and you will be forced to recognise the striking differences between contiguous, and in some respects cognate, nationalities. I need not elaborate this point. Whoever has travelled abroad will be convinced of the radical national differences firmly established between the several States.

Now, we must tolerate such differences, we must even appreciate and, in many respects, admire them; but we must not encourage them to such a degree that difference creates antagonism.

I have elsewhere¹ quoted in illustration of such childish, and far from uncommon, provinciality and intolerance, the story of the British sailor who wreaked serious physical violence upon a Spaniard because he "could not stand a man who called a hat a sombrero," as well as the—let us hope—more exceptional instance of crass provincialism on the part of a member of a more highly cultured class of Englishman who ended his unfavourable criticism of Americans with the exclamation, "What are you to do with people who call a biscuit a cracker?" Lowell has long since remonstrated against such provincial intolerance and ignorance in his essay on *A Certain Condescension in Foreigners*, when he argued, and successfully showed, that a first-rate American is not a second-rate Englishman. On the other hand, it is well for Americans to remember that the English "accent" of educated Englishmen is likely to be expressive of the natural evolution of the English language and that there is some hope for salvation in a country in which the "check system" in railways, the profusion of bath-rooms and the improvement of elevators have not all

¹ *Patriotism, etc.* pp. 53 and 54.

kept pace with the higher standards of the United States. Though I should personally greet—especially on a day like this—the presence of soda-water-fountains in every part of London, as well as in our provincial towns, their absence is not a mark of moral or intellectual inferiority. There is a more serious and more far-reaching side to the unsympathetic dwelling upon such differences of national customs and institutions and of the want of self-detachment in those who make them the basis of national dislike or antagonism. I found, for instance, the other day that an American private soldier among us, a man of university education, was in a state of great excitement and resentment because, at a railway booking-office, he was not allowed to purchase a first-class ticket and was informed that, as a private, he was debarred from travelling in such a carriage. It is not impossible that this man may no longer be a friend of this country and may, on the contrary, develop an antagonism against a people to whom he would deny the title of a democratic nation. It would be well for him to remember that those in America who can afford it, can take seats in a Pullman car or even secure a private State-room. If, moreover, he would consider that, rightly or wrongly, it is held by the military authorities that it may endanger discipline, which is essential to military efficiency, for a private to be cooped-up with his officer on a long journey, he may find that there is some reason for such an enactment. Whether he agrees with its necessity or desirability or not, he must admit that there is something to be said for it and must merely regard it as a difference of national custom to be considered with tolerance.

With all tolerance towards other nationalities let us however never forget that our own nationality, which gives coherence and solidarity, independence and security to the

State of which we are citizens, should be one and undivided; that by word and by deed and by our whole lives we should confirm and strengthen this unity of the political and moral corporateness of our own State. This is a primary and essential need and duty in time of peace and, especially so, in time of war. We cannot serve two masters, particularly when there is the possibility of a conflict between them, and, still less so, when they are actually at war.

It is here at this point that the false conception of nationality, against which I have hitherto been arguing, is fraught with the gravest consequences. With the racial conception, nationality readily merges into Hyphenism. Let us ignore, for the moment, autocracies (now happily, let us hope, of the past), in which those citizens belonging to races or religions differing from the majority of the inhabitants, or, at all events, from the ruling powers of such States, were suppressed and persecuted and were therefore driven into the assertion of their separate race or origin. But let us turn to the democratic States of the West, notably to the British Empire and the United States of America. In these States of which we here are citizens, we must confirm, and insist with all our power upon, our conception of nationality, in which racial differences and differences of origin and religion form no integral element. In this sense the citizen of the United States, as well as of Great Britain (not to mention France, Italy and our other Allies), must strictly profess and adhere to his American or British nationality and nothing else. This does not in any way imply that any self-respecting man should deny his origin, as little as he would deny his own father and grandfather. In many cases he may cherish, and rightly cherish, the sense of pride as regards his origin: But, in referring to his past and especially in his business and

social intercourse and, still more especially, in his political activities, he must refer to them as his *origin* or *descent* and in no way as his "nationality." In the so-called "Delbrueck laws," enacted in Germany not long before the war, it was decided that the German emigrant who settled in foreign countries and there became naturalised as a citizen, might retain his German nationality simultaneously with that of the country of his adoption. The reason supporting such a decision was one of "economic interest." This war has opened our eyes to the true motives and the political interests which might be involved in such "economic interests."

The sense of piety and regard for our forbears and their traditions may well be a beneficent element. It can coexist with our immediate and wider duties and may thus be morally educative. But it is here that I emphatically differ from Mr Zimmern¹, who first maintains that "no task is more urgent among the backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality, of the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character." I agree with him in this, and not only for backward peoples. But, when his conception of nationality is the older one, against which I have been arguing, and when he advises that these national traditions of *origin* should be fostered and developed in those who have become citizens of a new State possessing its own national traditions and corporate life, presumably higher than those of the emigrant's country of origin, I emphatically disagree with him. No doubt we have before us a sad specimen of humanity in the case of the expatriated Russian or Polish-Jew, the Slovak, the Neapolitan member of a Maffia, who enters the United States, drops all the traditions of his native country and, without

¹ *Nationality and Government*, pp. 54-55.

having assimilated any of the moral, social and political traditions of his new home, becomes an unmoral vagabond who, like Sir Mark Sykes's *Gosmobolidan*, enunciates advanced shibboleths, the meaning of which he has not half realised. This only means that any social traditions are better than none at all. On the other hand, we would ask the question:

How can these new settlers and aspiring citizens ever become truly possessed of the distinctive culture, manners, customs, political consciousness and loyalty of their new home unless they start life anew and open out their souls, free from prejudices and preconceptions of another world, to the new light that is to shine upon them, to penetrate their very being and illumine their lives?

This does not only apply to the child at school, but also to the adult immigrant, who must speedily and continuously be taught, or teach himself, the language, the thought, the outlook upon life and, above all, the political aims and ideals of the country of which he is to become a loyal citizen. He will surely not be without ideals if this effort is truly made—ideals, moreover, which presumably are higher than those of the land from which he came. One of the greatest blessings of the future, the outcome of this very war and of the new Peace Treaty—whatever its individual deficiencies—will, let us hope, be, that the world will no longer tolerate the persecution of racial or religious minorities within any country. If that is so, there need no longer be the mass-exodus of suppressed nationalities. All the more, therefore, in the future will the emigrant settler in a new free country be one who will claim naturalisation from free choice because he believes the conditions of life in his new country to be superior to those in his old home. All the more urgent, there-

fore, will be his duty to assimilate into his whole being the language, laws and customs—all that goes to the making of true nationality—in the country of his adoption. These laws, customs and ideals of the United States and Great Britain are beacon-lights of sufficient educative force to fill the whole social intelligence and energy of every child and every adult citizen. They must not be diluted or polluted by any other alien elements that may conflict, and actually have conflicted, with our national ideals. If the emigrant to the United States or Great Britain is hospitably received in those countries, he must make up his mind whether he wishes to remain a transient visitor or whether he wishes to become fully identified with his new home as a loyal citizen of a free country, where no persecution of minorities exists. He must then become naturalised as a citizen of such a country—if the country considers him worthy of such naturalisation. If he prefers, or values more highly, the political constitution, the laws, customs, and ideals of his mother country he should return there. But the moment he becomes naturalised he must identify himself in every respect with the political constitution, with the laws, customs and ideals of his elective nationality. His own aim and that of his children must be as soon as possible to step out of the circle of a distinctive foreign nationality, he must make every effort to acquire completely the language of his new home, acquaintance with its history and laws and customs, and full identification with its national aims. It is therefore a misfortune, to be strenuously avoided or mitigated, that the several foreign accretions within a country should, by collective occupation of one district in the country, or one quarter in a metropolis, confirm and perpetuate their racial or religious difference of foreign origin and thus counteract

full assimilation with the true national life of the country of which they are citizens. It would be the greatest political misfortune for the United States if the votes were grouped by the descent of its citizens. The encouragement of such separateness among the inhabitants of any country produces, not a new nationality, but what we have learnt to call Hyphenism. Hyphenism is the negation of true nationality and must be discouraged by individual citizens as well as by the State itself. It is important for Englishmen to realise that, before America entered the war, every American who urged her entrance into the war for the noble cause of the Entente Powers purely on the grounds of his English descent, was as much a Hyphenate as was the American of German origin who sided with the Central Powers because of his origin. President Wilson is of English origin, the late Mr Roosevelt was of Dutch (perhaps Teuton) origin. They would have been guilty of Hyphenism if their attitude as regards this war had been decided by their historical descent. In such a crisis as that of this great war there necessarily may arise difficult problems in the regulation of national life in this respect, especially when the recent, or even more remote, origin of the citizens of any country may be that of the enemy with whom the State is in conflict. The simple and only just procedure to be pursued by the State and its citizens in such a contingency is, that those naturalised citizens of enemy origin, concerning whose sympathies there may be any doubt, should, for the sake of public safety, be required to declare anew their adherence and loyalty to the country of their adoption. Should they then by word or deed in any way favour the enemy and his cause, they must summarily be punished for high treason, for which the law makes ample provision. But their claims to absolute equality

of citizenship, its rights as well as its duties, must be recognised as equal to those of all other citizens.

I have endeavoured to establish the true meaning of nationality and to indicate the dangers of its false conception. In *Patriotism—National and International*¹, referring to the liberation of the Balkan nationalities, I thought it right to point out that the so-called "Defence of the Smaller Nationalities," as well as the principle of "Self-determination of Nationalities," as thus wrongly conceived when applied to the democratic civilised States of Europe and America, present an element of great danger to the peace and progress of the world. That we should all unite in liberating from persecution, be they under the yoke of Turkish, Russian, German or Austrian autocracy, the so-called "nationalities" which have been suppressed or persecuted; that we should restore to political life and solidarity the oppressed or dispersed members of the Polish people; that we should even boldly undertake the almost impossible task of re-constituting the political boundaries of such people striving to realise their political nationality in the formation of States, is right. But we must remember, first, that in accepting such grave and stupendous responsibilities we are bound also to eliminate the possibility that other so-called nationalities, embodied in these liberated new States, should in their turn not meet with the fate of suppression or oppression. And we owe it to these to secure such fairness of treatment, not only in the present work of constituting these new national States, but even at the cost of infringing so-called sovereignty to ensure Justice in the future. But it is still more important for us of the West of Europe and of America to realise, and to face, the great danger which, by

¹ Pp. 5 seq.

such lawful and noble action on the part of the Allied Powers, we may have brought upon the whole civilised world, at least the whole of Europe, by thus using and confirming the conception of nationality which has been forced upon us only because of the unrighteous persecution in the immediate past on the part of autocratic powers. The danger is both imminent and far-reaching that the whole of Europe will become "Balkanised"; that we shall have created a vast number of so-called "national" States,—none of them satisfied with the response that has been made to their national claims—who stand in marked and prepared antagonism to one another, ready to spring at each others' throats. Moreover, M. Johannet has shown¹ in that most interesting introductory chapter to his book, how in the recent successive activities, not only of our enemies, the Central Powers, but also of the Entente Powers themselves, in every phase of their diplomatic action, from the beginning of the war and even during the present Peace Conference, the old racial and religious conception of nationality has been constantly used as an argument for and against the same object as suited the opportunistic interest of each side. Among other dangers to the peace of the world, inherent in these smaller national States as now constituted, he has pointed to one most lurid danger in the future. The final political result of this war may be to create a Central Power of Middle Europe consisting of at least 90,000,000 Germans, German-Austrians and Magyars, to which in time may be added the discontented remnant of the Turkish Empire; and that these powers will at once make use of the rivalries between the smaller, newly-constituted national States surrounding them, and, using their discontent, rivalries and conflicts, may win over one

¹ *O.c.* pp. vii to lvi.

or the other of them and some day call up the great Armageddon of the future.

Now, there is but one hope to meet this real and pressing danger. That hope rests in what has been called, The League of Nations; and that League of Nations is no longer, let me impress this upon you, a dream of Utopia. For, apart from all political and moral dreams or ideals, it has become a physical necessity for the future of the civilised world. If I may use the term (in order to counteract the charge of unpractical idealism or dreaming and to insist upon the sobriety and practicability of this new international institution), *it is a definite business proposition before us*. It is the only force in the future of the world which will save us from an imminent catastrophe which every good and reasonable citizen of our civilised States will exert all his energies to avert. But this League of Nations must develop into a far more effective and potent form before it can respond to our most crying needs. It must itself be constituted the Supreme Court, simply standing for Justice in the world; and this Justice must be supported by an actual Force at its command to carry into effect its decisions—a Force greater than that of any one nation or combination of States.

I solemnly appeal to you Britons and Americans who have fought in this war, to whatever political party you may belong: Do not belittle the great effort which the righteous and civilised world is at this moment making for the self-preservation of civilisation, even if you may have your doubts about one or the other aspect of its present formulation. Without presumption I may claim to speak with some authority on this question. For, more than twenty years ago, I published my own conviction that, first, through a closer understanding between the United States and Great

Britain, and then through the adhesion of other leading Powers, some unity of action on the part of such Powers should be established, and that this should ultimately lead to something of the nature of a League of Nations—which I then hoped would become the International Court backed by Power. I then saw, and expressed my belief, that such hopes were very remote, and I admitted that I laid myself open to be considered a Utopian dreamer. Well, within twenty years what was then considered the remotest dream, has become a reality. Who will dare to say that the further development of such an International Union to secure peace and progress to the world on the basis of what has already been achieved, is beyond the range of possibility? Who will venture to say, remembering the army of martyrs who have died at the stake for their religious beliefs quite independently of their material interests and even against them, that men of the present and of the future will not feel—and through the feeling and the passion be moved to make every sacrifice for—such international patriotism, the natural consequence of their truly national patriotism?

Let me warn you against two definite arguments which block the way to your acceptance of this my firm conviction. The first is contained in that commonplace *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who, in the case of such an International Jury or Court, will guard the guardians of the law? Nothing in this sublunary world of ours is absolute. Our own laws and our own administration of the laws may be imperfect and there may be miscarriage of justice. But can you suggest any other better means of ensuring justice in the business and social intercourse within civilised communities than our law-courts, judges and juries? In every case in this world we must ultimately rise to the conception of God, of all perfect

Justice, Wisdom and Charity to guard over our judges. Can you suggest any better power, more perfect to secure international justice, than a properly chosen jury or court of the wisest and best men, which each nation can send to administer pure Justice, but not with a mandate to represent the interests of the States from which they are deputed?

The other shibboleth which I wish to remove, in order that you may see the practical realisability of such an international body to ensure peace and progress, is the German contention of the Treitschkes, Bernhardis, and the rest of them, that war is *a biological necessity*; that it is against human nature to live at peace, and that nations must fight. It might be claimed, with some approach to truth, that lying, stealing and murdering are instinctive forces, are "*biological necessities*" in the individual man-animal. But civilised society, through its education and its laws, has seen to it that these instincts do not prevail. To maintain, that organised and civilised social groups called States, professing moral aims and necessarily acting with some forethought, cannot counteract and check immoral corporate instincts is palpably absurd.

The phrase "against nature" has been used to cover all forms of fallacies and iniquities. The study of man's history and even of men in the present, has shown us clearly how traditions, binding laws and customs, have been established and can be established, undreamt of by those who did not live under the rules of new institutions of higher and growing civilisation. Not to mention pre-historic man of the Paleolithic or Neolithic periods, but looking into more recent history, we find that men of those earlier days would have conceived it "against nature" that people should live peaceably together in civilised communities as they do

now, and that crimes and misdemeanours are immediately punished. Nay, I myself have known the most highly educated people in neighbouring countries who could not conceive how it was possible for the gentlemen of England and America to live in peace without fighting duels! Could pre-historic man conceive of the possibility that, by a simple business transaction, by a stroke of the pen, the most complicated business affairs, shiploads of produce, and the wealth of whole nations should be transferred over distances of land and sea under the protection of laws, never questioned by either participant dwelling in the most remote regions of the globe, distances which his imagination could never grasp? It would be "against nature" in his early conception. I have refuted such generalisations elsewhere¹, they are absolutely groundless.

As a last word allow me to warn you against such fallacious reasoning to weaken your righteous enthusiasm for the cause of international patriotism which forms the necessary key-stone to the arch of national patriotism, ensuring peace and progress to the whole world. Let me end with the simple words of two great participants in this war—heroes whose ardent patriotism no one will dare to impugn. Henri Boland, late Postmaster-General of Canada, said after leaving his German prison:

Only politics for *all* civilisation till this war is won—that is what we all want most. I came out of prison like a baby that has just been born. I know very little about events that have taken place in Canada while I have been in prison. I must begin again. I must learn like a child. But there is one thing that I have not to learn, one thing I know: that humanity must make itself safe now and for all time against another fearful tragedy like that we are now undergoing. That is my politics,

¹ *Aristodemocracy, etc.* chap. x.

and (I say it reverently) my religion too. If I can do something, anything, to bring about the end for which we all pray, then I am going to do it to the best of my ability. That is all! After a visit to my home and my mother I hope to take service at the front with the Canadian forces. [From *The Times*, August 7th, 1918.]

Nurse Cavell's last words were:

I have no fear nor shrinking; I have seen death so often that it is not strange or fearful to me.... But this I would say, standing as I do in view of God and eternity—I realise that patriotism is not enough....



II AND III

THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN
IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE

AND

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
BROTHERHOOD



PREFACE

THE lecture on the English-Speaking Brotherhood, here printed as the second essay, was written in the beginning of the Spanish-American War and embodies thoughts and feelings which I have nurtured through my whole life. It was delivered on July 7, 1898, at the Imperial Institute, London, Lord Rosebery in the chair, while this war was raging, and was published in an abridged form in the *North American Review* for August, 1898. When preparing it in unabridged form for publication last summer, I wrote the following preface:—

“My greatest fear is that, from the nature of the subject and from the special conditions which evoked my remarks, I may not have been able on this occasion to give proper emphasis to my positive and friendly feeling for the European Powers that are essentially the bearers of Occidental Civilisation. In urging the coalition and combined action of England and the United States, I have but seized the opportunity offered of advocating the union of the two civilised Powers who are best fitted by present circumstance to draw nearer to each other, and who, from the fundamental constitution of their national life, are more closely related to one another than any other two Powers in the civilised world. Whatever negative attitude may be manifest in this lecture towards the other civilised Powers of the European Continent is due to the fact that these Powers have, by their recent action, shown themselves to be opposed to any closer union between the United States and Great Britain; that

by several of their institutions, as well as by their foreign and commercial policy, they are not yet prepared for a more general federation of civilised nations; and that the prevailing spirit of Ethnological Chauvinism among them is not only an impediment to wider humanitarian brotherhood, but is destructive of the inner peace and good-will among the citizens of each nation. I feel so strongly what I have said of this curse of Ethnological Chauvinism that if it were possible to create effective leagues and associations among the civilised nations, and, moreover, associations with a negative or defensive object, I should like to urge the institution of a great Anti-Chauvinistic League among the enlightened people of all nationalities, to join together in combating this evil spirit in whatever form it may manifest itself. But I am not so visionary as to think that such a league could be formed at the present juncture."

Since I wrote this preface last July, I have visited the United States, where, the immediate war with Spain being over, I found the country drifting into a division on what has been called the Expansion Policy. I found that many of my friends, actuated by the noblest motives, were opposed to Expansion on grounds which, however high and noble, appeared to me none the less fallacious. Moreover, in conversation with them and others, I came to realise that there were points of view, inseparable from an intimate knowledge of European affairs gained in living on the scenes where these events are enacted, with which they were more or less unfamiliar. And these points of view appear to me essential to a correct understanding of the situation and of the whole question of American Expansion. The most prominent fallacy, and at the same time the most misleading in its effects, appeared to me the assumption on the part of the

Anti-Expansionists (an assumption in danger of being accepted by their opponents from the very frequency of its repetition): that those who oppose Expansion are actuated by the ideal side and represent it exclusively; that they uphold, against material interests, the integrity of American idealism. There was and is danger that, when such statements are repeated sufficiently often to become commonplaces, the Expansionists will acquiesce in this misstatement from sheer impatience and pugnacity, and will thus be robbed of the living strength which is at the very core of their own movement, its lofty idealism,—that they will at last subside into the cynical acceptance of a low materialistic view which turns its back upon “cant,” and that the whole national life will suffer in consequence. When I realised this, it did not require the encouragement of my friends to make me feel that there was a call for me to speak in the cause of truth and to publish what I have to say on the Expansion of Western Ideals.

THE AUTHOR.

SOUTH ORANGE, N. J.

June 5, 1899.

II

THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN
IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE

1899

II

THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE

IN his remarks following my lecture on the English-Speaking Brotherhood here published, Lord Rosebery¹ offers a graceful and gentle criticism of two of the chief points insisted upon by me.

With regard to my objection to the racial element contained in the term Anglo-Saxon, he says:

Our lecturer took exception to the term Anglo-Saxon, and he took exception very justly to that term as not being truly a scientific description of our race. But I think he would agree with me in saying that the same objections would lie against a generic description of almost any other race in the world—that there is hardly a race in the world inhabiting its own territory—I cannot recall one at this moment—which can be strictly called a race, if all the objections which lie against the term Anglo-Saxon lie against the adjective which may be applied to that race. I do not plead for the word Anglo-Saxon. I would welcome any other term than Anglo-Saxon which in a more conciliatory, a more scientific, and more adequate manner would describe the thing I want to describe. But whether you call it British or Anglo-Saxon, or whatever you call it, the fact is that the race is there and the sympathy of the race is there. How you arrive at that sympathy, whether it be purely by language, or as, perhaps, I think more truly, by the moral, intellectual, and political

¹ See *Appreciations and Addresses*, delivered by Lord Rosebery, K.G., K.T., 1899, pp. 261-269 (John Lane).

influences under which a nationality has grown up—how you arrive at that sympathy, it is foreign to my purpose to discuss to-day. But this at least we may say, that when a nation has inhabited certain boundaries without disturbance for a considerable number of centuries, even though it has received accessions from foreign nations, and when it has fused those accessions from foreign nations into its own nationality, and made them accept the name and language and laws and the facts of that nationality, it seems to me that for all practical purposes you have a nation and a race.

Evidently in my lecture I failed to express as clearly and pointedly as I desired to do the fundamental viciousness of the idea of *race* as affecting modern international politics—nay, national politics,—in its immediately disintegrating influence upon the life of the nation, and in its ultimately retarding the realisation of humanitarian ideals. And I was opposed to the Chauvinism implied in, and engendered by, racial distinctions; to the tone of passion which it breeds; to the native inimical attitude towards other races which it fosters. In “community of race” stress is laid, not upon the uniting power of ideas, but upon that of mere consanguinity. It is true, love may grow out of this as well as hatred—but in any case passion. In substituting the phrase “English-Speaking Brotherhood” for “Anglo-Saxon Alliance” I wished to accentuate the communion of ideas, which do not in the same way evoke passion,—that is, personal passion,—and if they do, produce that form which is least destructive and degrading, namely, the passion for ideas. I know that in the phrase I adopted the prominence given to language fails to express the full meaning I wished to convey. “English-speaking” only stood as a symbol for the life, institutions, laws, and ideals of the English-speaking nations; and I should gratefully accept any other

phrase which conveyed my thoughts more adequately. But, after all, the Word, *λόγος*, has before this been used to symbolise a vast range of thought. The more I consider Lord Rosebery's criticism, the more am I inclined to believe that his misunderstanding of the main gist of my objection was not wholly due to the inadequacy of my presentation. For I find that at the end of the passage here quoted he gives nation and race as convertible terms—which is the last thing I would admit.

If this was my general reason for objecting to the term Anglo-Saxon, the more immediate and special reason, which at the time led me to raise my voice at all, has been proved by recent events to have been good and strong. The opposition which at first produced Mr Davitt's strictures as representing the Irish element in Great Britain has, as I anticipated, found a more powerful response in the United States. The ineptitude of the phrase Anglo-Saxon, as meant to convey the element of unity and cohesion between the inhabitants of the United States and of Greater Britain, has not only been properly exposed in the pages of Mr Dooley's powerful satire, but has also quite recently been publicly condemned in the mass-meetings held principally in the Western States. This protest is headed by the German section of the American people; who, no doubt, incited to opposition by the misleading phrase, have protested against the great idea it was meant to carry. I feel confident that every day will prove more convincingly how mischievous the effect of such a misplaced word can be.

With the doubts expressed by Lord Rosebery on a second point in my lecture I can fully sympathise. They have since found forcible expression in the United States,

notably in a leader in the *Springfield Republican* (May 18, 1899), in which reference is made to an article by a Russian writer in the *Independent* showing the blessings arising out of an extension of the Czar's rule through Asia. Lord Rosebery says:

But I must warn you against a pitfall that lurks even in that expression. It is this—that, putting the conscientious Russian, whom the Professor summoned to give testimony, aside, I am afraid all the other great nations of the world are under the same impression as to the spread of their power and their empire. I doubt if the Germans or the French, for example, and I make bold to say even the Russians, though they have been quoted against the argument by the lecturer, would be disposed to say that the extension of their several empires was not in the best interests of the human race. That is a feeling common to all nationalities, and we can only hope that we indulge in it with more reason and on a broader basis than do the others I have mentioned.

Such arguments appear conclusive. Still, I venture to believe that they will not stand close and serious scrutiny. Of course, what I have to reply is not so much in the nature of argument as of fact; and these facts, from their very nature, are not readily tested. I can only give my personal experience, and rely upon the faith in my personal veracity of statement. But I venture to believe that there are so many who will bear me out in my experience, that we need not resort to a universal census of uninfluenced popular opinion throughout all European nations (if this were possible) to test the truth of my contention. Ask the simple question: "Do you think that the cause of civilisation, generally social and political, as well as in the national education of the individual, would be furthered more rapidly and effectually by the expansion of the

English-speaking nations or by that of Russia or any other of the Continental nations or grouping of these?" My own experience as regards this question is conclusive.

I would, in the first instance, point, not to Nihilists, political malcontents, or those in the political opposition (these, of course, disbelieve in Russian methods), but to genuine patriotic Russians of the educated and ruling classes, who have distinctly expressed their admiration of English and American social and political institutions, and have looked forward to the day when these institutions and the moral and intellectual tone of the nations possessing them would be introduced into their own country. They distinctly implied, and sometimes stated definitely, that humanity would gain more by the expansion of these advanced peoples than by that of their own nation.

In spite of the temporary state of ill feeling, arising out of rivalry and misunderstandings fostered by political rulers in Germany for definite and immediate political ends (a state of affairs as much to be deplored as it is bound ultimately to give way to a better understanding), the number of Germans—and these the best and highest among them—who are intense admirers of the social and political life and institutions of Great Britain and America is greater than the German Anglophobes are willing to admit. And I am confident, that, though everybody will willingly concede to Germany its high place in the sphere of intellectual education as fostered by its excellent schools and universities, the Germans themselves whose opinions count will recognise the superior political education and the social element which is its outcome as they are to be found in Great Britain and the United States. The necessary logical conclusion to such an admission is: that it is better for the

world at large that the politically superior nation should expand its political influence, even though the politically inferior nation be possessed of superior scientific attainment. For the first steps in civilisation are necessarily political.

I shall never forget one of the most impressive and touching—I was almost about to say tragic—conversations I have ever had. It was with a great statesman, now dead, the leader of the political life of one of the smaller states of Europe, who, in the opinion of many eminent diplomats of various nations, would have found his fittest, and probably most successful, sphere of activity in one of the great states. Our conversation on patriotism, which we discussed from every conceivable point of view, had lasted for some hours during which his face beamed with intellectual vigour and the strength of his concentrated and controlled will, while he maintained all his points with incisive eloquence. He seemed to have exhausted all that could be said on his side, and then paused. I did not interrupt his silence and watched him as he sat in thoughtful concentration, blind to the outer world, and merely following the sequence of images that were passing before his inner eye. I noted how gradually the expression of youthful energy and alertness faded from his face; the eye grew duller as the lids, briskly raised before, wearily descended over the orbs; the features seemed to grow more heavy, the furrows and wrinkles more accentuated, all the lines were drawn downwards; the head sank further forward on the breast; the arms hung relaxed, and the tall body seemed shrunk into itself.

After this long pause he slowly and wearily turned his head towards me, and, with an expression and a voice in

which deep sorrow and affectionate kindness were mingled, he said:

You are fortunate, inexpressibly fortunate, my young friend. For you have never felt the soul-deadening doubt which so often assails me and clips the wings of my imagination as it soars up like a dove in the morning sun, carrying with it the great message of my life, the love of my own country. You have never felt the doubt which has so often assailed me and which comes over me now: Whether it is ultimately right and good that my country should live and grow,—nay, that it should exist, as a country at all? Whether there are sufficient grounds, sufficient in view of what is ultimately to be in the rightness of things, for the solidarity and separateness of these people grouped together by tradition and language? Whether these traditions are likely to survive, and whether they are worthy of survival? Whether even this language, which I love and do all to foster and improve in its ancient purity, can ever develop effectively, and ought to be maintained for any reason beyond mere literary and philological convenience? Whether, in short, it would not be best to cast down the barriers that separate us from you, and whether, do what we will, our best acts do not merely tend to bring us nearer to you and to accelerate our ultimate absorption within the sphere of spiritual influence emanating from you? I ask myself whether my life, in so far as I am directly "patriotic," has not been wasted; whether I am not wasting it now; and whether it is not all a delusion? You are fortunate, my friend, for you need never have these doubts which bring sadness to the very core of man's heart; for you belong to the great nations which manifestly, admittedly, beyond all doubt, represent the best that man has thought out and acted out up to this day. You can frankly be a "patriot" at all times and in every mood. For you can remain confident that when you advance the interests of your own country you are ultimately in harmony with the world's great good, you are advancing the highest ideas which nations have yet attained politically.

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I quote these words because they express fully what the unbiassed thought of foreign nations must concede to us.

Now if we ask the same question in Great Britain or the United States, though many of us admire many institutions, customs, intellectual habits and attainments characteristic of other nations, and should like to see these replace our own, we should find it difficult to meet with any responsible person who would seriously and deliberately like to see our own social and political institutions replaced by those of any other nation. We do occasionally meet with impatient outbursts against the very core of our political life, namely, representative or parliamentary government; especially when some definite abuses in individual cases, and the slow and cumbersome procedure in view of practical issues, have aroused such a burst of impatient indignation. But these are never the expression of deliberate opinion as regards the ultimate tenets of representative government. I have even occasionally come across positive admiration of the results of autocratic government and a momentary desire to see it applied to our own difficulties.

We have all of us occasionally longed for the "intelligent autocrat"; but I doubt whether any one in his senses would have been satisfied with an unintelligent tyrant. Such a desire, moreover, meant that this ruler should be placed over people who have themselves been for many generations trained in self-government under advanced conditions of life and order in the communities—the outcome of our political institutions. This momentary revulsion against parliamentary forms of government among our Western nations has generally been expressed by those who have definite practical and administrative ends in view, which, for the nonce, they see retarded by the

cumbersome and sometimes corrupt machinery of representative government. They are the administrators or diplomats, those with whom it is natural that the means of government should be made the end,—dealing with questions of internal administration or foreign conquest which are so readily solved and answered in the simpler and ruder forms of autocratic government. They ignore, under the pressure of the immediate task before them, the ultimate goal at which their government aims, namely, the spread of individual liberty, the education of the people in all the ideas which stand for the highest civilisation. Yet it is because we were more likely to fulfil these great tasks which are ultimately conducive to security of life and to freedom of action, and thus to the happiness of those governed, that the intelligent foreigner prefers our institutions—because Great Britain and the United States represent these ideas.

If the English-speaking people are thus the representatives of the highest civilisation and are reaping its blessings, it is their duty, as well as their privilege, to hand on the torch which has thus been placed in their hands by their ancestors, even into districts where at present total darkness reigns supreme.

These views are more or less consciously held throughout the whole of Greater Britain; and though there be a small party of Little-Englanders, this party is a "negligible quantity." I have no doubt that they are also the views held by the majority of citizens in the United States, whose numbers will become still greater the more Americans realise the state of the world's politics and the position they are bound to take in it, as well as the duties which their prominent position in the world's affairs imposes

upon them. But my present stay in the United States has shown me that there is a not inconsiderable portion of the American people who are opposed to what is called Expansion; and these are far from being recruited from the least intelligent and high-minded citizens—in fact they are made up, to a considerable extent, of men actuated by the highest motives and representing, as they honestly believe, the truest and noblest traditions of American liberty. Their chief objection to Expansion, as we shall see, is that we are losing sight of our ideals in following its allurements. Yet I maintain emphatically, and I hope to succeed in showing, that the best Expansionists and the best Anti-Expansionists are both ultimately guided by ideals; only that the Expansionist's ideals are wider than those of the Anti-Expansionist and, being greater, include them.

In considering the objections raised against Expansion in the United States we discover three main grounds upon which the objectors stand: the first is distinctly and exclusively that of their native soil; the second is that of their supposed traditional American ideals; and the third, more negative and modest, is that of present unfitness for the wider task.

It would not be fair to maintain that the bulk of American Anti-Expansionists hold this first ground: it is purely selfish, narrow, "back-yard." "We are well enough off at home, why trouble about things outside?" It is readily understood how every thoughtful and far-sighted citizen, not to speak of statesmen, must realise, that if the United States is sufficient unto itself, materially and morally, at the present day and for some years to come, the enormous growth of industry, the increase of population, the intensifying of international relations, economically and morally,

make such an isolation in the future, not only disastrous, but absurd. A Chinese wall round a community living under the highest conditions of modern civilisation does not only debar it from the introduction of advantages offered by other nations, but may also lead to the disagreeable surprise of finding closed doors when it is found advantageous to issue out of the Chinese wall. And it is not reasonable to expect that he who has consistently sat at home within his four walls, while others have been paving streets and forcing doors, should at some late period, when it happens to suit him, find these streets ready for his pleasant perambulations and the doors complacently held open for his easy entrance. This whole view seems to me so fatuous and puerile, that I cannot conceive of its being held by thoughtful people. Meanwhile, it is necessary to point out that this materialistic ground of objection is in fundamental contradiction to that of the idealistic Anti-Expansionist; and that nobody can consistently and sincerely urge the two grounds together or a coalition between those actuated by either of these two motives. You cannot conceivably find any element of the Ideal (American, or otherwise), in the purely selfish view which maintains that you need not expand because you are happy enough at home.

I hope I am not wilfully caricaturing the views of those serious and noble Anti-Expansionists in America, among whom are some of my most honoured friends, if I maintain that there is, nevertheless, some link, some half-conscious analogy of reasoning, between their views and those of the "back-yard" Anti-Expansionists. They seem to hold, that one of the specific elements in the American ideal is this separateness and aloofness from the great current of

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international affairs throughout the civilised and uncivilised world. As if the framers of the "Constitution," and those who formulated the "Monroe Doctrine," had forever debarred the United States from its share in fashioning the world's destiny—or, rather, as if they had granted them in perpetuity immunity from the heavy burden of tasks which the *noblesse oblige* of civilisation puts upon those who enjoy its privileges. "The Russian, the Italian, the French, the Dutch, the Belgian, the German, and the British may all carry the fruits of their civilisation into distant parts. We have no such task before us. Our ideal is to stay at home!" If the "back-yard" Anti-Expansionist is materially selfish, one who argues thus is morally selfish.

He must, moreover, realise that in this diffusion of influence there is practically but one alternative to choose, namely, the system of colonisation followed by the Continental nations of Europe, most prominently represented by Russia, as contrasted with the system followed by the English-speaking peoples, hitherto represented by Great Britain. As Mr Kidd has put it¹: "More clearly than in either England or America, is it perceived [on the European Continent] that, as the result of existing developments, the world outside of Europe tends in the future to be controlled in the main by only two sets of forces, those which proceed from the peoples who speak English, and those which proceed from the peoples who speak Russian." When now he realises that, of the two, the English-speaking system, as well as the institutions and ideas enforced by it, is the higher and better, and that his state is one of the most prominent representatives of these institutions and ideas, he cannot possibly leave the task of the expansion

¹ *The Control of the Tropics*, by Benjamin Kidd, p. 27.

of these ideas to the British section of the English-Speaking Brotherhood and self-complacently remain at home.

History, however, is too much for these doctrinaires. The unstemmable tide of great events has proved kinder to the United States, in view of its honourable place in the future history of mankind, than the most well-meant advice of many of its teachers. We are in the midst of what may be the most thrilling moment of the world's history in our own century and perhaps of many centuries that have preceded ours. The Heracles Soter stands at the crossways; and it is of supreme importance which direction the wielder of great strength will take. Now, a new direction has been given to the drift of international affairs within the last two years, and this essential modification in the current of the world's politics is caused by the advent of the United States of America among the powers which fashion the destiny of nations. In spite of the extent of its territory and population, in spite of its great wealth and the intellectual vitality of its people, creating and solving so many problems of internal national life, the United States, up to our own days, was considered a "negligible quantity" by the European diplomat in all that concerned the vaster issues of international policy. It might have been used as a blind factor, as a pawn in the great game, but never as an active and determining agent.

All this has been changed within the last few years. I am not referring solely to the Spanish-American war and its immediate results, still less to the mode and methods of its beginning. It is to the results of conditions preceding, and incidental to, this war that I attach this supreme importance of the United States as a determining factor

in the world's politics. To understand this we must go further afield into the study of recent European politics; and we shall then understand what part the United States played and what part she is likely to play in the future.

Whether Mr Stillman¹ be right or not, the attitude of the United States towards Great Britain, as displayed for many years past, not only enabled Continental diplomacy to ignore any check to its anti-English policy which might come from that quarter, but even to count upon this very opposition as a means of neutralising any vigorous action, offensive or defensive, on the part of England. To any doubts as to whether this state of unfriendliness—if not animosity—was not accidental and passing, an answer was given which has some foundation in the experience of social psychologists. It was said: "Oh, there is no greater rivalry and antagonism than that of cousins; family quarrels are the last to be adjusted; physical and moral proximity, besides constantly creating conditions fostering irritation and the loss of temper, make the differences, even the slight ones, stand out the more strongly, because of the same plane of comparison, which is quite absent where people are remote from each other in every sense, and the differences are so fundamental as to give full sway to the sympathetic faculty." Historical facts have constantly borne this out. It was, is, and—in spite of all recent changes—will be, upon this factor that Continental diplomacy is likely to count. Is it merely a coincidence, a mere matter of chance, that the petty Venezuelan question should have twice turned up so opportunely to enable the enemies of England (surely, in this case, also of humanity) to checkmate that

¹ See his letter on "Germany and the Armenians" in the *Evening Post* of New York, of May 20, 1899.

country in its endeavours to solve the Armenian question? According to Mr Stillman, England had the support of Italy, and the consent of Germany and Austro-Hungary, in its plans to help the Armenians in 1887; and it was the Venezuelan question which then occurred to distract the attention of England and to occupy her hands, so that she had to desist from her noble task. Again in 1896, when the English government had practically pledged itself to put a stop to Armenian oppression, and was, at the same time, entangled in one of the most difficult crises of its foreign history (the South African imbroglio almost threatening a great war, difficulties in Egypt, warnings in India)—at a moment when the American nation ought to have joined her to give security of life to the Armenians, and the majority of the American people were actuated by the same unselfish enthusiasm in the cause of humanity and civilisation—it was at this moment that the “Cleveland Message” came, and the American jingoes brought war with Great Britain within sight. If this was a mere coincidence, then such a conflux of conditions favourable to the policy of Russia has never before occurred. It is not to be wondered at that some people in England and on the Continent, who are prepared to attribute any methods to a country which has no account to give of its foreign action to Parliament or to the public, should have suspected that the action of the United States was more or less directly brought about by Russia. At all events that “Cleveland Message” led the Continental diplomat to realise that even war was not impossible between Great Britain and the United States, and that a good understanding, or anything like common action between them, was far removed on the distant horizon-line of the Barely-Possible. I remember

discussing the European situation with a German diplomat more than two years ago, and when I said, that the whole character of civilised politics would be changed when once the United States entered the arena and came to a closer understanding with Great Britain, he answered: "No fear of that!" and a knowing smile was on his face, "the 'Rheingold' is appearing in the Northwest of the American continent; and that will keep them asunder effectually, if nothing else will." Let us sincerely hope that he did not speak truth.

But the whole face of the diplomatic world has been changed since 1896. The past two years have marked the great crisis in the world's history, the turning point in international politics. This is due to the advent of the United States and of American ideas as factors in European diplomacy. Negatively, this great step was prepared for by a comparatively smaller event, the Græco-Turkish war.

I cannot, nor need I, enter here into all the intricacies of the Cretan question which led to the Græco-Turkish war of 1897. Suffice it to say, that the Cretan troubles existed for many years before they led to that war; that by many diplomats Crete was for many years looked upon as the touch-hole to the Eastern question, at which any great conflagration in the Near East might easily be set ablaze, if such a conflagration proved convenient and desirable at that moment to the powers that directed European affairs. Moreover, we have reason to know that the pretensions, and even the revolutionary agitations of the Cretans, were far from being discouraged by the Russians up to that moment. At no time were the Cretans, and their Greek kinsmen with them, more justified in claiming the support of the Powers that had directly or indirectly

encouraged them in putting forward their just demands than in 1897. The prompt action of the Greek government in the Vassos expedition ought to have made the intervention of the European Powers all the easier, as it also intensified the sympathies of the European peoples. At all events it made it impossible for the Greek monarchy to recall Vassos and to maintain itself in the country. It was then that the European Concert, headed by Russia [and backed by the German Kaiser], ordered the Greeks to withdraw Vassos, and showed a decided antagonism to the whole Hellenic movement, thus bringing about the Graeco-Turkish war. England was distinctly favourable, if not to the granting of all the requests made by the Greek government, at all events to a course which would have facilitated the partial retreat of the Greeks under conditions most favourable to the stability of the monarchy and to the gradual remedy of Cretan evils. But the European Concert opposed the action of England in this respect, and the most curious irony in the eccentric course of diplomatic history was then illustrated. Russia, who had hitherto found her ready, obliging, and most helpful ally in France, in the Dual Alliance, which for some years had successfully wrestled with the Triple Alliance on the one side, and England on the other—Russia found as complaisant, nay, a more energetic, agent of its policy in Germany (Austro-Hungary following in the wake) than it had before found in France. And, more singularly ironical still, France, whose national sympathies were all with the Greeks, found herself joining hands with Germany in obsequiously doing the will of Russian diplomacy. The result was that not only was Greece left to its fate, but the whole moral—nay, even more than moral—support of Europe was thrown

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into the scales in favour of Turkey. And when Greece was beaten, was thus "set back" in its national aspirations, and had been taught its lesson of humility, the privileges begged and fought for by the Cretans were granted, and were wrested from the Turk, who had meanwhile been victorious and was supposed to have gained a new lease of life. These privileges were, moreover, graciously granted to the Cretans and to the defeated Greeks at the manifest initiative of the Russians. What may have appeared puzzling, if not inexplicable, to the uninitiated, is the unfriendly and relentless attitude of Russia towards Cretans and Greeks before their defeat, when the Cretan question (to a great extent made what it had become by Russia in the preceding years) came to a climax. This is not the place to enter fully into this question. But it will be enough to suggest to the intelligent and thoughtful, that, in view of the geographical and ethnological conditions of the Eastern Mediterranean shores (the Greek population predominating, from Thessaly round through Constantinople, down the whole coast of Asia Minor, not to mention the islands), the national aspirations of the Hellenic people had grown too rapidly and too strongly within the last few years, when considered in their relation to the interests of the Slav nations in the southeast of Europe. These national aspirations had found a manifest, though quite peaceful, expression in the Olympic games celebrated at Athens in 1896, and, still more powerfully, in the secret National Greek Society which played so sad a part during the Greek catastrophe in 1897. It appeared high time that Hellenic aspirations should be repressed and not allowed to prove too dangerous a rival to the Slav predominance of the future.

I venture to maintain now, in the light of what has happened since, what I believed and urged, so far as I was able to do so, before these events happened, that it would have been possible for the British government—without in any way falling a victim to the bugbear of a great European war—to have settled the Cretan question fully as well, if not better, than it has been settled now, without allowing the Greek war to have taken place at all, and without the severe disasters that have befallen the Greek monarchy and impaired the outer prestige and the inner self-respect of the Greek nation.

It is, however, important to consider the further results of these events upon the position of England in the European world during the six months following the Greek defeat. Russia, with Germany as well as France to back her, stood supreme as the leader, if not the dictator, of the world's affairs. England, completely isolated, had absolutely lost her prestige in the Near East (through her failure in the Armenian and Greek affairs), and was in imminent danger of losing it in the Far East as well. In the West it had but shortly before been on the verge of war with its kinsfolk of the United States, and the cause of discontent was far from being removed. In South Africa it had to adjust a complicated and humiliating imbroglio, and, meanwhile, stormy clouds appeared on the northern boundary of its Indian empire, where the Russian antagonist lies ever watchful, in the serious Afzidi rising.

Never was the position of Russia stronger, and that of England weaker. This, therefore, was the moment for the colonial expansion of the Continental Powers, as opposed to that of Great Britain. It looked like the easy victory of the old Continental system of foreign possession and

of "closed doors," over the English-speaking system of colonisation with "the open door."

This was indeed a most dramatic moment in the world's history. And it was then that the United States entered the arena and for the time being saved the situation. I say entered, but I ought rather to say was pushed or sucked in by the force of circumstance, and perhaps by the over-hasty diplomacy of Russia. As a matter of fact they had over-reached themselves. The rapid succession of diplomatic victories which had flowed in with an ease and readiness that must have appeared like a chapter in the *Arabian Nights* to the Russian Foreign Office; the good fortune, the good cheer, coming alike to the pampered appetite of Russia glutted with empire, and to its allies, starving for foreign possessions, seemed to go to their heads and to produce a hasty, manifest voraciousness, which at last startled even those who had a good store of provisions for the present, but began to feel apprehensive about their sustenance in the future. If not Russia, then, at least, her helpmate in the overthrow of the poor Greek, Germany, revealed these signs of aggressive expansion with an energy and haste which has characterised its action of late years. The partition of China among the Continental Powers began; the main point being to diminish, so far as possible, the influence of England there as well as in Africa—in fact, over the whole world. But the very violence and haste of this action began to arouse the people of the United States to the consciousness that they too had paramount interests in the Far East; that, considering their Pacific coast, they had vital interests at stake in China with which an intimate commercial relation exists, and must necessarily grow in the future. And the far-sighted among the American

people, who know and are familiar with history in the past and can apply its teachings to the future, realised that they owed it to the future generations of their countrymen, if not to themselves, that the United States should not be shut out of the world's commerce in future years—an event which the action of the Continental Powers made only too probable. And from this just apprehension they turned to realise positively that the system of expansion of Great Britain with the "open door," was the one which conformed completely to their present and future interests—that, in short, there were two clearly defined systems opposed to one another, the one that of the English-speaking peoples, to which the United States belongs, the other that followed at present by the Continental European Powers headed by Russia.

I need not enlarge upon this fact in view of the admirable exposition which it has received at the hands of Mr Benjamin Kidd¹. But, while naturally accentuating in his book the question of commercial and material interests as represented in the two systems, I am glad to find that he has done justice also to the political, social, and ethical aspects involved in the adoption of the English-speaking or Russian system. He has shown how the one responds to the fundamental spirit of the self-governing peoples in considering the ultimate good of those who are thus to come under the rule of expanded empire; while the other system primarily and essentially considers these "colonies" as possessions which are to be exploited for the good of the expanding country. To him the acquisition of such territory and power is primarily to be conceived as a "trust for

¹ *The Control of the Tropics*, by Benjamin Kidd, New York 1898.

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civilisation" with the full sense of the responsibility which such a trust involves¹.

In the crisis brought about by the aggressive Continental Powers in China, the people of the United States further realised that, beyond the community of material interests, they had, in common with Great Britain, the spirit which would modify the expansion of their interests in contradistinction to that inherent in the methods followed by the other nations.

And then, at last, with renewed force, which seemed to have gained additional strength from the long delay and the wilful oblivion of its existence, they realised their kinship in national, more even than in racial, character, the political, social, and moral kinship which binds them together. Then came the war with Spain, and by the action of Great Britain in contrast to that of the Continental Powers, all these ties which make for union were manifested by deeds, as before by feelings and their expression. We must leave it to the future to make clear to the American people to what extent, and how effectually, this national kinship was manifested by Great Britain during the Spanish War. It would, however, be vain for those whose interest it is to oppose the closer affiliation between these two great peoples, to point to the accidental community of material interests on the part of England and the United States in order to account for the warm feeling of kinship which has grown up between them within these days. The fact remains that such feelings could not exist between them if they were not based upon, and did not arise out of, the kinship of political, social, and moral views, the fundamental identity of character, as well as the community of ideals.

¹ P. 53.

The Spanish War thus brought to an intense, if not passionate, climax, by a final appeal to sentiment, the recognition of a community of interests between the United States and Great Britain, which the action of Continental Europe in China awakened. The united aggression of these powers against England, which at that moment appeared isolated and helpless in the face of these combined forces, had already appealed to the national sentiment of the American people, who, in spite of Venezuelan and Behring Sea complications, would have been unwilling to stand aside and look on while the British Empire, and all it means to civilisation, was dismembered and overthrown, or even weakened in its influence upon the affairs of the world. The sentiment of the British people would not have, for a moment, brooked the interference of the combined Continental Powers to check the advance of American arms, which were taken up in Cuba (whatever the nefarious spirit of "yellow" journalism may have done, however bungling the diplomacy which preceded the outbreak)—which were taken up by the people in a sincere wish to further the cause of humanity.

At the same time the United States demonstrated to the world its great military and naval capacity, especially when it has time to prepare, and when it has set on foot an adequate military and naval organisation. The *quantité négligeable* at once manifested itself to the European diplomat as far from negligible. Moreover he began to see that "family quarrels" are often "made up," especially when outer enemies become manifest; and that the united family then turns upon the interfering neighbour. And what happened then? The Czar's manifesto of universal disarmament was announced by the Russian Foreign Office.

Now, I do not for a moment mean to imply that the Czar was not sincere in his humanitarian enthusiasm, and that he did not also realise the great economical and social problems calling for all the energy the Russian government could expend for home use—in a country which has greater need of its inner resources, and perhaps is nearer bankruptcy than the world at large realises. But we must also remember that no government possesses a Foreign Office which carries on its own tradition and its long-matured plans of campaign without regard to any other department or authority as does that of the great Autocrat. All must make room to this iron machine, moving on relentlessly in spite of Czar and nation.

Well, is it again a mere coincidence that the Czar should have been urged to publish his manifesto to the world through the Foreign Office just at this moment? That moment was marked by the fact that a new English-speaking Nation had entered the lists as a naval and military Power and had distinctly shown its intention of joining the other side.

At the same time it was a curious and fortunate coincidence that, just at that moment, France had completed its part in furthering Russian interests and was becoming inconveniently exacting to see some return of courtesy on its side. A proclamation of universal disarmament must be, in the eyes of a people whose political life centred round the claim of *Revanche*, and the readjustment of its boundaries by the force of arms, a clear hint that the contract is over, the alliance ended. No more convenient means of getting out of the disagreeable relation to France could ever have presented itself to Russia. Could there be any harm in weakening the military parties in all

countries possessed of representative government by strengthening the parties opposing them and swelling their numbers? Might it not help the Peace advocates even in the United States (besides the Anti-Imperialists in England and Germany) and ultimately produce an Anti-Expansionist movement there? Meanwhile the whole situation left nothing to be desired. Russia had staked out all its "claims," all the districts it ever hoped to hold, including the *Hinterlands*; and all it need ask for from a Supreme Court of Arbitration, should the Conference succeed, was a maintenance of the *Status Quo* when such a court was once formed. And the interval between the Czar's manifesto and the meeting of the Peace Conference—not to speak of any authoritative body that might issue out of its deliberations—was this employed by Russia in preparing for its own disarmament? On the contrary, it was spent in increasing the number of "claims" and, in breathless haste, staking out as much as possible.

Now let me revert to the development of affairs and of national feeling in the United States. The inevitable course of events, which, for a time had raised the American people aloft into the purer region of ideas and ideals, and had, through such tortuous channels, finally led the stream of international feeling flowing between the United States and Great Britain into the broader current of sentiment in which the kinship of ideas and ideals was uppermost—the same course of events again forced this current back into the definite material channel of colonial expansion. A new aspect of this question was now forced upon the American people, new, not only because, after the fortune of war had delivered into their hands Spanish possessions which could not simply be left to themselves, the responsi-

bility of their good government had fallen upon the United States; but new in that the United States had now realised the broader and more general aspect of the whole question of colonisation and expansion in its international relation. It has had forced upon it all the experiences in the general development of modern international politics which I have just endeavoured to outline in part. It must now face these questions with the full knowledge of all that has been done in European politics as it affects the question of colonial expansion; and this must necessarily modify its own individual attitude with regard to any individual district or people with which the Spanish War has forced it into immediate relation. It is thus forced to choose to which of the two systems, standing directly opposed to each other, it is to adhere,—whether it is to be the English-speaking system of colonisation, or that of the Continental European Powers headed by Russia. This question has at once come to a head in a most acute form in the case of the Philippines. And it is naturally here that the opposition of the Anti-Expansionists in the United States has arisen.

We have here reached the really critical point in the development of Anti-Expansionism. Many who oppose the policy of the present government might say: "We agree in principle with your ideals of Expansion as you have just put them; but we do not approve of the means you apply for their realisation as seen in our treatment of the Filipinos." And having said this, by imperceptible phases of fallacious reasoning, they will gradually move round the circle until they will end, as the German phrase goes, "by pouring the child out with the bath water," i.e., by violently opposing the whole policy of Expansion, because

they disapprove of the government's action in the Philippines. Still more powerful and misleading are the arguments of those who oppose Expansion on the ground that it contradicts the fundamental traditions and the fundamental ideals of the American people. "You must not," they say, "buy the blessings you enumerate at the cost of war; you must not even benefit people against their will; you must not impose your rule upon others at the sacrifice of the very idea you wish to expand, namely, that of self-government."

Now I will not, though this would be the most effective way of showing the groundlessness of their arguments, call upon them to state clearly and definitely, with the possibility of its early practical application, the line of conduct which they would have the government follow in each individual case presenting such complicated difficulties in view of the far-reaching intricacy of the problems before us. Were it possible thus to compare the two rival schemes of administration, I believe the intelligent public would soon recognise the amateurishness of the criticism offered at this stage.

But I deny their right of appeal to American tradition and American ideals. Among the great deeds of the past which come nearest to embodying American ideals, two stand forth most clearly in the world's history. These justify the high place which the United States can ever claim in fashioning the world's destiny for good,—the one is the War of Independence, the other is the Abolition of Slavery. Yet both these ideas were realised by means of war,—moreover, fratricidal war, carried on with all the rigour and harshness of warfare. And in both cases we were using force to confer upon the people at large ultimate

blessings, which, at the time, a large number of them were unwilling to recognise as such,—the Tories in the War of Independence, and the Secessionists in the Civil War. And the initiators of these great deeds were certainly *unconstitutional* in the Revolutionary War, and possibly so in the Civil War. At the present moment, moreover, the United States is at war with the Filipino insurgents; it is an accomplished fact; and it is disloyal for any American citizen to counteract the success of American arms, materially or morally, while the recognised government of the country has raised them against an enemy at war. Should the spirit of humanity which actuates these protesters detect methods of warfare applied by his own country which are opposed to the essential spirit of civilisation and humanity, to the national conscience of this country, he is justified in his protest—but in no other case.

Still more misleading is the appeal which the Anti-Expansionist makes to the fundamental principle of the American Constitution, the principle of self-government. There has been more nefarious abuse of this term, and what it is supposed to imply, than of any other I can recall. The glorious proclamation of the Declaration of Independence—"All men are created equal"—does not mean, that we give the right to govern to each individual at his birth or for some years after this important event in his personal history. On the contrary, we take great care to defer the period in which he is to exercise his function of contributing to the government of the country to an advanced period in his life, when we have reason to believe that he will exercise this function, not, at least, to the detriment of his neighbours. Nor do we admit the

insane or the criminal to these privileges of self-government. It is important for us to realise that, in principle as well as in practice, the United States has always maintained essential limitations to the general principle of personal liberty and of self-government. And it is important always to remember that "self-government" really implies the governing of our neighbour. One of the chief tasks of our law-making bodies is constantly to define, to restrict as well as to safeguard, the rights of the individual, his personal liberty and his function of self-government. Now, what applies to the individual applies *a fortiori* to larger recognisable bodies of individuals in the form of communal bodies and states. And as little as we remain content with the past definitions of personal liberty in common and criminal law, so little are we justified in expecting to remain stationary in our dependence upon the past in constitutional law.

It is the natural and justifiable tendency for the legal mind to be, not only generally conservative and to worship that which is, but even to regard the 'dead word' rather than the living spirit, the anatomy rather than the physiology of human existence. I have before me a very able essay dealing with the present Philippine situation from the point of view of constitutional history and law, by one who is manifestly a master in these departments of juridical science¹. Professor Freund analyses the protectorates of the past, from those of the ancient Romans, through the Ionian Islands, the States of the Balkan Peninsula, Egypt, Tunis, Madagascar, Anam, Tonquin, the native States of the Dutch Indies, the native States of

¹ *The Control of Dependencies through Protectorates*, by Ernst Freund, Boston, 1899.

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British India, and the Samoan Islands. He then points out forcibly the difficulties of fitting a new colonial system into the legal conditions of the present American Constitution. But important and useful as the exposition of such difficult tasks is, the question must be asked: "Whoever expected, or had the right to expect, that these new tasks would not be fraught with difficulties?" Have we a right to expect that we shall be able at once to find the proper constitutional status for new bodies called into the world by such new conditions of national life, and that supremely mark the vitality of our national existence? That we shall do this in one day, without having to retract and to modify in the future, sitting peacefully in our secluded studies surrounded by our reference books on constitutional law and history,—one system, perfect and complete in itself, which shall suit all cases? And can we ask for this in face of the fact that the British Colonial Department, after many generations of colonial expansion and experience in the government of dependencies, has to deal with the list of colonies presenting, as regards the nature of their government, a variety at once confusing, and, at the same time, creditable to the good sense of the British people and the colonial administrators¹?—

At the head of it come the great self-governing States like Canada, Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, the Cape, Natal, New Zealand, and others, all colonies in the true sense of the word; off-shoots of England in temperate regions of the world, many of them engaged in the practical solution of some of the most advanced political and social problems which occupy the attention of the modern world. If we look further down the list, we have a strange medley. Vast territories in tropical lands, acquired at various dates in the course of war

¹ Kidd, *o.c.* pp. 33, 34.

and trade; countries inhabited by different races and governed under a variety of constitutions; regions representing every type of administrative problem—questions of war, of defence, of finance, which raise the whole modern policy of the Empire, questions of responsibility to weaker races, of the relations of the governing power to great systems of native jurisprudence and religion, which take us back to the very childhood of the world, and in which the first principle of successful policy is that we are dealing, as it were, with children, are all grouped together as “colonies,” in common with those modern self-governing States, the reproductions of England in temperate regions.

Whether the Philippine Islands are now to be called colonies, dependencies, protectorates, possessions, or dominion States, is immaterial. The future, as well as the moral and political conscience of the United States (and it is here that the noble section of the Anti-Expansionists will, *in the future*, be called upon to manifest their ideals), will decide this question. But at this juncture there are two points that stand out clearly and that must determine the present policy of the government; and due regard for these is to be had in the interest of the Philippine people themselves, as well as for the preservation of peaceful relations of the United States to other powers, and, consequently, in the interest of the world's peace. The first is, that the American possession of these territories be complete, and its rule unquestioned in the eyes of the inhabitants, as well as of the outer world; the second is, that no rash promises be made as to what will be done in the future.

Once granted the right, and the duty, of the United States to expand its influence into regions not yet possessed of Western civilisation, the first steps in carrying out this

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policy are so intricate and complicated, and demand so much intimate knowledge, wide as well as thorough, of facts that are essentially technical, that the general public is most likely to err at every stage when attempting to deal with them, and must leave them to the responsible heads of government which it has chosen to solve these technical problems. Yet we can all of us realise how disastrous would have been the effect of granting absolute "self-government" to the population of the Philippine Islands the moment they were freed from the Spanish yoke, in view, not only, of the complicated internal conditions of that country, but also of our experience by analogy in countries on the same (some of them on a much higher) level of political education. And the recent history, while our occupation was effected, and the present troubles in Samoa, force us to appreciate to what international complications a title of possession that is not clear may lead. It is important to remember the advice¹ given by a German authority, Baron von Lüttwitz, to Germany, "that the prevailing conditions in China and the unstable condition in many South American States offered opportunities for German expansion in these regions." But the danger of a hesitating occupation of such countries is far from being restricted to the attitude of Germany; it will apply, at least potentially, to any other State. In view of future danger from within and without, it is not only wise, but also charitable, to make the first stages of occupation as clear and unequivocal as possible. Let us remember what would necessarily be the waste of blood and treasure if, in the future, the United States was forced constantly to intervene between the belligerent factions within such a country, or

¹ Quoted by Kidd, *o.c.* p. 47.

to make real the claims of its own inhabitants, who, by the action of the Philippine Legislature, were hampered and repressed by laws dealing with them as *Uitlanders*.

The same applies to any promises which any government might make for its future action with regard to occupation or the degree of self-government to be granted in the future. England's experience in Egypt ought to teach a great lesson. Such promises on the part of a statesman are either insincere or foolish. For the true statesman must know that the force of circumstance and the altered conditions demand new treatment, perhaps new concessions; and that it is always easier to grant more liberties than to retrench existing ones.

When once the union of these countries with the United States is made clear to their inhabitants and the outer world sees that they are beyond all doubt an integral part of the United States, then will be the time for those actuated by the high ideals of the noble section of Anti-Expansionists to raise their voice and to maintain constantly an attitude of watchfulness and criticism, to give an upward direction to the administration of these countries. Yet even here it will be wise for them to learn from the experience of those who, for generations past, have been struggling with the solution of similar problems. I would recommend all interested in this subject to read what Mr Kidd says in commenting on the institution of the English Indian Civil Service¹, and will select a few passages here, which the present Anti-Expansionist might bear in mind for his *future* efforts. Speaking of the responsibility of those who "colonise" distant countries, he says²:

If he has any right there at all, he is there in the name of civilisation; if our civilisation has any right there at all, it

¹ Pp. 53-60.

² P. 54.

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is because it represents higher ideals of humanity, a higher type of social order. This is the lesson which, slowly and painfully, and with many a temporary reversion to older ideas, the British peoples have been learning in India for the last fifty years, and which has recently been applied in other circumstances to the government of Egypt. Under a multitude of outward aspects, the one principle which separates the new era from the old in India, a principle the influence of which has come to extend even to the habits and dress of the governing class, is the recognition of the fact that the standards according to which India must be governed have been developed and are nourished elsewhere. The one consistent idea which, through all outward forms, has in late years been behind the institution of the higher Indian Civil Service on existing lines is that, even where it is equally open to natives with Europeans through competitive examination, entrance to it shall be made through an English University. In other words, it is the best and most distinctive product which England can give, the higher ideals and standards of her Universities, which is made to feed the inner life from which the British administration of India proceeds.

And further¹:

But in this, as in all other matters, the one underlying principle of success in any future relationship to the tropics is to keep those who administer the government which represents our civilisation in direct and intimate contact with the standards of that civilisation at its best; and to keep the acts of the government itself within the closest range of that influence, often irksome, sometimes even misleading, but always absolutely vital,—the continual scrutiny of the public mind at home.

And finally²:

A policy in such relations is a matter beyond the control even of governments; it is ultimately regulated only by the development of a people, by standards which are the slow

¹ P. 57.

² P. 59.

growth of time. If the English-speaking peoples do not mean to shirk the grave responsibility which lies upon them in this matter, they must act at once, with clear purpose and with courage. Neither the purpose nor the courage should be wanting to those who possess a conviction of the far-reaching importance in the future of the ideas and principles for which these peoples now stand in the world.

It is at this very point that the third group of Anti-Expansionists come in, those whose ground of opposition has all the strength of modesty in its favour. "Great Britain," they say,

may be prepared to rule distant colonies, for that people have set their house in order at home, which we have not yet done. They have a well-organised Civil Service, with a firmly rooted tradition of integrity and honour inherent in the very offices themselves, and thus they have been able to devise an admirable Indian Civil Service which we, at least for the present, cannot aspire to. We must learn to govern ourselves honestly and effectually at home before we think of extending our government in distant lands. For, at present, the addition of a long list of offices in distant parts, removed from the watchful, critical eye of those at home who are earnestly exerting themselves to counteract corruption here, will only add to the wealth of "spoils" which the unscrupulous party politician already possesses as a means of corrupting the whole nation.

May not this Anti-Expansionist be putting the cart before the horse? The "spoils" system existed in England not so very many years ago in its most cynical form, and British party politics were as corrupt as they could well be. I maintain that the gratifying reforms which have been introduced during the last two generations were in great part due to the reactive influence of colonial administration upon the Home government, until they gradually formed new national traditions. Corruption,

when circumscribed and local, may shock with great intensity the inhabitants dwelling within the immediate limits where it is active, and may lead to intense protests and indignation. There may be, as in the case of Tammany frauds, periodical risings of those representing the purer and higher public opinion. But it is far from being a paradox to, say, that such inquiries into local corruption tend ultimately to debase rather than to elevate the public conscience. For radical and lasting reforms have not yet been introduced, and the inability to extirpate such vicious growths, root and branch, is to be sought in the more remote, yet fundamental, spirit of national political life. And when a community has ultimately to acquiesce in the retention of even a portion of the corrupting forces, the community, as such, becomes party to the corruption itself. Public spirit is thus ultimately robbed of the keen edge of its conscience, its moral substance becomes blunted, and lower traditions become fixed and firmly established. The newspapers all over the country may find abundant "copy" in the inquiry into local frauds of one city or district, and the sensationalism inherent in the trials may stimulate the curiosity of the readers all over the Union; but this form of reading matter soon makes room for the newest sensation, and the trouble really only concerns a definite locality or department.

It will not be so with the maladministration of a protectorate or colony; this is not a purely local or departmental affair. Nay, the watchful criticism will not be confined to the nation itself; but the whole world, all other nations, those inimical and covetous as well as those friendly and sympathetic, will be ever present to reveal hidden corruption and to call for justice and redress for the colonists

protected or ruled. I venture boldly to predict that in the future the department which will lead the way, as regards efficiency and integrity, in the whole United States government, will be the "Colonial" department¹.

Moreover, the creation of such new offices will, directly and indirectly, accelerate Civil Service Reform in the United States. For, on the one hand, it will demand, on the part of officials, qualifications of a technical and un-local character which will necessarily raise the standards for the applicants to such offices. And, on the other hand, in itself, in its immediate bearing upon the Department of State, and, ultimately, upon the whole administrative machinery of government, it will, from the nature of the issues raised, call upon the educated intelligence of politicians and those aspiring to political honours, and thus will make it practically impossible for the ignorant "ward-politician" to face the public at all without making himself manifestly ridiculous in the eyes of the whole public. A timely appeal to the immediate interests of any class of audience which such a politician may be addressing, in connection with even the widest economical or fiscal issue in national politics, may always help him to hide his fundamental ignorance and unscrupulousness. This convenient loophole is not so likely to present itself when American politics have developed out of the infantile stage of national provincialism.

Here we come to the more indirect, though none the less

¹ Since this was in type I have had the privilege of making the acquaintance of General Wood, and have heard from him what he has done at Santiago and intends to do in the future. I can only say that if the United States can produce more men of this stamp, there will be no fear for the "colonies," nor for the good fame of the home government.

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important, influence which expansion will have upon the political and social education of the nation as a whole; it will enforce a wider view of politics upon the whole people. It has often been pointed out that one positive reason for the wide-spread political corruption among the American people, possessed as a nation of comparatively so high a standard of social and commercial morality, is to be found in the great and growing prosperity of the country itself and the all-absorbing attraction of its active life outside of politics. The supreme abundance of opportunity, the alluring and clamorous appeals to the advance of individual prosperity are within the reach of all its freeborn citizens; and thus no time and energy remain for direct participation in public affairs to those best fitted to struggle in life's battle. This very wealth and prosperity within the country, which thus absorb the best men and draw their moral and intellectual power away from politics, make the results of political mal-administration, which would be keenly and painfully felt in an older and poorer country, less sensible to the actual life of the American people. But if these be truly the positive reasons, the negative cause, it appears to me, lies in the absence of wider political issues which break through the narrow bounds of local interests and produce more attractive as well as elevating political ideals.

With all its disasters and incidental inhumanities, the Civil War aroused and satisfied the higher cravings for wider political ideals on the part of the nation. The period succeeding this, down to our own days, has been one of unprecedented economical development and prosperity. But the moral and ideal side of national life has been starved, and these national faculties are gradually ap-

proaching a stage which pathologists designate by the term atrophy. All questions have pre-eminently had a topical, and, hence, a personal character. Even the great questions of general economical and fiscal policy, far-reaching in their effect upon the world though they be,—the questions of protection or free-trade, of gold or silver currency,—can always, and will always, be reduced to the personal, “back-yard” view.

All this has favoured a national tone of cynical self-sufficiency which leads the American not so much to feel pride in his glorious freedom and independence, as to assume an almost negative attitude of mind towards the rest of the world, and to cultivate a growing emasculating habit of self-admiration. Now, there is death from congestion and hyperæmia, following the inner concentration of vital forces, as well as from attenuation and anaæmia, following the diffusion and dispersion of such vitality. Whatever may be said against the motives and methods of “yellow” journalism and those whose opinions it represented, the spirit which moved those who called the Americans to arms to better the conditions of the oppressed Cubans gave a new lease of life to the national morality of the American people.

I verily believe that if the American could have seen himself before, as in a mirror, and realised what sort of a political physiognomy he had in the international world, he would have been astonished. While meeting Americans in Europe I have often heard the naïve complaint, with the suggestion of wounded vanity underneath, that the European newspapers did not contain more news from the United States. Beyond despatches concerning presidential elections and wider questions bearing upon federal policy,

with commercial and financial news, there was very little. But such a complainant did not stop to ask himself, whether, in the news he craved for, there were any events or facts that concerned or affected, even the whole people of the United States, not to mention the other nations of the civilised world? The complaint, and the ideas which caused it to be made, emanated from what, after all, we should in sober judgment call provincialism, which always implies an absence of the sense of proportion. On the other hand, it appears to me that the newspapers of the United States have, in spite of growing facility in the means of rapid communication, reduced the proportion of impersonal news (they have unfortunately used the facility for communication to increase the publication of matters of a personal nature)—news bearing upon the international life of the civilised world. I am not referring to foreign events which have attained a sensational stage, such as actual war; but to facts which, though less satisfying to grosser curiosity, have the most important bearings upon the world's civilisation,—events, for instance, in a small state like Bulgaria or Rôumania, or in a distant "colony" in Australasia—an enormous and important empire of the future with most vital bearing upon the civilised life of the world. I am often astonished to observe how even the most educated, not to mention the people at large, are ignorant of the most rudimentary notions in these affairs.

A perusal of the leading English newspapers, on the other hand, and a consideration of the choice they make of the abundant news from all over the world, a choice not affected by the sensationalism of events, but by the well-considered bearing of events upon the wider issues of the world's politics, illustrate the political education of the

people whom in turn they tend to educate. Besides the "news," they frequently contain exhaustive and well-matured accounts of different countries, each filling several columns and dealing with the social, political, and commercial life and prospects of these distant communities. These are generally written by special correspondents sent out for the purpose and well-qualified for the task, or by scholarly and experienced travellers, such as the present Viceroy of India, whose studies we may often find the more profitable from the fact that they are not written by professional journalists.

The English people as a whole thus command a wider horizon for their political interest and judgment. And this training has come to them chiefly because they have expanded in the past into an empire with distant and diversified interests and duties. Nay, even the distant investment of capital and infusion and diffusion of commerce, though they arise in every individual case out of purely selfish and personal motives of gain, have this ultimate good for the nation and for the world at large (and this to many of us is their only justification from a national and universal point of view)—that they increase the knowledge of distant countries, the interest in them and the realisation of duties toward them. They ultimately make clear to the nation standing in such relation to the distant colony that they hold this relation as a "Trust for Civilisation."

In the United States the first effect of such a widened sphere of political activity and responsibility will be that it will strike the death-knell to the rule of the "ward-politician," which has hitherto been the corner-stone and the key-stone to the whole of national American politics. If the timid fear that the United States is at present not

prepared for such high tasks and grave responsibilities, the answer is: that it never will become so if it remains under the bane of "back-yard" politics. The life of nations and the life of individuals have shown that those who are possessed of real vitality and strength are always elevated by the loftiness of the aims which they hold before them, and that they ultimately live up to the high standards which an idealism not divorced from reason sets before them. And so long as the Expansionists in the United States remain conscious of these ideals and never lose sight of the ultimate duties which they have towards their new dependencies, holding them as trusts for civilisation, the effects upon the American nation, and, through it, upon the world at large, can only result in blessing.

When the question of Expansion is viewed in this light it must be realised that the claims, implied in the criticism of the best Anti-Expansionists, namely, that they are moved by American Ideals which others have forsaken, are absolutely groundless. And if it be thought, by some who pride themselves upon possessing a sober and practical mind, that these Expansionist ideals are rather vague and remote as forces which directly move the interested action of a nation, and have no power to check its aggressive action when passionate interest strongly urges it on in the wrong direction; if they doubt whether these ideals are sufficiently proximate and tangible to enter into the conscious life of the individual and to affect his actions, I will sin against the dictates of good taste and will make a personal confession, confident as I am that there are thousands who feel as I do.

So far from being remote and ineffectual, I solemnly

declare that these ideals with regard to the aims of Western civilisation form the foundation of my conscious existence even in the most practical aspects of my life. That, if I were not aware of their existence at the base of my consciousness, I could not pursue the vocation of life to which I have hitherto devoted myself, and by means of which I gain my subsistence. If I did not believe that ultimately all individual efforts culminate in the increase and strengthening, as well as in the diffusion, of Western civilisation and its highest and most subtle attainments, the best that man's intelligent efforts has yet devised,—I should wish to spend my life in lotus-eating, if not to seek peace in Nirvahna.

As I have arrived at this lofty sphere of aspiration, I will draw one last conclusion in the direction of ideals from the policy of Expansion as it ought to be followed by the United States; and I do this at the risk of being considered a "mere dreamer." But there are different kinds of dreamers; there are rational and irrational dreamers. Those who have succeeded in attaining the highest achievements in the world's history might all be called, and generally were called, dreamers. No man—and for that matter no nation—can do great things unless his imagination can produce, and hold up both before the intense discriminating power of his intellect, and before the untiring and unflinching energy of his will, some great ultimate goal to lofty endeavour. In so far all great men are idealists. But the difference between these idealists and the mere dreamers is that the latter spend their lives in the contemplation of their ideals, whereas to the former the ideals illuminate their lives. The dreamer gazes upon the brilliant sun until his vision is dimmed, and his whole brain lapses

into an hypnotic state. The world outside the immediate radius of this brilliant sun is one great darkness, and he expends the weakened energy which is left to his somnolent nature in railing at this darkness and despising it. He is even unable to detect the lighter shades and half-tones, the infinite gradations which lie between the brilliancy of his distant sun and the darkness below and behind his feet. The idealist, on the other hand, having raised high aloft on the pinnacles of existence his brilliant beacon-light, does not spend his time in gazing immediately at it; but allows it to shed a lustre of illumination upon the whole roadway of life over which it shines; and instead of casting what is immediately at his feet into greater darkness, this distant light searches out every nook and cranny of existence, and enables him to pursue his path unfalteringly, to recognise the size and dimensions of each object in his path, its power of facilitating or impeding progress, of yielding or resisting; and, finally, it gives him a clear notion of distance itself. And thus he is patient, and not petulant, as regards what lies immediately before him, knowing that he has beyond a clear, lofty goal which lights and warms.

It is thus that the expansion of Western ideals will ultimately tend towards the supreme goal of the World's Peace; and I maintain in all sincerity of conviction, that it is through the introduction of the United States into this great expanding movement, and through, as a first step, the realisation of the English-Speaking Brotherhood, that this ultimate goal is most likely to be attained.

When, within the last decade, colonial expansion more and more asserted itself as the dominant motive power in the policy of European nations, the lovers of progress


and peace were struck with horror at the appearance of this new Leviathan, this great enemy of humanity, that threatened to furnish a continuance of causes for internecine warfare after the dynastic rivalries had died away, and when the racial and territorial differences seemed to be gradually losing their virulent energy in Europe. It looked as if we were entering into a chaotic period of Universal Grab, in which each nation would rush in to seize all the spoils it could carry, and would frequently have to drop them in order to fight its equally voracious neighbour. This gloomy view has been completely dispelled by the prospect of a real English-Speaking Brotherhood. For, as regards colonial expansion, I can see the English-speaking conception of colonisation in clear opposition, in the domain of material interests as well as in that of ideas and ideals, to that of the Continental European Powers. And this common ground of thought, feeling, and action will of necessity tend to bind the English-speaking peoples together. Through it I look forward to much more than an Anglo-Saxon Alliance. I can see the day when there will be a great confederation of the independent and self-governing English-speaking nations, made clearly recognisable and effective to the outer world by some new form of international corporation, which statesmen and jurists will be able to devise when the necessity of things calls for it. For, day by day, this union of the English-speaking peoples is becoming more of an accomplished fact in the social and economical life of the people themselves. Consider the strength of such a confederation! Who will say nay to it? And the stronger it is, the better for the peace of the world; it will ensure this more effectually than any number of Peace Congresses convoked by the mightiest of monarchs.

Step by step this power will advance, binding the nations together, not severing them. For it will be based upon ideas which unite, and not upon race which severs. And all those who share these ideas are *ipso facto* a part of this union; Germany, which stands before the world as a great leader of human intelligence will be with us. France, which overthrew mediæval feudalism and first raised the torch of freedom, will be with us in spite of the tragic crisis through which it is at present passing, when vicious reaction is contending with delirious anarchy;—for it must never be forgotten that the France of to-day produced the Picquarts, Zolas, and many other heroes who fought for the sanctity of justice. Thousands of Russians, their numbers constantly swelling, will be with us in spirit, and the spirit will force its essence into inert matter; these leaders will educate the people until they will modify (let us hope gradually) the spirit of their own government.

Then we shall be prepared to make an end of war; because behind the great humanitarian idea there will be the power to safeguard these ideas. "No right without might" is a cynical aphorism of which history has proved the truth. To be effective, the law must have behind it the power to enforce its decisions. It is so in national law, and it will be so in international law.

Let us allow our "dream" to materialise still further. I can see this great Confederacy of the future established permanently with its local habitation, let us say on one of the islands,—the Azores, Bermuda, the Canaries, Madeira. And here will be sitting the great Court of Arbitration, composed of most eminent men from all the nations in the Confederacy. Here will be assembled, always ready to carry into effect the laws enacted, an international army,

and an international fleet,—the police of the world's highways. No recalcitrant nation (then, and only then, will the nations be able to ~~disarm~~) could venture to oppose its will to that of this supreme representative of justice. Perhaps this court may develop into a court of appeals, dealing not only with matters of state. The function of this capital to the great Confederacy will not only concern war; but peace as well. There will be established here "Bureaux" representing the interests which all the nations have in common. As regards commerce and industry, they will distribute throughout the world important information concerning the supply and demand of the world's markets, and counteracting to some extent the clumsy economical chaos which now causes so much distress throughout the world. Science and art, which are ever the most effective bonds between civilised peoples, will there find their international habitation, and here will be established the great international universities, and libraries, and museums. There will be annual exhibitions of works of art and industry, so that the nations, comparatively so ignorant of each other's work now, should learn fully to appreciate each other. And at greater intervals there will be greater exhibitions and international meetings, the modern form of the Olympic games. The Amphyctionic Council of Delphi, as well as the Olympic Games of the small Greek communities, will find their natural and un-romantic revival in this centre of civilisation, this tangible culminating point of Western Ideals. Thus will the World's Peace be insured, the nations be brought together, and the ancient inherited prejudices and hatreds be stamped out from the face of the earth.



III

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHERHOOD

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE IMPERIAL
INSTITUTE, LONDON, THE EARL OF ROSE-
BERY, K.G., K.T., IN THE CHAIR, ON
JULY 7, 1898



III.

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHERHOOD¹

THE discussion of an Anglo-Saxon Alliance, while evoking almost universal enthusiasm and approval, both in England and in the United States, has at the same time called forth criticisms and strictures which it is well for us to study dispassionately. Though these objections come from those who are either decidedly inimical to the main spirit and substance of such an alliance, or at least show no friendly attitude towards it, their attacks are undoubtedly directed towards the weakest point of this great and all-important scheme. When, moreover, we find that these vulnerable parts are in no way essential to the main stem and body, and that, by lopping them off, we can ensure the only form of sane and healthy growth, these criticisms ought to be gratefully considered at this early stage. Strictures similar to those made by Mr Davitt in his letters to *The Times* might be made—though on different grounds and from different motives—by one who is the most ardent devotee to the idea of an alliance or complete understanding between Great Britain and her Colonies and the United States of America. It would be most distressing to him if what is, after all, a minor point were to destroy the whole of this scheme at its very inception, or that, if this minor point

¹ This lecture is here printed as prepared for delivery in London last year (1898) without any change.

itself were to gain importance, such an alliance would be jeopardised in its leading purpose, and for all time its vitality and durability would be threatened. For an effective and close amity, if not a federation, between Great Britain and the United States has been one of the dreams of my life, which appeared remote, sometimes very remote; yet which, whatever may happen, has now fortunately been brought near to realisation in the minds of the best and even the most sober people in both countries.

Mr Davitt has shown that the American nation cannot be considered to consist of Anglo-Saxons. He has pointed with force, perhaps with some exaggeration, to the people of Irish birth or descent as a strong component element in the American nation. That this is so as regards the Irish cannot be doubted, and it can be extended to other nationalities within the American people clearly not of Anglo-Saxon origin. Whatever the practical reasons or interests in speaking of such an alliance as an Anglo-Saxon Alliance may be, as a matter of truthful and accurate statement such terms can never be used to convey and to cover adequately the ideas which they are meant to impart. An alliance between the British Empire and the United States of America can never rightly be called an Anglo-Saxon Alliance; nor do we mean Anglo-Saxon when we have in mind the British Empire or even the English people—still less the American nation. They *can* all be called English-speaking nations.

Take the case of the English people. Who can define, with any claim to scientific accuracy, the ethnological elements to be found in the earliest pre-historic inhabitants, followed by Celts, Romans, Angles, Jutes, Danes, Saxons, and Normans? Who would compute and give their accurate

value in the formation of the English people, its government, policy, its intellectual, social, and economical life, to the subsequent immigration of Dutch and Flemish, French Huguenot, Italian, Jewish, weavers and craftsmen, bankers and traders, thinkers and artists? All these elements combined and intermingled, merged and fused into one another in the social and political unity of this people, have made the British Empire of to-day.

It profits little to disintegrate these component parts and weigh them separately in the scales of abstract science; it mars much, however, to turn this inaccurate abstract thought into action, into practical life and politics, and to use its theoretical dryness to fan the flames of a misguided political passion. If this be true of the dwellers in England itself and of the English people of the present, it is still more true when we consider Great Britain and Ireland, not to mention the transfusion of the Anglo-Saxon in Scotland with Celtic and other ethnological elements.

Unfortunately the misdeeds and blunders of those who governed England in the past, as well as the leading questions of actual politics in our own days, have made the Irish Question synonymous with the measure of separateness claimed by, or to be given to, the inhabitants of Ireland. But there is another side to the Irish Question which, if political passions and interests allowed of it, would be recognised as equally interesting and instructive. This Irish Question would consider the actual and historical claims which Irish people have to be an integral and important part in the wholeness of the British people and in the making of the British Empire. And if there be glory in the making of such an Empire, and justified pride in the strength and superiority of such a nation, the Irish people,

whether they accept it or not, have an undeniable claim to such glory. I am not only thinking of great individuals who made, framed, or modified the lasting fabric of this Empire, not of Wellington (who is and remains an Irish Briton more than William the Conqueror and his successors were Englishmen), of the Wolfes and Goughs, and Dillons, and Inchiquins, the Bourkes and O'Connells, the Grattans, and scores of others. I am not only bearing in mind the huge number of great Englishmen who inherited their personal greatness perhaps more from their Irish mother than from their English father; but I am thinking of the compact army of Irish Britons who fought our battles and who force us to recall the heroism of the Connaught Rangers, the Royal Irish Regiment, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and many others, while we glorify the Gordon and Seaforth Highlanders in their recent victories. Moreover we must not limit our estimate of the Irishman's share in the making of Greater Britain to the consideration of the fighter's in war; but there are the armies of working men who have contributed by their skill and the sweat of their brow to the supremacy of our manufacture and trade in Manchester, Liverpool, and all the industrial centres, and who had so great a share in the early formation of our thriving colonies beyond the seas.

Can we, even after a hasty consideration of these facts, use the term Anglo-Saxon in connection with Greater Britain in anything but the sense of a figure of speech, and a very inaccurate one at that? And when such a figure of speech is not only misleading in thought, but may work upon the feelings of great masses of people, cripple or stultify or misdirect action, what use can there be in applying it at all?

If now we turn to the United States, the term Anglo-Saxon with its faults and pedantic suggestion of ethnological fundamentality is still more inaccurate and misleading. It is true, and will always remain so, that the substructure of American national life is English, English in language, in its social and political institutions. But ethnologically the American nation presents a huge and unequalled mixture of different European races; and I venture to hold that upon this very mixture depends its ultimate strength, though it may be the source of occasional weakness and danger when the national fusion is not recognised as paramount. Nay, I venture to say that, in the present phase of American historical evolution, the incomplete state of national unity in the process of this fusion is the greatest national danger. It is, for instance, well known and readily recognised, that the preponderance of Irish influence in the politics of our own day has, on more than one occasion, given a serious turn to the gravest questions of federal politics, as it constantly and continuously affects local administration. And it will readily be seen how this may in turn evoke similar groupings and antagonisms of the other national components, which, to say the least, do not contribute to the compactness and political unity of a nation. Whenever in the United States one or the other of these would-be racial elements rises up as a majority, or even as an effective minority, and carries its separateness into political action, we shall have distinct cases of national disease and of national crises. The geographical vastness of the country is not, as De Tocqueville anticipated, the chief source of danger to American unity, not even the stereotyping of opposed interests in the East and West and the recognition of such

an opposition on the part of the people. It is only when this difference of so-called interests¹ is fixed and intensified and appeals to the passions and prejudices of the people, when it becomes social in character and develops Chauvinistic antagonisms, that it acts as a real revolutionary force. The moment the Westerner is recognised by the Easterner as distinct from himself, and recognises himself as such, the seeds of disruption are sown².

Of this there are and have been dangerous symptoms in the United States, never quite clear and clearly defined, but there all the same. It is not only that the Western

¹ I do not mean to say that when such material interests can be clearly grouped according to districts or social divisions they do not tend to strengthen tenfold the existing antagonisms; as, on the other hand, the recognition of common interests increases amity and the need for alliance, in fact, brings these uniting currents to a head. That is why the Far East, as a common fund of material interest between Great Britain and the United States, has given a consistent, firm, and strong immediate impulse to the idea of such an alliance. Such common interests will ultimately strengthen amity into alliance. But this is only because these material seeds fell upon the fertile ground of a common civilisation, national sympathies and ideals. Conversely we must hold that the Franco-Russian Alliance will always remain precarious, because it is purely opportunistic and is only based on material interest.

² The careful student of politics will realise that the fundamental danger to Italian unity, as well as to the stability of government in France, lies in the dualism and antagonism between the Northerner (Piemontese) and the Southerner (Neapolitan), the Northerner in France and the Meridional or Southerner; just as, in the first stages of the contemporary German Empire, the differences between the Prussian and South German was the most potent factor against German unity. These differences and antagonisms of temperament only become effective in the world of politics when they mean differences of social institutions, tastes, and aspirations, of tradition and ideals. They make real and full understanding impossible; and most quarrels grow out of misunderstanding.

farmer is opposed in his interests to the Eastern merchant and manufacturer¹, the Western borrower to the Eastern capitalist. These differences may no doubt create severe competition and legislative struggles; but there is no reason why they should penetrate deeply into the most complex developments of social life, and there produce, not rivalry, but actual antipathy and social antagonism.

Now this social antagonism between the East and West of the United States, so far as it may exist, is chiefly due to the very same conceptions as might be grouped round such vague and pernicious terms as Anglo-Saxon. In spite of the great emigration from the New England States to the West, and though the most active element in the West may be of New England origin, the obtrusion of such New England origin in the West and the recognition of "Mayflower pretensions" in the East are at the bottom of a great part of this social antagonism. It is no doubt true that a great deal of the active opposition against England in America within the last few years was immediately excited by the Irish enemy of the Saxon. But though this Irish opposition accounts for a good deal of the anti-English feeling in the East, it is not so in the West. In the West the antagonism to England was very much the same as the Western opposition to the pretensions to, perhaps the possession of, superior education, manners, and breeding prevalent in the Eastern States of the Union. Nay, with a large section of the population in the East itself, it was not Irish sympathy which produced the anti-English feeling, but elements of a social nature which, consciously

¹ As a matter of fact, it would be more natural to assume that the Western farmer and the Eastern merchant or importer are combined in economical interest against the Eastern manufacturer.

or unconsciously, aroused antagonism, and which might be defined as the English or Anglo-Saxon elements. It was a protest and reaction against the wave of Anglomania which has made itself felt as a social force in those classes which were socially predominant. The gibes and witticisms grouping round the catch phrases such as "'T is English you know," or the New York street-arab's query, addressed to the "dude" whose trousers were turned up, "Is it raining in London?"—the report that in certain fashionable clubs card and betting debts were computed in sovereigns and shillings,—all this is clearly indicative of social antagonisms.

When the social pretensions of such classes were thus expressed in "Anglo-Saxon" terms and when the ethnological, quasi-feudal, basis for such social distinction was fixed upon pure English descent, the internal, local, social antagonisms in the United States itself were, on suitable occasions, readily turned into strong antagonism against the original *corpus vile*, namely, England. Not only the Irish, but the Americans of German, French, and Dutch descent, and the mass of population coming from other European nations, all are naturally opposed to any Anglo-Saxon assertiveness.

What really unites all these different peoples, massed together in this great country, are the actual political institutions, the basal views and habits of life and living, and the common language. To remind them of the English origin of these at a moment when the English part of them is used to mark a distinction between certain groupings in their national society, to call upon the rivalry which comes from separateness and exclusion in the common life of social bodies—produces discord where the result ought to be harmony. For there can be no doubt that

complete national and social assimilation into the American people is reached when the foreign emigrant and his descendants,—who were at first stigmatised by cries of "Mickie" for the Irish, allusions to *Sauer-Kraut* for the Germans or Dutchmen, Dago for the Italians,—when these are no longer grouped together in distinct quarters in the larger towns, and when the English language, which includes or suggests common ways of thinking and habits of living, has been fully mastered.

If these differences are felt in the East, and are in great part responsible for English antagonisms, their original meaning has become still more comprehensive in the minds of the Westerner. To him the Easterner stands in a relation similar to that which obtains between the social Anglo-maniac and his opponent in the East. He must recognise that the conditions of Eastern life are more favourable to higher education and to all the amenities of culture than those of his own younger and ruder home, and he is on the lookout for, and on the defensive against, any arrogation of higher claims on the part of the Easterner whom he may meet. This may often blind him to the fact that it evokes in him a peculiar form of assertiveness which is frequently less dignified than it is boisterously manifest. The Western stories which turn upon the ridiculous unfitness of the florid New York "dude," the "Harvard man," or "the young lady from Boston," to adapt themselves to the healthy and unostentatious simplicity of their own life, illustrate the prevalence of feeling which goes deep down into the life of the people. Similar differences exist in England between, let us say, the Public School and University man and those who have not spent their youth in such institutions.

Now the term Anglo-Saxon, besides being inaccurately pedantic and fundamentally untrue when used to denote the uniting element between the two great peoples, is as misleading in America as it is in Great Britain and comes dangerously near to the natural prejudices of both peoples. These prejudices can be skilfully awakened and intensified, and will be effectively used on the numerous occasions which will present themselves, by those whose interest it is to keep the two nations asunder. How much such people are aware of this, and how readily such ethnological differences can be used to sow the seeds of discord, is illustrated by a telegram to *The Times* quoting a letter signed by a well known Russian writer in the *Novoe Vremya* on the occasion of Mr Gladstone's death. He says:

The strength and weakness of Mr Gladstone consisted in the fact that he was not an Englishman but a Celt, with a great soul and a great mind, but a mind without English cruelty, narrow-mindedness, and unscrupulousness in the choice of means towards an end. He was able to inspire the souls of others, but his ideals were too much for the average Englishman, in whom the spirit of the old Saxon and Norman robbers is still to be traced. He would have felt himself more at home in Russia than in England, had he known our country, but it was felt that he was attracted to our side. Little by little, the scaly covering of the Englishman left the soul of the great Celt, and he became convinced of the necessity of liberating his kinsmen the Irish. The English, however, refused to join with him when they felt that he was not one of themselves, and he died with French words upon his lips. Peace to his ashes! He has been a grand elevating example to all humanity.

I object to the term Anglo-Saxon when used to qualify the amity or alliance between Great Britain and the United States, because the ideas it conveys are inaccurate and

untrue, and further because it opens the doors to that most baneful and pernicious of modern national diseases, which has disseminated its *virus* through most European States and from which we have hitherto enjoyed comparative immunity, namely, Ethnological Chauvinism. The slightest infusion of such a spirit suggested by the term Anglo-Saxon will not only stultify the efforts towards closer national amity, but may, if insisted upon and strengthened, produce disintegrating disturbances in the internal national life of these countries.

It is interesting to note that the extreme and unbalanced form of so-called patriotism which is now designated by the term Chauvinism had its origin in the time of Napoleon, when Chauvin lived as the unbounded admirer of that great leader of men. But Chauvinism can in no sense be called an outcome, or even a modification, of patriotism. They are two distinct, if not opposed, ideas, the following of either of which points to characters and temperaments as different as the generous are from the covetous. Patriotism is a positive attitude of the soul, Chauvinism is a negative tendency or passion. Patriotism is the love of, and devotion to, the fatherland, to the wider or the more restricted home, and to the common interests and aspirations and ideals of these. Chauvinism marks the antagonistic attitude to all persons, interests, and ideas, not within this wider or narrower conception of the fatherland or home. Patriotism is love, Chauvinism is jealousy. The one is generous, the other is envious. The loving temperament makes for expansion, the jealous tends towards contraction and restriction. While the patriot who loves his people and his country is therefore likely to be tolerant, even generous and affectionate, towards the stranger, the

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Chauvinist is likely to turn the burning fire of his animosity inwards, within the narrow spheres and groupings of even his own country. Now this vice of hatred and envy which may, alas, be ingrained deep down in human nature, may have existed in all times and places of human history and may have been predominant in some; yet in our own times it has received a peculiar character, a special formulation, with an attempt at justification. I have tried to qualify the general Chauvinism in the form predominant in our time by the attribute *Ethnological Chauvinism*.

The origin of this social disease within the nations of Europe may be traced back first to Napoleon, when, with the inner growth of France and its power, and his successes in Italy, he coupled the designed enfeeblement, if not the destruction, of the German Empire by splitting it up into insignificant principalities under his own influence. There is no doubt he conceived the bold idea of the predominance of the Latin race and Empire over the Teutonic race and over the world in general. But he found himself wedged in between two forces which checked the advance of this Latin Hegemony, and which ultimately crushed him. On the one side was the Slav, on the other side there was the Anglo-Saxon. He succeeded for the time in repressing the Teuton, but he failed both in Russia and in his struggle with Great Britain.

As a reaction against this Latin wave which submerged the Teuton Empire, the German patriots endeavoured to restore the vitality of the sturdy Teutonic oak. But while the Latin Crusade had for its inspiring preacher the great leader and man of action himself, the Germanic revival fell to the lot of the theorist and thinker, and a German philosopher and professor, Fichte, in his *Reden an die*

Deutsche Nation, is the fullest exponent of these views. These again are further formulated and carried into the realms of romantic thought, theory, and science by the learned enthusiasts who led the Revolution of 1848 in Germany.

But again there turned up a great man of action who, knowing his countrymen and the trend of the times, utilised all these currents to weld together the separate blocks,—smoothly polished and florid marbles of prince-ridden principalities, and clumsy unhewn stones and rubble-stones of independent cities and towns,—the huge edifice of the German Empire. The scientific spirit which was pervading the civilised world of Western Europe was recognised by Bismarck as a useful force which could be turned into practical advantage for the great purpose he had in view. He called upon the German professor—even the ethnologist, philologist, and historian—and they obeyed his command with readiness and alacrity. The theoretical and scientific lever with which these huge building blocks were to be raised in order to construct the German Empire was to be the scientific establishment of the unity of the German people based upon the unity of Germanic races. An historical basis for German unity was not enough; an ethnological, racial unity had to be established. The historical and philological literature of German university professors belonging to the time of Bismarck's ascendancy can almost be recognised and classified by their relation to the problem of establishing, fixing, and distinguishing from those of other races, the laws and customs, literature, languages and religions, the life and thought, the productions and the aspirations of the Germanic race.

This influence went beyond the bounds of Germany: by

sympathy in England, the Freemans, and those who felt with him, thumped the Saxon drum; while, by contrast, in France, the *Fustel de Coulanges* played variations in softer strains on the theme of the *Cité Antique*. In course of time and of events Russia, in the growing vigour of its racial and national expansion, formulated and developed its Pan-Slavistic theory and war-cry.

The distinctive feature in this modern version of the old story of national lust of power is, that it now assumed a more serious and stately garb of historical justice in the pedantic pretensions of its inaccurate ethnological theories. The absurdity of any application of such ethnological theories to the practical politics of modern nations at once becomes manifest when an attempt is made to classify the inhabitants of any one of these western nations by means of such racial distinctions. What becomes of the racial unity of the present German Empire if we consider the Slavs of Prussia, the Wends in the North, and the tangle of different racial occupations and interminglings during the last thousand years within every portion of the German country? And the same applies to France and England, Italy and Spain.

But the German professor, with his political brief wrapped round the lecture-notes within the oilcloth portfolio, pressed between his broadcloth sleeve and ribs, as he walks to his lecture room, was forced further afield and deeper down in his "scientific" distinctions. The divisions he established for the purposes of national policy were but minor subdivisions of broader ethnological distinctions. Here the philologist took the lead and established "beyond all doubt" the difference, nay, the antagonism, between the Arian and the Semitic, which makes the Hindoo more closely related

to the German and Saxon than these are to Spinoza, Mendelssohn and Heine, Carl Marx and Disraeli. We can perhaps now appreciate the singular oversight of the last named statesman in not having made use of the scientific establishment of this fact in order to strengthen his imperialist views of the Indian Empire as an integral part of Great Britain.

This last named classification could further be turned to practical advantage by those in Germany whose interest it would be to set one part of the German people against another section, and to create a new party or to strengthen the hands of decrepit old ones. And thus there grew up the anti-Semitic parties in Germany and elsewhere, who could give strength and some semblance of sober dignity to their party passions or violent economic theories by so respectable a scientific justification as a racial distinction fixed thousands of years ago. This step once-made, however, has necessarily led further afield into wider and unsafer regions, the exploration and exploitation of which may ultimately lead to most disastrous results. For, when once the distinction between Arian and Semite led to the anti-Semitic movement, religious prejudices, or, at all events, religious distinctions, are necessarily carried in the wake and tend to serious complications. Were it not for the clamorous interests of recent politics in the East and West, as well as in Africa and the Far East, which absorb the attention and the passions of the nations of Europe, I venture to believe that the current Ethnological Chauvinism would have drifted more and more into the channels of religious Chauvinism. And we need but recall the history of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century in Europe to realise the effect of religious and

sectarian elements when mixed up with international partisanship!

There were striking indications within the last few years that the ethnological game was played out. In Russia the Pan-Slavistic cry was growing feebler and feebler and was gradually merging into something like a Pan-Orthodox movement, which carried very practical, if not material, plans and purposes within the religious breast of its spiritual devotion. Feeble echoes of Pan-Anglicanism made themselves heard; while the Catholic Church followed its old tradition, and the national and Germanic ardour of Berlin, if not of the whole of Germany, was diverted from the monster statues on the hills of the Rhine and the Teutoburger forest to the national Protestant churches in the German capitals. Arminius was after all a Pagan! And if this new old cry is silenced for a time beneath the din of Gatling guns, the axes of the coloniser, and the hammer of the colonial prospector, they are not silenced for good and all, and will shortly be raised again.

The result of all this is, that old antagonisms have been intensified by the introduction of these ethnological distinctions, and that new ones, non-existent before, have been created to swell their nefarious phalanx. No doubt other passions have been added to them, the greed of gold and the lust of Empire.

The result is that, with all our printing-press and the rapid exchange of thought through its channels, with our railways and telegraphs, which are supposed to bring us together and to thwart invidious distance standing between human hearts and brains, there has never been a period in the world's history when, in spite of triple and dual alliances, every nation feels more opposed to the other,

its hand ready to strike. Ask a typical Frenchman whom he loves and feels at one with? The Russian? One would like to answer him in his own vernacular: *Qu'allez vous me chanter là!* And whom does the German feel a brother or a cousin to? Surely not the Englishman! Let every one go through the list for himself and appeal to his past experience. The conception of Humanity as a really potent thought, with meaning and significance, calling forth definite feelings if not images, a conception which pervaded the thought and feeling which were supreme in the second half of the eighteenth century and moved whole nations to action, these are disused and unheard in our day, or are pityingly and incredulously smiled away as cant.

If we cannot resuscitate and infuse the spirit of life into the corpse of Humanity, we can at least prick the ethnological bubble and recall the sane nations to the reality of their inner history and the truly effective elements in the actual national and social life of our times.

Patriotism is the love we bear to our country and its people, represented by its government; the love of order and law; and the submission of the interests and the life of the individual to the State and its government, because they stand for order and law. The modern State is a product of modern history, and we need not go to the nebulous regions of pre-historic ages to seek for its *rationale* and the order and law which are its essence. If you wish to go back to the ethnological foundations, you must ignore and wipe out the history of centuries in Germany, France, Italy, England, and the United States. You must ignore the language and literature and the thought and feeling they embody and convey, the form of government evolved, the freedom and integrity of the citizen that are established,

if you wish to build your commonwealth upon racial distinctions. Arminius did not make the modern German Empire; the Anglo-Saxon did not make the England of to-day. But government, laws, institutions, customs, habits, language, thought,—these are clearly defined in each State. Every day of our lives these facts are impressed upon us in the streets of the towns and in the lanes of the country, they make up our feeling of home, our feeling of belonging to this country and not to another. These are not evoked by the stagey picture, all out of drawing, of a Saxon in wolf's-skin with spear and club, which the ethnological brush of a sign-painting politician holds before the eyes of the masses.

England is the only country in Europe which has not yet been affected to any harmful extent by this disease of Chauvinism; and there is no fear that, in spite of all the provocation which the attitude of other nations towards us arouses, we shall respond to them in the same tone. But, to call an alliance, or the growing amity between Great Britain and the United States an Anglo-Saxon alliance, and to accept such a term as embodying the essential bond of union between these two great nations, would familiarise us with evil ideas, if it did not create the evil passions. What brings us, and will hold us, together is something quite different and far more potent than the empty words and the unsound theories with regard to our racial origin.

If the forces we have just considered lead to Chauvinism, and are not the essential elements which hold people together, the question must be asked, what these binding elements really are? Sir John Seeley maintained that "the chief forces which hold a community together are common

nationality, common religion, common interest." I believe that this epitome errs in being too narrow and in omitting some elements which are perhaps the most efficient in binding people together, while at least one of the three is not essential to national unity or national amity.

I should prefer to summarise these elements under the following general headings: A common country; a common nationality; a common language; common forms of government; common culture, including customs and institutions; a common history; a common religion, in so far as religion stands for the same basis of morality; and, finally, common interests.

Now I maintain that when any group of people have all these eight elements in common, they ought of necessity to form a nation, a political unity, internally and towards the outside world; and when a group of people have not the first of these factors (the same country), but are essentially akin in the remaining seven, they ought to develop an international alliance or some close form of lasting amity. In the case of the people of Great Britain and of the United States seven of these leading features that hold a community together are actively present.

It may even be held that the first condition, a common country, which would make of the two peoples one nation, in some sense exists for them. At all events a country is sufficiently common to them to supply sentimental unity in this direction. For, as regards England, Seeley has well remarked, referring to a period when steam and electricity had not yet reduced the separating distance of the ocean, there is this fundamental difference between Spain and France on the one side and England on the other, that Spain and France were deeply involved in the struggle of Europe, from

which England has always been able to hold herself aloof. In fact, as an island, England is distinctly nearer for practical purposes to the New World and almost belongs to it or at least has the choice of belonging at her pleasure to the New World or to the Old.

As for the proximity between the two countries for persons travelling and goods interchanged, I can only say that, from continuous experience, the expenditure of money, nerve-tissue, and comfort is higher in a trip from England to Greece or any of the Balkan States, than in a voyage to New York; while it is a significant fact that the transport of goods from an American to an English port is not only cheaper than from any point in England to a short distance on the Continent, but even from one point of England to a comparatively near point on the same island. But if we turn from this question of mere physical propinquity to the feeling of the American people as regards the country, the actual soil of the British Islands, we come to a sentiment far deeper and more cogent in its binding power. It would be a very small minority of the American people who would not be overcome by a sense of home the moment they arrive on British soil, be it at Cork or Liverpool; and, after a short halt at Chester, during which they have walked through the streets of that picturesque city, they settle down in London and set foot in Westminster Abbey, passing by the monuments of patriots, statesmen, and poets whom they can rightly all claim as essentially their own! To all these people Great Britain is the "Old Country." But I will go further and venture to say, that this does not only apply to the Americans of distinctly British origin; but also to those of German and French and Dutch descent, or from any of the other European peoples, whose home has

been sufficiently long in the United States for them to have become thoroughly nationalised through the language with its literature, the customs and institutions which are practically the same in both countries. Such an one has read his Shakespeare, Macaulay, and Walter Scott from his childhood upwards; and thus Westminster Abbey and Stratford-on-Avon, and Kenilworth, and Scotland strike an old familiar tone in his mind and his heart,—whether his name be Sampson or Schley or Shafter.

Leaving the question of a common country, the bond of union becomes closer the further we proceed with the other essential features which make for unity, when once we drop the misleading and wholly illusory ethnological basis of nationality and, instead of flying to the nebulous and unknown regions of pre-historic ages, we take into account the process of real history. We then must acknowledge that the people of Great Britain and of the United States are of one nationality. I say this in spite of the Revolutionary War, and, if I did not fear to be too paradoxical, I should almost say because of it. I mean by this, that the establishment of independence in the British Colonies of North America marks a phase in the expansion of international freedom, as the advance of representative government marks the development of national freedom; and that, as the recognition of the separate household of an adult son, who has been fretting with growing animosity against the domination of parental authority, re-asserts, on a new and more propitious basis, the kinship of the two, so is it in the relation of the two nations since America is free.

There is but one real and material fact amongst many to which I wish to draw attention in view of the claims of

common nationality between these two great peoples, and that is, the question of kinship and intermarriage. If statistics could be established concerning the citizens of each country, as to those who have some member of their kith and kin, however remote, residing in the country over the sea, the numbers of these would be found to be astonishingly large—at all events, much larger than such relationship between any other two nations. And in this respect the importance of the continuous process of intermarriage, which promises to grow even more frequent and effective in the future, cannot be overestimated. For, in the making of nations, intermarriage is the most important factor in welding the diversity of race into the unity of nationality. In the history of England, Germany, France, and Italy it was chiefly this custom which enabled the numerous and discordant ethnological elements to fuse into national unity. Where larger masses of the population, as with the Hungarians and the Austrians, or smaller sections within a nationality, are kept from intermarriage, from whatever cause, the unity of the nation or of the smaller community is not complete, and no amount of government action and of administrative pressure can supply this want.

As regards the actual intercourse between the two nations, a great deal can here be done by individuals to improve and strengthen the relations between us. I would recommend a little more tolerance, intellectual sympathy, and fairness of judgment to Americans as well as to Englishmen. We must shift our standards of judgment if we mean to be fair to those who have not put themselves within the pale of our own social—often extremely provincial—laws. Such provincialism argues a want of education in some and a want of imagination in others. To put it tritely

and epigrammatically: Let us charitably remember that there is still some salvation for the man who wears a frock-coat and a round hat—if he be a foreigner! We may be ever so sure that our own rules of life and habits and fashions are the best, but we cannot judge those by them who have never recognised their sway. Also it is well for us to remember that, whatever we may justly feel with regard to our national greatness, the individual citizen—even the least distinguished—is not necessarily responsible for the superiority of his nation and country.

I would recommend every Englishman to read Lowell's essay "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners." He there strongly impresses the fact, that a first-rate American must not be confounded with a second-rate Englishman. And I should like to add: that a second-rate Englishman will never make a first-rate American. The difficulty will remain, how to recognise "the first-rate American or Englishman"? Well, there is no wholesale tag attached to them. They are not known through the paragraphs in the newspapers, nor are they always recognised by their own estimate of themselves. We can only meet each other courteously and generously, and find out for ourselves. It takes some time and acuteness of perception to realise that there is a native dignity and quiet modesty in the American, though he may successfully hide it under the boisterous ebullience of his vigorous life and manner; while, I hold, that there is a native fund of amiability and genuine cordiality deep down in the Englishman's nature—only it is often so deep down that it never appears on the surface. It is effectively checked by a narrow, "provincial" education, continued and fixed by stupid social traditions slavishly accepted and followed by all classes.

The unity of nationality is expressed in the State, in the laws and the forms of government, which actually hold the people together. Now, though England is a monarchy and the United States a republic, the fact remains that the inhabitants of both countries feel that they belong to the freest nations of the world. This freedom is the outcome of representative government, an idea and a fact born in England, to the development of which the history of the British people is one continuous illustration. It does not diminish the glory of the framers of the American constitution to say, that the central idea of liberty and self-government, which that document embodies and develops, was the natural evolution of political principles sunk deep down in their hearts and minds by their English ancestors. And the reality of a common foundation for the government and all political institutions in the case of the United States and of Great Britain impresses itself upon us, not only when we ponder or generalise on things political, but when we are living our ordinary daily lives and follow the natural interests and calls of our several avocations. It is not merely a question of political theory and speculation, it is eminently one of practical experience and of the action of life, individual as well as collective. At every step, while the Englishman or American travels abroad, even in the most civilised countries, he meets with administrative enactments, privileges, restrictions, injunctions, and directions, sent from the summits of government into the busy plains of ordinary daily life, which are foreign to him and which evoke a sense of criticism, if not of irritation and revolt. The same feeling of strangeness and of foreignness constantly comes over him, if he attempts to follow their political life, though the American considers

the legislative and administrative proceedings of a European republic, and the Englishman observes the laws and enactments of some other constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, every Englishman becomes readily familiar with the political system of the United States, and feels at home under its rule, as the American lives happily under the laws of Great Britain and can at once follow with interest the legislative work of the House of Commons.

Far more potent, however, than the ties of common descent, country, and government, is the all-comprising bond of a common language. Nay, so much do I consider this the chief force of union and amity, that I would substitute for Anglo-Saxon, or even Anglo-American, the title English-Speaking Brotherhood. For this conception is at once so wide that it comprises, not only Great Britain and Ireland and the United States, but every distant colony where English is spoken and the same thoughts and feelings, laws and institutions are therefore bound to prevail.

But with the comprehensiveness of this term we also at once come to the most important, the central and essential manifestation of a common life necessarily leading to close relationship.

We may differ from those philologists and philosophers who have exaggerated the supreme importance of language, and maintain that it actually covers the whole of human thought, so that it is supposed to precede thought. We may hold that there are other means of communicating thoughts and feelings, through the channels of other senses besides the ear. But it is an undoubted fact that language is the chief vehicle of human thought and its communication. For none covers the whole range of human experiences,

from the highest to the lowest, as does language. And if we compare the more emotional, the artistic aspect of language, with that of the other arts, which are all such powerful exponents of the national and historical life of a people, we must assign to the literary arts an exceptional position, as conveying the distinct individuality of a nation with more directness and precision than any of the other arts. I would but suggest one important distinction among many, namely, that while sculpture and music and painting and decoration can all reflect the past and express the present, literature is the only art that, with these, can also foreshadow, nay, directly evoke, the future of a nation's life.

But in art we are, no doubt, approaching the international, the common sphere of all humanity. It is on the more purely linguistic side that language becomes such a force in national life and gives such distinctness and solidarity to the communities which have the same language in common. Great statesmen have ever recognised this. We need but consider the efforts made in Prussia to introduce the German language into Poland; we need but follow in our own day the troubles of the Austrian Empire, in dealing with the Czech and German languages in Bohemia, or the power of the mere Italian language in giving substance to the cry of *Italia Irridenta* in districts nowise Italian and with populations of ethnological origin quite distinct from the main bulk of the Italian people.

We can never feel fully at home in a country where our own language is not spoken. *Das Land das meine Sprache spricht* is our true fatherland. We need the language of our parents and, still more important in the creation of national sentiment, the language of our childhood, used by those about us, our nurses and the friends of our child-

hood, in our first work and play, associated with our earliest daily impressions and—prejudices.

Here we come to the very root of national sentiment. This is the very core and centre of our thought and feeling, and it takes a considerable development of mind and experience to make us realise that other languages can exist. We need not merely laugh at the young people who have just left the schoolroom for a trip abroad and are astonished to find that even the children in the street speak French and German fluently; for this is but a proof of the central, vital position which our language holds in the consciousness of ourselves as social and political beings. When the British or American *pater familias*, travelling with a large family, jumps in despair on one of his numerous boxes at the Naples railway station, worried and harassed to distraction by an army of officials, porters, and beggars, and, frantically waving his hands, shouts: "Is there anybody here speaks *God's own language?*"—we can appreciate of what supreme importance his native language is to him.

It is further interesting to watch how delicate and sensitive an instrument a language is in the formation and crystallisation of its words for the reflection of peculiar, even subtle national characteristics. I would but ask you to consider for yourselves the nature, history, and significance of the foreign words borrowed or domesticated in a language. Such study will tell you a good deal about the position of language in national life and about the national life itself. In the literature of other European nations, besides the whole vocabulary of field sports and pastimes, which they have directly borrowed in their English form, you will find such words as "self-government,"

“gentleman,” “fair play,” “the morning tub¹,” made quite at home in their foreign English garb in a whole page of German, French, or Italian. And in our books you will find “esprit” and “chic” and “homme du monde” and “roué,” as well as “Zeitgeist” and “Sehnsucht,” “Gemüthlichkeit”—perhaps even “Bakshish” and “Kismet.” If you ponder on such words, and what they stand for, which nation has produced them, and that the other was forced to borrow them, they may tell you much about the national life of the different people. The idea of self-government, of fair play, of gentleman, do not only *happen* to be expressed in English, the facts which the words embody—the soul of the thing—were born among the English-speaking peoples, and these terms of self-government, of fair play, and of the gentleman, correspond to the essential, most lasting, most all-pervading, and most characteristic features of the life of the people in Great Britain and in the United States, whether they were first used in England or America. Purists in language and literature may deplore the importation of Americanisms into English books and periodicals; but the fact remains that they do come, and naturally and necessarily come. They very soon emerge out of the stage of slanghood and quotation marks to fully established and recognised linguistic respectability, and their right of existence is tested by this process and their power of persistency.

The binding power of a common language has never been more forcibly put than in two lines of the poet Davidson:

In all the hedges roses bud
And speech and thought are more than blood.

¹ No doubt you may also find “snob” and “flirt” and similar terms. But it is not my object to point to our national defects on this occasion.

But language in this aspect reflects more than mere words and thoughts and feelings: it shows the common customs of living as well as of thinking and feeling. People who, besides speaking the same tongue, eat and drink in the same manner, find their pleasure in games and sports and the exertion of vitality, and in contemplating the same plays and pageants, to whom the "morning tub" is an essential instrument of daily life, such people not only live together in peace, but they ought to live together.

Language thus merely reflects the same customs and institutions, the same thoughts and aspirations, the same *culture*. I have already referred to the influence derived from the fact that we read the same books. The people of the United States hardly feel that their debit account to England, with regard to poets and writers, is greater than their credit account; because they consider these authors their own, as the Englishman claims Poe, Longfellow, Hawthorne, Emerson, Lowell, Bret Harte, Mark Twain, Howells, and James. So with the artists born in America, who are fully domesticated in England, and the actors who divide their performances between the two countries; while the chairs in universities and schools in America, are, and have been, held by Britons, and an interchange is daily growing more active and frequent. Day by day our life in every sphere is becoming so thoroughly interwoven and intertwined that, not only the merchant, manufacturer, and farmer, but the author and artist, nay, the student in his remote study, must consider the sister-country while he is working for his own.

This inevitable course of the future is borne out by the past. We have a common history. Whatever the Revolutionary War may have meant and means to the people

of the United States, it can only be regarded as a natural step in the English feeling for self-government and independence. Meanwhile, the whole of American history before 1776 is to be found, not with Red Indians, but with the people of Great Britain. And what Seeley has impressed so vigorously and clearly for the Britons, when they regard Greater Britain, that the British Colonies form an integral part of Greater Britain, and that every English political view which does not include the national life of Australasia and Canada is crippled and distorted,—this applies to the attitude which the Briton must hold to the United States. The United States have not only formed a central factor in the English history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they are an essential element in the growth of national life in the present, and will become still more vital in the future.

I have more than once quoted Sir John Seeley's *Expansion of England*. There is much in this book with which I heartily agree, still more that I admire unreservedly. But there are two points in which I decidedly disagree with him: first, in the state-making importance he assigns to religion among communities on an advanced scale of political civilisation. I mean the power of religion as a fixed Church or Creed in the formation of state, as an element which binds communities together. I also disagree with him in his assumption that our Colonies are not bound to the mother-country by community of interest.

Though a common creed may be powerful in bringing or holding together people or races or nations in comparatively early phases of political development, this cannot be maintained in the more advanced stages of modern politics.

Of all Western States, for instance, Italy is perhaps the one in which one definite Church preponderates among the population with hardly a dissentient sect that might not be considered a negligible quantity. Yet it can hardly be said that this common creed was an active agent in unifying Italy in the past, nor in holding together the Italian monarchy of our own immediate days. Germany on the other hand has in our days achieved complete Imperial unity against most powerful separatist interests and traditions; and yet in Prussia, a Protestant State, there are more than one-third Roman Catholics; while in Baden and Bavaria nearly two-thirds are Roman Catholic.

The principle of religious toleration by the state, strangely sinned against by the early Pilgrim Fathers, is one of the fundamental principles in the political constitution of the United States; and, in spite of the existence of an established church in England, this principle is becoming more effective in the political and social life of Great Britain with every day.

Sectarian differences, even in communities where the differing sect forms but a small minority, always act as a severing element, disturbing or endangering the stability of the state and community. On the other hand, religion as a civilising power, as creating or modifying the national conscience, the national ethics, the force and direction of national aspirations and ideals, religion passing through the life and history of a people, is one of the most effective elements in political life. It leaves its deep and broad stamp upon national character, and thus creates or strengthens sympathy or antipathy, spiritual relationship or estrangement.

Thus, for instance, the Pilgrim Fathers, from the depths

of their religious life, convictions, and sufferings, did give a definite character to the national ethics of the United States: a stern sense of duty, of veracity and honesty, which, in spite of all individual instances in which these have been disregarded or contravened, permeate as leading principles the life of the American people in every phase. This is the historical resultant of the Puritan supremacy in America, and the British people passed through the same historical process in Europe. The Puritanism of the Commonwealth, nurtured by the Hebrew sense of abstract duty, derived direct from Moses, the Psalms, and the Prophets, however violent, coarse, or dry it may often have been, and however much, from an artistic or æsthetic point of view, we may deplore its effect upon the life of Merry England, was and is a most potent factor in the historical evolution of the national ethics of Great Britain of our day.

This and many other religious elements, which in the course of history have made us think and feel as we do, the two nations have in common, and this binds us together more than the mere adhesion to the same dogmatic creed. They make us feel at home in a country where, in the smallest dealings of daily life, we at once realise that the established expectations of truthfulness in word and deed, as well as the ultimate ideals of a high and noble life, are the same as in our own home. This common foundation of popular and national ethics and religion, the American and the Briton who have travelled far afield realise as existing to a greater degree in each of these two countries than in any other foreign land, and this will always act as a real and practically efficient link between the two nations.

And finally I come to the question of Interests which Sir John Seeley enumerates as one of the three chief elements holding communities together. Yet, strange to say, in dealing even with the British Colonies in their relation to the mother-country, this great historian has ignored the potency of their common interests, and has even implied that they might normally be opposed to one another. Now what we say of the relation between the United States and Great Britain applies *a fortiori* to that existing between Great Britain and her colonies.

The state of affairs which in the last few months has brought the question of an effective amity between the two great countries,—allies by the fulfilment of all the other conditions we have just examined,—within such close range of possible consummation and at least serious discussion, is the best answer to the doubt concerning the commonness of interest. In spite of all the historical, national, social, and ethical relationship, the most sanguine of us could not have hoped to see the 'discussion' taken up seriously for the next fifty years. And now, by one move in the Far East of several Continental Powers, bound together for the time being by common interests,—and interests only,—and by the thrilling and far-reaching events of the immediate present, the realisation of these common interests on our part has made us see with the clearness of day the essential kinship between us in every aspect of our national life.

And this condition of things is not fortuitous, and isolated, so that it occurs once now, has never occurred before, and will never occur again! Whoever studies carefully the international history of 1823 will see how strikingly parallel the conditions were then to what they

are now. In the emancipation of the South American States from the oppressive Spanish yoke, imposed with the stupid brutality of the mediæval conqueror of lands, not the modern coloniser, Cuba was the burning question. Then as now England, the self-governing country, stood by the United States against the Continental Powers forming the Holy Alliance; and, but for England, the united action of these Powers would have crushed, not only the independence of the South American States, but would have jeopardised the development of American freedom. The Monroe Doctrine was, in one sense, as much the outcome of Canning's policy, as it emanated from the combined genius and statesmanship of Adams and Monroe. Nay, the Continental diplomacy of the day attributed the authorship of the President's famous message to Canning, and it required his direct denial to discredit the report.

It has been, is, and will be, the policy of Great Britain to recognise and to safeguard the main principles of the Monroe Doctrine as much as it will be in the interest of the United States itself.

But the social and economical conditions in the national life of every people have altered since 1823. The greater the need and desire for independence, the less the possibility of isolation. The increase and facility of intercommunication have made the international organism more sensitive, and with it the commercial interdependence, as affecting, not only manufacture, but even agriculture, has made it impossible for a nation to remain absolutely self-contained, and will in the future, if disregarded in its vital claims, lead to the desiccation and ultimate annihilation of its national prosperity and life.

All great nations have now (some of them tardily)

awakened to this fact. Hence the energetic activity displayed on all sides, and the constant rivalry leading to the growth of Chauvinism. Great Britain, by centuries of continuous activity, probably by a natural aptitude of its people for colonisation, and certainly by long national training of the government and the people, has stood powerfully in the forefront of the colonial and commercial expansion, and has therefore readily evoked the combined opposition of its several European rivals. But, as the late Austrian Premier, Goluchowski, wisely saw and expressed more than a year ago, the Continental Powers in this commercial struggle have to count, not only with Great Britain, but with the United States. These two go together as the most formidable rivals of the Continental Powers. The United States can co-operate only with Great Britain in its material interests beyond its border. For England is the great Free Trader, the champion of Open Ports. As a matter of fact, in South Africa and in all British Colonies, the proportion of citizens of the United States who have introduced American industries and have themselves accumulated great wealth, is much larger than people are wont to imagine. The expansion of England and its opening out of the world's ports to commerce, is *ipso facto* the expansion of American commerce without the cost of blood and substance to the United States.

But these interests have to be maintained and safeguarded against foreign prohibitive encroachment, and herein forces may have to be joined by those who have common interests. What would happen to the China trade of the United States, with its prospective growth in future years, from the mere position of its Pacific coast, if Russia, Germany, and France were to seize the ports and close them practically

to all competing trade but their own? All American statesmen have realised the gravity of the present situation, and have been led forcibly to recognise the interests which bind them to Great Britain. But looking beyond the United States, and further ahead¹ to future years, the question of the material interests of the British Colonies, Australasia as well as Canada, in the expansion of their trade in Asia must forcibly turn them to look to their uniting mother-country for encouragement and actual support.

And if the unjust exclusion of the expanding United States and the British Colonies is carried on in the future, and right demands the support of might to enforce its claims, where is the might to be found with the peculiar development of modern, especially maritime, warfare? Where will the United States or Canada or Australasia or the Cape Colony find their coaling-stations, not to mention the Navy?

Let us but hope that the United States, now recognising the need of strengthening its forces, will solve the most difficult problem which history presents: to create a powerful army always ready to serve, yet never to rule the nation.

The present Spanish-American war is giving the United States a most instructive illustration of these needs; while at the same time it brings clearly before our eyes, as well as those of the Continental Powers, the strength of an English-Speaking Federation to protect the common interests of each one of us.

¹ Nay, it is conceivable that many of the smaller Powers of Europe, of industrial and commercial importance, yet of defensive weakness, may be forced to join the English-Speaking Federation to guard their interests against the exclusive dominance of the great Continental Powers.

It does not take much foresight for any statesman to see that the trend of national and international life for the last hundred years has been towards the expansion of international trade into regions that formerly did not come actively into the cognisance of the European diplomat; and that each State individually, or those with common interests collectively, must be prepared to guard, and enforce this free expansion. If the United States and any one of the British Colonies disregard this paramount interest of their future, and do not strengthen themselves by firm amity or alliance where such alliance is on every ground natural and imperative, they will some day find their national development and expansion checked. They will then come under the domination or tutelage of one of these great Powers, or a grouping of several of them, and the interests of such leading States will be paramount and will dictate the course of national life to the one held in tutelage.

All this, however, is impossible in view of a great English-Speaking Brotherhood. The Continental Powers know this, and the plan of their diplomacy must be to keep us asunder, by playing us off one against the other. And for this the term Anglo-Saxon must yield them an acceptable opportunity.

If I have succeeded in showing that the element of common interest also exists in bringing Great Britain and the United States together, I fear that, in dwelling upon these common interests as they might be opposed to the interests of other great European Powers, I may have given food to a Chauvinistic attitude of mind or passion, similar in kind, though on a wider basis, to the purely national Chauvinism.

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But, in dealing with the one point of interest, I have merely considered the question of trade and commerce. We must not forget, however, that, after all, commerce is not everything. It is but the forerunner of civilisation and receives its moral justification in being this. So soon as the spread of commerce is not *pari passu* with, does not mean, the spread of civilisation, it has no right to exist, no claims to the full and enthusiastic support of even those who do not immediately profit by it materially.

But there is one undoubted and undeniable cause for joy in being a Briton or an American, namely, that the nations to which we belong stand in the fore-front of civilisation and all that this means; that in political, social and economical education we stand as high as any nation, and higher than any group of nations we can imagine massed against us. In furthering our sphere of influence we are necessarily spreading the most advanced and highest results of man's collective efforts in the history of his civilisation. An English-Speaking Brotherhood will, after all, only be a step towards and link in the general alliance of civilised peoples. Its main principles and final objects will be those to which the highest and most cultured members of the French, German, and even Russian nation would subscribe; and in so far, they would morally be members of this alliance. Ask the most cultured and enlightened Russian, though he be a patriot, to speak the truth before God: whether he would think it for the good of humanity, including the future Russians themselves, that Russia as it is now, or that England should dominate the world? If he is really true to himself, I think he would like to be a member of the English-Speaking Brotherhood.

If Tennyson has sung—

That man's the best cosmopolite
Who loves his native country best,

I should like to supplement these verses by adding—

He loves his native country best
Who loves mankind the more.

Ideals are the lasting generalisations of past experiences and future aspirations. These will ever govern the world and stimulate men to action in one direction instead of another. These ideals are the same to the people of Great Britain and of the United States, and that is at once the highest and the most lasting bond of union. Here thoughts and feelings and faith of a religious order force themselves upon us. We feel that we are justified in pushing on, and there is no need of casuistry in our patriotism. For we know that what we ultimately desire is *right*, not only in the eyes of the present English or Americans, or a class of them, nor even for present man and mankind,—but in the eyes of the lasting embodiment of all highest good as man can think it and feel it and love it,—that is, God.



IV

THE NEXT WAR

WILSONISM AND ANTI-WILSONISM

1918



AN OPEN LETTER TO COLONEL ROOSEVELT

DEAR COLONEL ROOSEVELT,

Ever since, about 1886, our friend, the late Richard Watson Gilder, did me the honour to couple my name with yours in saying that, though I had then resided in England ten years, "you and I were the two youngest Americans alive," I have followed with sympathetic interest and admiration your activities and achievements in so many spheres of public life. Throughout all these years I have found myself in complete and cordial agreement with your aims and ideals.

But, from the reports of your recent speech on "The Lafayette and Marne Day" which I have read in to-day's *Times*, I regret to find that I no longer am in agreement with you,—on the contrary your words, and the attitude which you take towards the plan of a League of Nations, arouse the strongest opposition in me. Of course I depend for my information on condensed reports of your speeches in our newspapers here. Were I to see the full account of your speech, I might find,—and I sincerely hope that this may be the case—that there does not exist such a fundamental divergence of views. But, though I agree whole-heartedly with the War Aims which you define for the Allies, your words on the proposed League of Nations can but mean, that you are opposed to any proposal of the kind as militating against national Patriotism, which you appear to consider

the ultimate virtue to which men can attain. Your analogy between the husband and the patriot seems to me to be—as analogies are likely to be—misleading and fundamentally fallacious in the application you make of it. The relation of man to woman is complicated by an essential element, namely the difference of sex and all that this implies. The parental and filial relation, though still imperfect, would be less open to such fallacies. But, admitting your analogy of the good husband, I feel sure you will agree, that an attitude of regard, consideration, even affection towards all woman-kind, and the ever present consciousness of our duty to all women, will in no way weaken our affection and fidelity towards the wife. On the other hand, I believe you will also admit, that loyalty and affection to the wife will not lead the perfect husband to support or condone an injustice or a positive wrong done by the wife to another woman or to woman-kind. I even venture to believe that he will be the better husband for habitually insisting upon a wider justice and kindliness towards other women not his wife. The best conceivable son or father will maintain beneficence and justice towards the people living in his own community and country and towards human society in general. Should a father or a son do wrong or commit a crime, his son or father would abide by the law and support the administration of justice, however loyally and affectionately he may stand by the culprit to give him all the help which the law admits and filial or parental loyalty and affection exact. Surely we are not worse husbands, fathers or sons for submitting to wider and impersonal laws and duties. On the contrary, I venture to maintain, that we become less selfish and unjust to those nearer to us, our affection is deeper and more tried and secure, the more we

conform to the wider calls of duty and affection. The man who only cares for his family comes dangerously near to the man who only cares for himself, and, in moments of trial and crisis, we may find that his altruism fails him in his dealings with his very family. I have endeavoured to develop and maintain this thesis in two books which I had the honour of sending you a couple of years ago (*Aristodemocracy etc.* and *Patriotism, National and International*), in what I have called "The Ascending Scale of Duties." Beginning with duties to Self, we ascend to those to the Family, the district in which we actually live, our Country, Civilised Human Society, Humanity at large, and end beyond this planet of ours in cosmical and religious conceptions clearly and adequately expressed and formulated to the best of our capacities of thought and feeling. The higher duties in the scale must confirm, guide and modify the lower. They must confer sanction on the lower, and by such sanction the justification and the effectiveness of the lower are confirmed and increased. The wider our sphere of sympathy, altruism and affection, the stronger and safer does such manifestation become in every minor region or point within this wider sphere.

Now, you seem to me to stop short at national patriotism and to deny the validity and effectiveness of international patriotism. If the State or Country is thus made the ultimate limit, we come perilously close to that philosophy which, in Germany, under the form they themselves have called "*Politismus*," has with the mass of the thinking population replaced all humanitarian ethics as well as religion. In theory and in practice it has been the moral ground-work for the mass of the German people as well as of its philosophers, historians and statesmen. Your words,

as I read them, would bring us dangerously near to such politics, philosophy and ethics.

You will forgive me if I suggest as an explanation of your decided attitude of opposition to a "League of Nations" in any form, your impatience with, and your strong antagonism to, the "Pacifist," the Bolshevik and those International Socialists who preach class-warfare and would see the so-called Proletariat rule over every other class and occupation in civilised life,—those who have appropriated the term and the idea of Internationalism as they have wrongfully and untruthfully arrogated to themselves the use of the word Labour.

Well, those who think as I do, who passionately look forward to a League of Nations to secure Peace and Justice among the nations of the world, are equally opposed with you to "Pacifists," Bolsheviks, and International Socialists. We claim that the limitation of the "Sovereignty" of each State by the ultimate dominance of international Justice made corporate and all powerful, will confirm such sovereignty for each State. There is one supreme sovereign on this earth to whom all sovereigns and sovereign States must bow—Justice. And the limitation of the sovereignty of each State to such a supreme earthly sovereign will but confirm the independence and sovereignty of each separate State, as Law confirms and secures the liberty of the individual citizen. And we believe that loyalty and "Patriotism" to such an idea, embodied in a tangible, durable and all-powerful form, will assure, strengthen and ennoble our Patriotism to our own Country and State. Here too the higher idea and passion secure and strengthen the lower. May I suggest to you personally, that I can but believe that, while your devoted work as Governor of the State of New

York may have been a useful preparation for your beneficent tenancy of the Presidency of the United States, the political and moral training, the wider appeal to sympathy and public devotion which your greater office has given to you, have but raised and fortified your patriotism towards your native State and city. So it is or will be with the wider organisation of international justice in the new form which the Future promises to give to the world. I ventured to amend, many years ago, the (for him) cacophonous verses of Tennyson:

That man's the best cosmopolite
Who loves his native country best,

by the supplementary truth:

He loves his native country best
Who loves mankind the more.

A wider patriotism of this kind will intensify, as it will fully justify, the nearer patriotism towards our country and, with its own growth, will increase our effective work for the good of each country and the world at large. We shall know ourselves and be ourselves more truly. Even in the army, where concentrated discipline within each organisation itself is supremely desirable and necessary, the wider organisation with its aims may increase discipline, effective obedience and loyalty as well as a wider efficiency. It has been most instructive to read within the last few days (*Times*, Sept. 4th) the report of a leading war-correspondent on the recent victories of the British Army. He writes:

All this time we have been asking for a victory of the mind, and at last we have got it. The British Army, in sinking its particularism—its provinciality, if we may so express it—has found itself and has achieved a new distinction and a greater freedom under the united command than it has yet had.

The democratic States of the world will "find themselves" when they form part of such a League of Nations or, still better, when they subordinate themselves to a Supernational Court backed by Power. Only thus can Peace and Progress be secured for the suffering world.

I have always admired your courage, your straight-fighting spirit. Well, we will fight with you against the "Pacifists," Bolsheviks, and the so-called International Socialists. But we too are ready to fight, to sacrifice our lives, for the great League of Nations of the future. You are the last man whom I desire to fight.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES WALSTON.

Newton Hall,

Newton, Cambridge,

Sept. 7th, 1918.

IV

THE NEXT WAR

WILSONISM AND ANTI-WILSONISM

INTRODUCTION

IN all the discussions, official and unofficial, which have recently taken place on the great problem of the future, to prevent war and to secure international justice, the highest form to which we have attained is the suggestion of a League of Nations. None of the serious and responsible advocates of such a League have dared to go further than this form of international confederation in their boldest flights of constructive political imagination; while not a few—and these among the weightiest authorities—have, for the present at least, remained content with the widening of the international purview of the actual Allies now fighting for the final downfall of Prussian Militarism. None have boldly put forward the plan to establish, by means of international sanction, an autonomous *Supernational Court backed by Power under its own direct control*. When once such international sanction is obtained from the whole, or from a majority, of civilised States, there can be no interference on the part of the constituent States in the course of international justice, and the “supernational police force,” directly under the sole control of the supernational guardians of international justice, must then be immeasurably stronger than the military forces of any individual State or group of States. Now I consider it

of most vital importance that such a plan should be in the very fore-front of the consciousness of those who are concerned in the elaboration and realisation of the one supreme end on which the efforts and the passionate desires of the great majority of the people concerned in this war are now centred. At all events it must be considered along with all the other plans now under discussion.

It may be maintained that such a Court, which pre-demands international sanction, also presupposes the existence of a League of Nations. But this is not so. All that is needed for the establishment of such a Court is the definite sanction of every one of the States, prepared to ensure the cessation of war, for that one international act—a kind of international Referendum. This is a simpler and more practicable aim than the organisation of a new Confederation or Federation of States. The latter may grow out of such an institution of international justice and may, perhaps, *ultimately* lead to the United States of the Civilised World.

But I am convinced that, as in the past, so in the present, no security can be found in Holy or Unholy Alliances. I have given my reasons for this conviction elsewhere and for some years past¹.

I am also convinced that most, if not all, the objections which have been raised by the best authorities against a League of Nations do not hold against such a Supernational Court. At the same time I have maintained before², and I

¹ *Aristodemocracy, From the Great War Back to Moses, Christ and Plato.* See Preface to the first American and second English editions, 1916 and 1917.

² *L.c. caps. ix, x, xi, pp. 132–167; see also The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace, London and New York, 1899, pp. 109–112.*

hold this conviction still more firmly now, that the establishment of such a Court and the organisation of such a vastly predominant Police Force (Army, Navy and Air-Force) is not visionary, but eminently practical and realisable, and I have ventured to develop in outline the main features of its organisation and activity.

In any case I claim that, so far from being an idle play of irresponsible theory-mongering or Utopian dreaming, it remains of vital importance, when plans for future reconstruction of international politics are in serious contemplation, and that the ultimate aims in their highest form (however remote their realisation may appear to some) should be faced and considered before premature compromise is resorted to. For *compromise*, however powerful and ever-recurrent a factor in human affairs, must be the outcome of the actual clashing of opposed forces presented by the contending views and aims of conscious and intelligent wills, not a primary force or aim in itself. These contending views and aims of conscious and intelligent wills, however, must, before compromise is reached or accepted, be clearly expressed and advanced into the field of argument in all their logical purity and strength.

The next and last war will be fought either to confirm the full and independent establishment of a Supernational Court backed by Power under its Own Control or on the final issue of converting a precarious "League of Nations," in the form of a Confederation, into a real Federation of States, when the "Secessionists" will be overcome by the "Unionists."

THE AGE OF THE GREAT REFORMATION

IN almost every age of the past there have been writers and thinkers who have maintained that their own age was unique in history and who have pointed out striking similarities between their own times and some outstanding age in the history of mankind. In the same way many individuals believe that their own position and experiences in life are unique, as they have, also with some self-satisfaction, dwelt upon the similarities between themselves and some great personality in history. In the case of both nations and individuals such reasoning is generally proved to be fallacious. Their position and their experiences, so far from being unique, follow the ordinary course of cause and effect, while the leading conditions producing the causes remain the same in each instance. Similarities to great ages and to great personalities may no doubt be detected; but the differences are also there and outweigh in quality as well as in quantity the points of resemblance.

In spite of the truth of this generalisation, I venture to maintain that the period defined by this Great War—or, rather, the age arising out of it—will prove to be unique in history. So I also maintain that there exists the most striking analogy between this period and the age of the Reformation and Renaissance, with additional points of manifest contact with the French Revolution and the founding of the United States of America.

To begin with the latter proposition, it must however be remembered that the periods preceding Reformation and Revolution have generally prepared the fundamental

changes which have taken place and have in so far materially contributed to Reformation and Revolution. We need not dwell upon the numerous analogies between our own times and those of the end of the 18th century. They are too manifest. Nor is it necessary to point out the powerful movements in religious organisation, doctrines, and faiths, as well as in the reconstruction of our social morality, the traditions and customs of life and living, which manifest strong resemblances in our times to those of the Reformation and the Renaissance. Nor even do I propose to dwell upon the fundamental economic changes, foreshadowed or actually effected, which to a great extent underlie, or interact with, the social, moral, and religious changes. All these factors together act and react upon one another and all together contribute to what we must call political movements, producing a decided change in the social foundations and the social outlook of human society, of nations and of individuals. It is not my purpose here further to develop this suggestion of a thesis; but I cannot refrain from pointing out that, even in the definite material causes which produced or contributed to the wide social changes, the analogy between our own times and the age of the Reformation exists. For our own age has often—perhaps with some exaggeration—been called *the Age of Invention*. The influence of inventions upon the life of nations and individuals is manifest, as it has also been widely recognised and admitted in modifying the actual warfare of our times. The Reformation and Renaissance were also ages of discoveries and inventions, and we need merely point to the invention of gunpowder and the printing press to remind the reader how powerfully these modified the warfare of those days and effected fundamental changes in the

social organisation and traditions of the European world¹.

If this analogy is readily admitted, it may not be so with the other contention, namely, that our age is unique in the history of such reformatory or revolutionary movements in its distinctive and leading features.

In all ages of reformation and revolution there have been two distinctly opposed forces contending with one another, the governed and the governors, the ruled and the rulers. The ruled, the people, the dispossessed or unfavoured, prepared or encouraged by the thinkers and philanthropists and led by their chiefs, moved forward and fought against their rulers, the monarchs, the aristocracies bent upon retaining their power, supported by their statesmen and protected by their armies to preserve the integrity of their sovereignty. Whatever minor differences there may have been among the thinkers and leaders of the people, they all, and the people behind them, were united in their chief and definite aims for which they fought, as the rulers with their statesmen and their armies were prepared to arrest and to repress their onslaught.

Our own age is unique in that these essential conditions which marked the Reformation and Renaissance in the past do not exist. On the contrary, the thinkers and political leaders of the mass of the people, of "Labour," throughout the world now fighting against German autocracy, are not thus united. This want of unity does not only apply to Russia with its Anarchists, Bolsheviks, Socialists,

¹ I shall here confine myself to the consideration of the political changes and in these again especially to the modification in the conception of the State and nationality in their relation to other States and nationalities.

Minimal Socialists, Cadets,• Democrats, Constitutional Monarchists, etc., but in every country the labour parties manifest decided difference between and even opposition to one another as regards their aims in national reform. There is certainly no definite unity there.

The real claim to uniqueness in this great historical movement, however, is, that there is no difference between the rulers and the ruled with regard to the absolute need for reformation in the conception of nationality and internationality, the relation between the several States of the civilised world,—the need to extirpate, root and branch, the dominance of militarism and the securing of international peace for all times. The recognised personal heads of the great republics, Clemenceau and Wilson, are the leaders of this vast reformatory movement, and the latter is foremost in the definite formulation of the limitation of nationality and the construction and stabilisation of international justice. The sovereigns of the leading States of constitutional monarchy—foremost among them the ruling head of the British Empire—are at one with their own chief statesmen in promulgating the aims and ways and means of international reconstruction. From the early words of Mr Asquith to the clear, eminently sincere confessions of Lord Grey of Fallodon, to the critical and well-balanced expositions of Mr Balfour,—all summarised in the passionate, forceful and epigrammatic declarations of Mr Lloyd George, the need of a League of Nations in some form has been definitely impressed in the clearest language.

And the Allied armies, the soldiers and sailors, who in bygone ages blindly followed the commands of their immediate rulers in order to uphold their rule, are themselves fully and clearly imbued with the ultimate aims for which

they are fighting; while their own sufferings and the horrors which they have witnessed daily have strengthened them in the determination to secure for their children and children's children, even at the sacrifice of their own lives, the cessation of such senseless, wanton cruelty and bestiality, and the assurance of a new period of peace in which civilised man can follow his own right impulses to self-preservation and self-realisation under the restraining and lasting security of the highest and purest justice.

It is in this combination of all forces to bring about the great reformation that our age differs from all others.

INTERNATIONAL WAR MUST CEASE

Only politics for *all* civilisation till this war is won—that is what we all want most. I came out of prison like a baby that has just been born. I know very little about events that have taken place in Canada while I have been in prison. I must begin again. I must learn like a child. But there is one thing that I have not to learn, one thing I know: that humanity must make itself safe now and for all time against another fearful tragedy like that we are now undergoing. That is my politics, and (I say it reverently) my religion too. If I can do something, anything, to bring about the end for which we all pray, then I am going to do it to the best of my ability. That is all! After a visit to my home and my mother I hope to take service at the front with the Canadian forces. Dr HENRI BOLAND (Ex-Postmaster-General of the Dominion after release from German Prison. Interview to *Globe*). From *The Times*, August 7th, 1918.

* The above words express the feelings of a patriot and a practical politician who has realised from his personal sufferings what war means. They are not the words of a philosopher, nor of a dreamer dreaming theories in his

study. Still less are they those of a "pacifist." I venture to say these are the feelings of nine-tenths of the thinking men fighting at the front.

They are the feelings of the American people as represented by their trusted spokesman, President Wilson.

They are the feelings of all thinking people in the British Empire.

They are the feelings of practical business men. For it is realised, apart from ethical and humanitarian aims and aspirations, by simple practical men on sober and purely materialistic grounds, that the great aim of this war is to stop war. Whatever difficulties may stand in the way, they must be overcome; and all other considerations, political, legal, national, racial, religious or philosophical, weigh but lightly in the balance, when on the other side the supreme weight of humanity's greatest need is thrown into the scales. The plain business man realises that, apart from the loss in working-power through the death or incapacitation of the flower of youth and strength among all the civilised nations of the world; apart from the obligation to provide for the widows and orphans of those killed, as well as those maimed and incapacitated from work; apart from the absolute destruction of world treasure, the wealth in money and kind, which represents the accumulated labours of generations of men—the repayment of the debts which each nation has contracted during this war will strain the strength and resourcefulness of all civilised nations for generations to come. Even if all these debts are made good, the hands of the clock of civilisation, in its material and its moral aspect, will have been set back, set back for ever in the current of time as measured by human progress and by the ideals of man.

From the simple and sober business point of view, moreover—to go still further into details—the trend of modern labour and business enterprise has invariably been, and manifests itself more strongly every day, towards economy in co-operation. The mere wastefulness in the policing of the world, as represented by the cumbrous and antiquated system of modern nationalities and States—quite apart from the destructive antagonism of internecine war among these civilised States—leads the simplest labourer and the most sober and practical business-man to join the philanthropist and moral reformer in demanding in unequivocal terms the creation of a rational and just body, which, by co-operation and intelligent organisation, will reduce the cost of armament and the support of the guardians of the world's peace, by raising them to an international scale and thus avoid the most senseless waste of human energy, quite apart from the destruction of human happiness and progress.

If a vast majority of civilised people are thus agreed upon this need, the question to be decided concerns the means by which this great need of the world can be satisfied. For it is here that there may be some difference of opinion. Before dealing in detail with the definite objections which have been raised against the practicability of a "League of Nations," it might be as well for those who think as I do to define our own position on the whole question in a summary manner. It may even be useful to note in a bold and general outline the points in which we differ from those who have hitherto defined the claims and limitations of such a League of Nations, and positively to indicate, even in detail, the form which such an international body ought to take to secure the peace of the world:

We are not "Pacifists."

We are not Bolsheviks.

We are not Marxian "Internationalists."

We believe that war between nations *can* cease and *must* cease.

We do not believe that such peace can be secured by a League of Nations with a Parliament of Nations analogous to the government by political parties in the civilised democratic countries. For we believe that such a League of Nations will afford no stability or security of peace.

Yet we do believe that a supreme body can be created or evolved which shall be free from such insecurity.

We believe in Liberty; but we believe that Liberty can only be secured through its limitation by Law.

The supreme international limitation of Liberty must be "Justice," not entrusted to the fluctuating clash of interest and opinion of the several national representatives, ending in an equally fluctuating and insecure majority.

We do not believe in a supreme Parliament—or Sovereign State—dominating and limiting the sovereignty of the individual nations.

The Supreme International or Supernational Court backed by Power must have no other function than the establishment and maintenance of international Justice; and the members of this Court must have no other mandate. They represent no State and, for the time being, drop their nationality.

In the international world of the future, as represented by this Supreme Court, there is but one Sovereign, i.e. Justice. The Sovereign State of the World is the Highest Court of Human Justice, and therefore the Suzerain of all States.

This Supreme Court must be endowed with power in-

comparably greater than any single State or group of States; and the separate States must disarm (except for internal policing) as in civilised communities individual citizens are forbidden to carry arms.

The army and navy, under the direct authority and command of this Supreme Supernational Court, will not be composed of separate national quotas, a congeries of national quotas, combined into one army and navy. The soldiers and sailors will for the time being drop their nationality, as do the Judges of the Supreme Court, and as, by analogy, the civil servant or the soldier drops his politics in our separate States. The national soldiers will all be merged into new units and become one great international army, navy and air force.

With the central habitation and home of this Court, corresponding in some degree to the District of Columbia for the United States, and to Delhi for the Indian Empire, there will also be established military, naval and air stations, dotted over the globe to enforce the decisions of the Court at once and effectually. For this "Supreme Sovereign State of the World" all civilised men will learn in course of time to feel passionate patriotism, as now they are moved by loyalty and patriotism for their own country, for their county, district and town, and towards their family¹. A man is not a bad father because he is a good patriot. Civilised man has in all times felt intense and passionate love and has given devotion and supreme sacrifice for an idea or an ideal, especially when such feelings group round a physically perceptible centre. His religion, his church, the idea of liberty, have led him to fight and to die.

¹ See *Patriotism, National and International*, 1917, by the present writer.

We can well conceive that *all* civilised men will some day feel pride in their great centre of civilisation, *the Capitol*, with its international libraries, universities and galleries, as well as its international courts. This will be his home as a civilised man, the embodiment of all that is best in civilisation, and he will regard it with the love and the pride which the northerner and southerner, the westerner and the easterner, from whatever State of the Union he may come, regards the City of Washington and the district of Columbia.

This we do not regard as the idle dream of Utopia. It is the one great primary need of modern life.

Now, before the complete establishment of such a Supreme Sovereign State of the civilised world in the form of a Supernational Court backed by Power, or before this moral sovereign of the world has fully manifested his power, there may be one more war, leading to its final establishment. The causes for such a war will group round the process of the complete and final establishment of the sovereignty of such an international entity in conflict with the antiquated and inherited conception of nationality and sovereignty, to which the world has hitherto been accustomed. Whether it is to be finally confirmed in power or not will depend entirely upon the victory—to use the established terms of past political history—of the Federalists in this international conflict over the Confederates. It will partake of the nature of a Civil War. But it will not be between North and South, between the conflicting interests, material and moral, of the several States, but for the dominatnce and sovereignty of Justice. If it occurs at all it will be a short war.

If the civilised nations engaged in the present world war

do not become one—all having become clearly conscious that this must be the last war of nations for the dominance of the world, and its goods,—they have not learnt the simplest of all the lessons which this war is teaching us, and the catastrophes which will immediately follow upon this war will be intense. They will of necessity in the end lead to the establishment of the rule of International Justice. But even when this great lesson has been taught, there may yet occur that short civil war before those who are inalienably wedded to the absolute sovereignty of the individual States as they now exist, learn to submit in obedience to the supreme commands of the highest human justice and give expression to this supreme sovereign entity in conferring upon it constraining power to ensure obedience.

THE TRANSITION BETWEEN THIS WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPERNATIONAL JUSTICE

THIS outline is the definite scheme which we conceive to be not visionary but eminently practical, even necessary, to guard against militarism and to ensure peace for mankind in the future. On the other hand, it would be distinctly visionary to expect that such a Supernational Court of Justice backed by Power should be fully and adequately established at once—in fact, should stand before the suffering world full grown and fully armed, as the new-born Athene appeared at birth before the admiring gods. Such a world organisation will most probably not be called into existence by a single act of designed creation and organisation on the part of the several States, but will be evolved, perhaps during a lengthy process of organisation

and compromise among the several sovereign States even if they were each at once willing and desirous of calling it into early existence. Perhaps even—as we may have an opportunity of suggesting more fully when dealing with the industrial and commercial need of the future—it may be materially advanced, if not originated, out of the clash of commercial and industrial interests among the several States, out of the chaotic and internecine commercial warfare which may follow upon this war of bloodshed between nations. It may be realised by all nations that the inconsiderate pursuit of their own interests, even though modified and to some degree held in check by the common interests of the league or alliances which will arise out of this war, will of itself make it absolutely necessary to call in the guiding and directing, if not the constraining, power of reason and justice made effective and supreme¹. I even venture to believe it possible, if not probable, that the question of the treatment which Germany is to receive at the hands of the victorious allies at the end of this war will, step by step, on the purely economical ground of necessity, evolve some form of effective international justice to meet with the momentary demands of the peace-settlement, which again will prepare the way, if not lead to, the full establishment of such an international court in the first instance. It will thus not be created by one designed act of creation by patriots, jurists and philosophers; but will be naturally evolved by the logic of events out of the peace negotiations of this war. For these peace negotiations will be a lengthy and complicated business, especially on the economical and commercial side. Consider merely the task of indemnifying Belgium, France and

¹ See *Aristodemocracy*, p. xxi.

Serbia for the direct losses which they have sustained in contravention of all International Law, of public morality and justice!

Now, in establishing the claims for indemnification and the physical possibility of exacting them, the financial and commercial capabilities of the Central Powers will of necessity form the material basis of all action. I may at once say here that it seems to me puerile and premature now to argue, from a purely moral and legal point of view, as to whether Germany will be admitted into the League of Nations or not. She will *have to be admitted*, because the judges will have to decide as to what it is possible for them to exact in the way of indemnification from these Powers. Having decided this on the grounds of law and equity they will—*nolentes volentes*—be driven on to the consideration and adjudication of the international opportunities for wealth-production; and the peoples of the world will have to force such authority of adjudication upon them. The whole question of raw material, of credits and general finance, will necessarily arise and obtrude itself during the peace negotiations, until an international, industrial and commercial court will be necessarily evolved and be made the ruling factor in imposing its judgment on the world.

But this Supernational Court backed by Power has not yet been created or evolved, and it would be unwise to expect that it will be established for some time to come. The question, therefore, arises as to what is to be our attitude with regard to the defence of our own national interests, the maintenance and development of our whole national life in the States of which we are citizens? To avoid all misunderstandings those who think as I do must

clearly define their position towards the States of which they are patriotic citizens during the interval preceding the full establishment of such a Supernational Court.

Having made it quite clear that, as a guiding star, or rather a sublunary beacon-light within the actual range of realisability, we must clearly face the line of action which we should support for the welfare of our own country and State during this interregnum:—We maintain now that British sea power has saved the world from Prussian militarism and autocracy in this war, as it has policed the seas for the advantage of all nations before; and that it must be maintained in its full strength and predominance until the whole world is free from the danger of military aggression and commercial tyranny on the part of any ambitious nation. In the same way the armies and the aerial forces of the entente powers must be maintained and even developed further until such security against all aggression in the future has been definitely established. On the economical side each country and the countries leagued together against German commercial dominance and penetration will have to protect themselves commercially and agriculturally against the aggressive system which this war has clearly revealed to be the economical complement of German military ambition towards world domination,—again, until internecine antagonism has been removed and a more rational adjustment of economical independence, securing the development of every nation, is definitely and lastingly assured.

If thus we must guard ourselves against any confusion as regards our own ideals with those ideals of internationalism as are held by "Pacifists," Bolsheviks and doctrinaire Socialists on the one side, we must equally

guard ourselves against, and give timely warning of the danger threatening us from the other side, namely, the growth by reaction and by one-sided and blind opposition to such ideals, on the part of Chauvinists, Junkers and ruthless commercial egoists who exist among us as they dominate Germany. This section of "patriots" in our midst will more and more cast off all international ideals, oppose the League of Nations and gradually glide into the attitude of the Germans before the war which has brought this catastrophe upon the world. There will arise a strong party of British, perhaps American, French and Italian, *junkers* who will stigmatise as, not only impracticable, but as dangerous dreams, all attempts at further realisation of the aims and ideals for which we are fighting, the aims formulated by most of our Allied statesmen, but most clearly defined by President Wilson. There will arise—the date may not be far distant—a marked dualism between Wilsonians and anti-Wilsonians. This dualism is slowly showing itself on the horizon. It will be most clearly defined when once peace is discussed or declared. Already in the various discussions on the League of Nations the division and antagonism on these essential views are adumbrated in accordance with the rejection or the purely negative criticism of a League of Nations.

It is therefore most important that our ultimate attitude towards such a league be taken and made manifest now, and it is also of great practical consequence that the conception of such a final organisation to secure the peace of the world be clearly formulated and impressed upon the wider public in its purest and highest form and not in a temporising spirit of compromise by the acceptance of any intermediary scheme which does not fully guarantee such lasting peace.

Before, however, we venture to construct in imagination, tempered and guided by experience and reason, the essentials of such a Supernational Court backed by Power, it is instructive to recognise and to meet the criticisms which have recently been directed against the League of Nations, a term and an idea which we favour merely as a stepping stone to the efficient organisation of international justice and peace for the future.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

OBJECTIONS AND CRITICISMS

LET us now consider the objections which have been raised against the League of Nations. These will of course *a fortiori* stand against our still bolder plan of the Supernational Court which goes much further in advance of existing political organisations of national and international life and makes much more serious incursions into the sovereignty of the modern State and the claims of international law hitherto admitted. These objectors may be grouped under three heads:—First, those who are decidedly opposed to any attempt at realising such a League of Nations, either on nationalistic or Chauvinistic, or, on what might be called, romantic grounds. In the second place we have the distinctly juridical opposition of those who, through an inopportune obtrusion and exaggeration of the admitted letter and spirit of the law, as well as from the domination of the purely legal attitude of mind, are not always cognisant of the true origin of laws as the expression of the needs of a changing and developing society, while they are still more incapable of realising

fully the paramount and constraining claims of the future need of society in its growth and progress. And in the third place, we have the objections of those statesmen who are too much impressed by their experience of the past and the reality of the organisation and working of the State in the present. The result is that the difficulties and impediments, which they rightly discover in the path of future reforms and new organisation of society and the State, are unduly exaggerated by them, and that their habit of mind, enforced upon them by the actual machinery of government, is apt to rob them of faith and courage in boldly facing new issues which are imperiously demanded by the people themselves whom they are to govern.

All these three groups of critics and objectors together have in common the fear and mistrust of the doctrinaire, the constitutional or habitual repression of the impulse of constructive imagination, however much the imagination may be permeated with and produced by thoroughly practical observation and experience.

THE CHAUVINIST AND THE ROMANTICIST

There exists, as I have indicated above, in every country a strong Junker party. In Germany this Junker party, which is the nucleus of the *Alldeutsche* party, consists of the undiluted "aristocrats," chiefly the country gentlemen, and the smaller or larger landowners and "agrarians," the members of whose families constitute in the greater degree the military body, the officers of the army, as well as the civil officials, the bureaucrats. By a singular development of modern times they have transformed into an alliance their previous and essential antagonism to the industrial

and commercial classes with the leaders of industry, finance and commerce, the present *Schlotbarone*, the captains of industry and finance. By a still more singular development of these latter days they have absorbed into their expanding Pan-German body a certain section of the Socialist Party, the "majority"-leaders of the world of labour, who, while in the past and, when occasion demands even in the present, coquetting with Marxian internationalism of labour and of the whole proletariat world, are chiefly moved by a conviction that the interests of the German labourer as such are identical with those of the captains of industry and—paradoxically—even of the agrarians. For the one outstanding fact, which they recognise and strive to further, is that the wages and prosperity of the German labourer are identical with, and are certainly advanced by, the realisation of Pan-German ideals, the expansion of German industry, the domination of the world's markets and the consequent increase of wages and prosperity to the German artisan and labourer. By a facile process of sophistry they have moreover persuaded themselves that, with whatever misfortune and misery to the workers of other nationalities all over the world the dominance of Germany is accompanied, its realisation will ultimately be for the world's good; they uphold this thesis under the banner of the convenient phrase "German Kultur," which they assume is the highest form of civilisation and the diffusion and predominance of which must ultimately tend to world-progress. At certain unguarded moments all these classes in Germany in their public and deliberate statements entirely repudiated the validity of this more spiritual element in national and international life, they have thrown the banner of Kultur on the dust-heap of antiquated shibboleths, and they have

then proclaimed an unadulterated creed of pure materialism and selfishness¹.

Now these Junker parties exist in every nation. They rarely venture outside Germany crudely to express and to publish their true convictions and political faith. But in moments of irritation, aroused by the upholders of the League of Nations, or any tendencies which this implies and which they readily stigmatise as "Pacifism," Bolshevism or Socialism, they are led to repudiate *in toto* all such tendencies, motives and ideals: national and imperial aims and ideals are quite enough for them. To make their own nations strong and prosperous is, according to them, the highest and all-sufficient aim of true patriots. Whatever counteracts or limits such aims is anathema. They are always prepared to look upon any other nation or State as their natural or potential enemy; and, however sincere and intense their loyalty towards their allies for the time being may be, it takes very little to turn their friendship into enmity and peace into war. Even in their internal life they are logically and consistently led to narrow the limits of their loyalty and sympathy, and their "nationalism" takes a more isolated and antagonistic form of a political party at home as it readily degenerates into Chauvinism in relation to all other States. As in Germany for the past few generations *Germanenthum*—in spite of its ethnological absurdity when applied to the half Slav Prussian and other German States—insisted upon the limits of political privileges by means of a caricatured and exaggerated form of internal "nationalism," and has borne and bears its fruit in the poly-ethnic Austro-Hungarian empire with its

¹ See, by the present author, *What Germany is Fighting For* (1917), pp. 43 seq.

growing internal disruption, so we can notice the growth of such would-be national parties in the allied countries as well, whose watch-word is and will be—"England for the English, France for the French," nay, even "America for the Americans"—whoever they may be.

How actually to define these Englishmen, Frenchmen or Americans ethnically or by individual descent or by religious beliefs is a problem which cannot be seriously and conscientiously faced and, if it is, will at once be reduced to absurdity.

It is needless to dwell upon the fact that people possessed of such a political and social attitude of mind, who constitute the vast mass of national Chauvinists, look with contempt or mistrust and with undisguised antagonism upon all ultimate ideals and immediate schemes for international unity and justice; and it is superfluous to deal with criticisms and objections which are raised in this camp. But where these are clearly manifested and published they, at least, have the merit of establishing fundamental differences of points of view, so fundamental that agreement can never be hoped for; and it then means a clear contest as to which moral view will prevail in the end.

The group which I have designated as Romanticists cannot be classed as pure materialists, social and national egoists and cynics. They have in their favour—and in so far deserve more sympathetic consideration—a certain poetry, an intense and vivid realisation of history, a reverence for the past and faith in the unalterable and, in so far, justifiable leading characteristics of human nature and social institutions. To them war has ever existed and will always exist as an integral part of human nature. The fighting and courageous side of man ($\tauὸ\ \thetaυμοειδές$), the passionate force out of which all action and creation

grows, is one of the greatest assets for good in human nature. In its highest form it leads to chivalry and to courage in the upholders of the supreme social virtue—Patriotism. Without this the higher life of human society would be, if not inconceivable, at all events the poorer and meaner. War—besides being pre-ordained in the divine revelation of the past—especially when dominated and moved by the spirit of chivalry, is one of the greatest and noblest educators of mankind. Such is their reasoning.

When, however, we realise that even in this horrible war of machine guns, high explosives, bombs and tanks, longest ranged ordnance and the decisive power of every chance invention in modern destruction on the part of one side or the other—when we realise the poetry inherent in this point of view (which is to some degree eloquently upheld by Mr Hilaire Belloc) we cannot withhold a certain degree of sympathetic consideration. But this sympathy must needs be short-lived. For if we but realise, first, that there was but little poetry in all the wars of the past; that cruelty, deceit and meanness predominated; and, secondly, that in spite of all the heroism and sacrifice of the men fighting in the trenches (who further sacrifice their lives for the one great cause of doing away with war in the future) this war has sung the dirge of all chivalry, justice and fair-play, that it was prepared for, and is being fought, with all the means of deception which has spelt nothing more than the undoing of all the standards of truth, humanity and virtue which generations of peace and civilisation laboriously built up for us,—then the poetry vanishes and the horror and disgust alone remain.

Finally, I would remind Mr Belloc of the simple fact, that if we can enforce the laws of fair-play and chivalry

upon the fighters of future wars we can equally enforce upon them complete desistance from war¹.

THE OBJECTIONS OF THE JURISTS

Other objections (or rather doubts and criticisms) to any league of nations naturally spring from a legal attitude of mind. However deeply the jurist as such enters into the causes or origin of laws and contemplates the need for change or reform, the bias of the legal mind is always conservative and is naturally, though unduly, concerned with the formal aspect of laws and institutions arising out of the varying need of a growing, progressive society.

The supreme task of the legislator and jurist is to fix equity by law. His aim must always be to convert equity into law, to establish it as law. He thus gives it the most essential of all its elements, that is its security. He must also endeavour to give to it clearness. Formal drafting and establishment of a law aims at the avoidance of all misconception. The jurist must eliminate all loose statements, all that may admit of varied interpretation. That absolute success in this endeavour cannot be obtained is proved by the innumerable and continuous lawsuits, however clearly and with however great pains contracts, wills, etc., are drawn up by legal experts. The legal mind thus of necessity becomes formal, suspicious of ideas and of feelings and desires as such, however much these may be justified on

¹ I have developed this thesis in *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 59 seq. and 144 seq., as I have also there shown that the true analogy to was among nations is the duel and that the duel has been entirely eliminated from the life of civilised people in our day—at least in Great Britain and America.

grounds of morality or utility or even equity, and however much they may respond to social and political needs. The importance—nay the sanctity—which is thus attached to a definite legal term may often block the way to the acceptance of reforms in the constitutional rights of a people, warranted by the moral consciousness of the whole people and springing from the most pressing need of an age.

One of the most striking illustrations of this influence of legal mentality is furnished by the all-important significance given to the term “Sovereignty” in recent discussions on the League of Nations. I venture to believe that it is to a certain degree the worship of such legal formality which underlies most of the objections raised against the definite scheme to secure international peace by so great a jurist, so deep a philosopher and so humane a philanthropist as was the late Lord Parker of Waddington¹.

¹ This is also the opinion of Mr Ernest Barker in his reply to Lord Parker's article. See *The Times* of June 25th, 1918. “The sovereignty of which he writes seems to me to be a definition rather than a thing. It is a definition, as far as I know, invented by a canon lawyer, Innocent IV; expanded by a French lawyer, Jean Bodin; and popularised in England by another lawyer, John Austin. I have a profound respect for the lawyers, and I think I can almost understand their conception of sovereignty. But it is a conception, like legal conceptions in general, which is formal. If one asks what real sovereignty is, and where the real force resides that ultimately determines political action, one finds it not in a determinate person exercising a determinate complex of rights, but in

All thought, all passions, all delights,

all the ideas, thoughts, and volitions (by whatsoever name they may be called, whether it be ‘public opinion’ or ‘the general will’) that sway the frame and determine the action of a community. Sovereignty is a mental force. It resides in the minds of men who believe certain things to be good and by their wills translate these things into action. If our minds can believe in a League of Nations,

In his critical consideration of Lord Grey's pamphlet on the League of Nations, Lord Parker (*The Times*, June 23, 1918) points to the constitutional difficulty involved in the creation of such a league:

Viscount Grey admits quite candidly that the governments and states willing to join the League must understand clearly that it will impose some limitations on the national action of each. In other words the creation of the League must involve, as a condition, precedent surrender by each member of a portion of its sovereignty. Such a surrender must always be a matter of very grave import, and it is not always easy to see to what it may ultimately lead.

From a very different quarter this fact has been clearly and effectively insisted upon. Mr Belloc, in his reply to Mr Archer's article in the *Westminster Gazette*, singles out as the chief point in the whole discussion the "*sanction*" of the new international system proposed.

"There are," he maintains, "two answers to this question, and only two. Either the force must be an international force acting upon disarmed nations, or it must put the use of national armies combined in alliance to enforce upon one recalcitrant member the will of the majority.

The common objection of confused intellects that human affairs are too complex for the admission of exact principles, etc., etc., cannot be used here even by those least willing to reason.

You cannot have a mixture of the two systems, for one or the other solution will preponderate. Either you have an international armed force in comparison with which the national forces are so weak that the majority decision will certainly be obeyed; or you will have an international force so weak

and our wills co-operate in its institution, the real sovereign will have created a living fact, and the formal sovereign must be adjusted, by a new definition, to that fact."

that certain national armies in alliance against others would be the true sanction of the majority vote; or you will have an international force not supreme but strong enough to be pitted against national armies.

In the first case you have a working international society imposing peace.

In every other case save that of an international force acting upon disarmed nations you have the challenge of war.

That is why I call all this loose talk perilous. Men are in danger of setting up a positive instrument which will clash with the profound instinct of patriotism, directly challenge it, and inevitably provoke resistance.

If you decide boldly for the only solution satisfactory to those whose ideal is international; if you believe that the world has now become virtually one nation of which the old nations are only provinces, then you must consent to see the nations completely disarmed (a large order!), and you must set up some external armed body (with the three branches of air, land, and sea) which can coerce any nation recalcitrant to its orders."

There is no doubt that no scheme for the establishment of anything of the nature of a League of Nations can be conceived without some diminution of the sovereignty of the existing States. With this in view Lord Parker enlarges upon the difficulties inherent in such a scheme in the following terms:

Now let us consider for a moment what the League of Nations, as conceived by its most prominent advocates, involves. First, there is to be an international tribunal administering international law. Secondly, there is to be an international force by which the decrees of the tribunal are to be enforced. Thirdly, there is to be something in the nature of an International Legislative Council, revising and enacting international law. Fourthly, there is to be something in the nature of an international executive, charged with the duty of raising the international force and giving effect to the

international tribunal's decrees, a duty, which, if it is to be carried out successfully, must involve the right of levying men and money in the territory of each member of the league. No one will deny that in order to bring such a scheme into operation every member of the league will have to sacrifice a considerable portion of the sovereign rights which it has hereto enjoyed. It should be noticed, too, that such a surrender must be permanent in its nature. No really sovereign power can exist on sufferance merely. To admit the right of its members to withdraw from the league would be as fatal to the league's sovereign power as would have been the recognition of the right to secede from the Union to the sovereign right of the United States. If, finally, we remember that in constituting a League of Nations we shall not be dealing with more or less homogeneous parts of the same Empire, but with a number of different nationalities with distinct traditions and distinct ideas, I doubt whether the practical difficulties in the way can be exaggerated.

One of the most valid objections, with which we shall deal as we proceed, is the fourth one enumerated by him, namely, the levying of the forces or the establishment of an international executive within the several nations constituting the League. This would certainly imply an infraction of the independence or "sovereignty" of the several nations, which would be intolerable. But it must be clearly understood that contributions in money and men will not be exacted from the several sovereign States by this supernational body periodically of the nature of a tribute paid to the over-lord. The terms of foundation of this Supernational Court by the free consent of the sovereign States will give to these terms the nature of law. After this foundation any question concerning these contributions will be decided by the Court *as a matter of Law*—not as a question of administrative authority. The

admission of the authority of Law will not be derogatory to national sovereignty. I may at once anticipate, what will become evident as we proceed, and say, that in any effective and lasting scheme to ensure international peace, relative disarmament of forces designed for international war will be an essential condition; while the international tribunal, however fully organised as an international entity, will not require an executive corresponding to that of our established national States in the present. The Supernational police, the Army, Navy and Air-forces, will be directly under the orders of the supreme tribunal merely as a police force to carry out its orders in the establishment of international justice. Lord Parker, and others who agree with him, are really deterred, in spite of their sincere desire to see established a league of nations in some form or other, from following the idea to its full and ultimately logical consequences by their worship of the term and conception of "sovereignty," to such a degree, that they would entrust the guardianship of the peace of the world to the precarious trusteeship of the present alliances with their varying interests and with their fundamental differences of national character, national outlook, and national interests. All these to guard the sanctity of the so-called "sovereignty of States."

Let us examine this term and the idea it conveys. The term itself has never been clearly defined in its true legal and constitutional significance; and if it has, it has never been accepted in such a final sense by legal and constitutional authorities.

In Professor Oppenheim's lucid sketch of the history of the conception of sovereignty¹ he shows that

¹ *International Law, A Treatise* by L. Oppenheim, 2nd edition, London, 1912, p. 115.

...it becomes apparent that there is not and never was unanimity regarding this conception. It is therefore no wonder that the endeavour has been made to eliminate the conception of sovereignty from the science of politics altogether, and likewise to eliminate sovereignty as a necessary characteristic of statehood, so that States with and without sovereignty would in consequence be distinguishable. It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs. As there can be no doubt about the fact that there are semi-independent States in existence, it may well be maintained that sovereignty is divisible.

If we omit theories concerning the earliest evolution of the idea out of tribe and tribal confederacy to the city-state, and if, for the moment, we defer the consideration of Aristotle as representing the Greek conception, as well as the constitution of Imperial Rome, we find that in the medieval conception we come dangerously near to the essential principle underlying the plans and the hopes of the most modernist and futurist advocate of the League of Nations. In the theories prevalent in the Middle Ages, the whole of mankind was conceived as forming a unity of people with the Pope and the Emperor at the head: the universal Church and the universal Emperor were supposed to rule the world. When there was practically only one Church and one religion "providing spiritual unity" and one emperor representing "the temporal power" we have to deal with a unity far greater than even the most fanatic upholder of the League of Nations in our days can dream of. Yet this conception was familiar and ruled the minds of the world for centuries, even in the

time of Leibnitz. Still the idea of Sovereignty was in those days imperfectly defined.

Its real definition, partaking of the nature of a legal term, dates from the second half of the 16th century¹:

The term Sovereignty was introduced into political science by Bodin in his celebrated work *De la république*, which appeared in 1577. Before Bodin, at the end of the Middle Ages, the word "souverain" was used in France for an authority, political or other, which had no other authority above itself. Thus the highest courts were called "Cours Souverains." Bodin, however, gave quite a new meaning to the old conception. Being under the influence and in favour of the policy of centralisation initiated by Louis XI of France (1461-1483), the founder of French absolutism, he defined sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power within a State." Such power is the supreme power within a State without any restriction whatever except the Commandments of God and the Law of Nature. No constitution can limit sovereignty, which is an attribute of the king in a monarchy and of the people in a democracy. A sovereign is above positive law. A contract only is binding upon the Sovereign, because the Law of Nature commands that a contract shall be binding.

It must be noted that even in this more absolute and autocratic conception the sovereignty of the State is limited at least by "the Commandments of God and the Law of Nature." We may at once anticipate and say that the Commandments of God can be variously interpreted, and, as is shown in history and even in the present day, present no intelligible unity for the practical execution of the law. As regards the Law of Nature in regulating human conduct, it might readily give justification to the principle that "Necessity knows no law."

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 111.

In the 17th century Hobbes went even beyond Bodin, maintaining that a sovereign was not bound by anything and had a right over everything, even over religion. Hobbes had his followers; but Pufendorf denied that sovereignty includes omnipotence, and held that it may well be constitutionally restricted. In the 16th and 17th centuries, however, "sovereignty" is indivisible and contains the centralisation of all power in the hands of the sovereign, whether a monarch or the people itself in a republic. Yet the way for another conception of "sovereignty" is prepared by Locke, whose two treatises on "Government" appeared in 1689 and paved the way for the doctrine that the State itself is the original Sovereign, and that all supreme powers of the Government are derived from this Sovereignty of the State.

Owing to the political constitution of the numerous States of the German Empire in the 18th century, constitutional authorities developed the new theory of "full sovereignty" on the one hand, and "not-full or half sovereignty" on the other. When, towards the close of the 18th century, the United States of America turned from a confederation of States into a federal State, the division of Sovereignty between the sovereign federal States and the sovereign member-States appeared. Though Rousseau defended the indivisibility of Sovereignty, its divisibility became the dominant view during that period.

In the 19th century (especially since the Russian Czardom no longer exists), sovereignty with absolutism belongs practically to the past. Moreover the example of the Federal State set by the United States has been followed by Switzerland, Germany and others. The member-States of the federal State remain sovereign States; and thus the divisibility of Sovereignty is recognised.

One fact stands out most clearly from the review of the deliberate conception formed of the idea of sovereignty by publicists and jurists of all times, namely, that the sovereignty of the State is never conceived to be *absolute* even in the Middle Ages, the power of the sovereign is, at least in theory, limited by the Will of God and Law of Nature. Whatever interpretation may be given to this conception, the Law of God on earth is justice. To put it negatively: no theory of Government would admit that the sovereign power can avowedly be wielded against justice. To Aristotle the fundamental maxim of all government is that law should reign. But law itself is subject to justice and morality. To him private and public morality can never be divorced. The State must act like a just man, and the justice of the State is the same as the justice of the individual man. In the most definite form this theory of government has been enunciated as underlying the most decided act (the declaration of war) of one of the most powerful and prosperous governments of the world by President Wilson as the chief and practical motive which led the American people into this great war.

Moreover this principle has found direct recognition in the constitution of all modern democracies and is the point upon which all theorists and writers on constitutional law are agreed, however divergent their opinions may be on many fundamental principles of the theory of government. To whatever school of political theorists we belong, whatever writer on this subject we accept as authoritative, from Aristotle to Austin and Maine, Mill and Spencer, there is no one who would maintain that in modern democracies the judicature must not be independent, that government can ignore law and justice. Whatever freedom

and authority are granted to the King, the President, the Cabinet, to Parliament and the people as a whole in the making of the laws—all must submit to the laws they have made and all must bow to justice; and the administration of justice must be independent. This is borne out by all the constitutions of the leading modern democracies. Of the three departments of Government, legislation, judicature and administration, judicature stands alone in its absolute independence. In the British constitution the Bench is always conceived as being independent. In the constitution of the United States the Supreme Court is in reality supreme. As the supreme courts of the several States are the guardians of the constitutions of those States, so the Supreme Court of the United States is the guardian of the federal constitution. It has even to judge whether a measure passed by the legislative powers is not void by reason of being unconstitutional, and it may therefore have to veto the resolution of both the Houses of Congress and the President. The political consciousness of the public mind of the British people as well as of all democratic nations in modern times has become so thoroughly familiarised with this notion of the ascending scale of authority from the lower to the higher courts ending in the finality of authority of a supreme court, that it requires no strain or effort to carry on this natural and logical process of reasoning and conviction beyond the limits of local habitation and even of national boundaries to the sphere of international justice.

As a matter of fact the sovereignty of each body and of the State itself is confirmed and strengthened by the sanction given by justice, by its limitation and subordination to the power of the law. Without such limitation sovereignty becomes tyranny and licence,—whether it be the tyranny

of the autocrat or of a body of anarchists and Bolsheviks. In the life of the individual, even from the purely juridical point of view, there exists a most striking analogy which, through many centuries of social and political evolution, has become fixed in the body of the English law and has permeated the individual life of the British people and of every single subject of the King. It is to be found in the confirmation of the individual liberty of the subject by the restrictions of the *Magna Charta* in all the successive modifications of the *Habeas Corpus Act*. Fully established in the time of Charles I and passed by both Houses in 1627, followed by the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1640, it can even be traced back to the 12th century. In the second half of the 17th century, arising in the first instance out of the impeachment of Lord Clarendon, Lord Shaftesbury was chiefly instrumental in passing "A Procedure Act for empowering the legal mechanism to guard constitutional liberty." Further developed in the 18th century, the whole tendency of such legislation was, to restrict and *legalise* the restriction of personal liberty by a court and not a king or the executive or a political department, and thereby to safeguard personal liberty. Finally, by the legislation of 1816 and of 1898 (further restrictions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act) and of 1906, steps were taken to put an end to all forms of legal detention in public or private custody.

By such restrictions personal liberty is secured. The people know this. Now, what liberty is to the individual, sovereignty is to the State. The people of civilised and democratic nations know, or will have to know, that by legal restriction of the sovereignty of each State they will secure national sovereignty.

But in the history of human institutions it has been found that laws could not be effectually imposed, however much they harmonised with the moral consciousness, and even the physical needs, of the people, unless they were backed by power to enforce them. It has even been found that the rules and elaboration of the laws themselves to meet all contingencies of life were not systematically and completely formulated until the power to enforce the law was itself established and organised. If this is shown by the history of municipal and State law, it cannot be otherwise with international law.

So much however we may assert: that from the juridical point of view there is nothing in the spirit of the law, in the past as well as in the present, there is even nothing in the position which we may accord to the conception of sovereignty in the life of each nation and State, to prevent the establishment of international sovereignty, of a Supernational Court backed by Power to limit the sovereignty of each independent State.

THE OBJECTIONS OF STATESMEN AND ADMINISTRATORS

If the legal mind is, by its very nature, opposed to the acceptance of new ideas which fundamentally alter the existing state of things as formulated in existing laws, the same applies, in a different sphere of public life, to the statesman and administrator. The opposition to the League of Nations is in this case not theoretical, but practical. The executive and administrative officials are oppressed by the weight of the actual conditions, their inherent complexity, and the still greater complexity and inter-

dependence of all the forces which actually make up the international and national government. It may perhaps be an almost universal experience in the personal history of every statesman and administrator that, however open to great ideas he may have been when in his youth he entered upon a political career, however definite and vital his determination may have been to be guided by ideals and to realise ideas in political practice, as he proceeds in his work, in observation and experience of the actual conditions of government, of the things that are, he more and more loses faith in his power of realising great ideas and even in the ideals themselves. He becomes more and more impressed with the urgency of the definite demands before him, with the difficulty of satisfying each one of those demands, with the amount of energy which is required in order to deal effectively with even the minor material conditions and personal considerations which surround the definite task itself, and with the ever-growing, avalanche-like number of such immediate questions, problems, and tasks, that not only does he lose sight of the broader, fundamental principles and ideas, but from doubt and resignation he turns to contempt and opposition as regards their desirability and practicability. "He cannot see the forest for the trees." The danger is that he thus loses the sense of proportion, that the definite tasks before him and the difficulties which these present to the realisation of wider ideas and ideals, cause him to lose sight of, and faith in, the wider ideals themselves to which they ought to be subordinated, as, on the other hand, the visionary or doctrinaire is apt to neglect and underestimate, if not to despise, the definite tasks and the practical difficulties which lie between him and his great ideas.

It would be grossly unfair to maintain that this has been the case with the statesmen and executive officials who have recently taken part in the public discussion concerning the League of Nations, notably in the case of those who, in the debate on Lord Parmoor's bill in the House of Lords and in the public pronouncements from eminent members of the House of Commons, have pointed out the difficulties which actually prevail when such a fundamental reform in the constitution of the country is to be carried into effect. These leaders of thought and of public life have all of them recognised the need for some action of the kind in the immediate future, they are fully alive to the moral, social and political necessity of some such reform, and yet they have thought it their duty to warn the enthusiast of the innumerable actual difficulties which lie between the conception and the realisation of a consummation devoutly to be wished. In this they have no doubt done great public service; while they have, also doubtlessly, in no way swept aside the great scheme as set before the world by President Wilson and by Lord Grey from the platform of interallied politics.

Still, if I venture to believe that in their attitude of mind "they are sicklied o'er with the pale cast of" experience to such a degree that they have given undue prominence to these undoubted difficulties, I in no way wish it to be believed that those who think as I do, do not fully recognise the numerous obstacles which must be overcome before any scheme, especially one so revolutionary as the establishment of a Supernational Court backed by Power necessarily carries with it, is accepted. I may be allowed to add that I have received the strongest and most unexpected encouragement from the public recognition given to the

bold scheme which we advocate, by one of the greatest administrators of our time, whose eminently successful life was passed in carrying into actual effectiveness reforms and laws under the most overwhelming difficulties and complexities in the social and political conditions of the people among whom he lived, so that no man was ever better able to judge of what it was possible to achieve in adapting great principles and reforms to the actual exigencies of popular and political life. I mean the late Lord Cromer. In dealing critically with the scheme for the establishment of such an international tribunal as published by me he wrote:

It would indeed be a mistake for practical politicians to brush aside summarily proposals of this nature on the ground that they are unpracticable and can only be regarded as dreams of Utopian idealists. Not only moralists and thinkers but also the general mass of the public are yearning for the discovery of some means to prevent future wars and to relieve the heavy burden of taxation due to the maintenance of enormous armaments¹.

Now if we consider the debate in the House of Lords on June 26th and in the House of Commons on August 1st of this year (1918), we find that the leading statesmen (in this case Lord Curzon and Mr Balfour) are agreed that "something must be done," and that they were honestly bent on giving tangible and effective form to Lord Parmoor's bill. This view is emphatically confirmed by the remarks of Lord Curzon:

The noble viscount (Lord Bryce) reminded us just now that it has received the formal acceptance of the majority of the leading statesmen who are fighting in the cause of the Allies. He mentioned the speeches and pronouncements of

¹ See *Spectator*, June 3rd, 1916. Review of *Aristodemocracy, etc.*

President Wilson in America, of Mr Balfour, of the present Prime Minister, of Mr Asquith, and the pamphlet recently published by Lord Grey of Fallodon. There was one utterance to which the noble viscount did not refer, but of which it may be worth while to remind the House. In the reply of the Allies to President Wilson on January 10th, 1917, there appeared the following passage which I quote as covering a much wider area and therefore carrying a much greater authority than the individual utterances of statesmen: "The Allies said they associated themselves whole-heartedly with the plan to create a League of Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world." So much for the opinions expressed by Allied statesmen. Among the neutral States we have had similar expressions of opinion, and among our enemies lip service has been rendered to the idea in the speeches of Count Hertling and Count Czernin. It is unnecessary for me to analyse the difference in motive or phraseology of these various utterances. They may have been animated by different convictions, but I think that they do show that the idea itself cannot be ruled out, that it has come into the world of international politics and relations to stay, and that if there were any disposition on the part either of nations or of statesmen to treat it as an inconvenient intruder and sweep it on one side, the public opinion of the countries they represented would protest and insist on it being maintained. . . .

There is one most encouraging reflection to which no allusion has so far been made. To a large extent a League of Nations is already in existence, or rather there are two Leagues of Nations in existence at this moment. The first is the League of the British Empire, comprising something like 450,000,000 of people, or one-quarter of the entire population of the globe. No fresh constitution is required to call that League into being. Its governing body is already in existence, and is sitting in London in the shape of the Imperial War Cabinet. There are the statesmen from all parts of the world representing the views, the aspirations and the hopes of this great aggregation of mankind. There is also the League of the Allied Nations, who have combined together to resist the

militarism of Germany. Those States number between 20 and 30. There is in existence at Paris the machinery by which the representatives of the four most important of these States—Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States—already take common action in respect of military matters, finance, shipping and food. This League possesses its own armaments. Those armaments have actually been placed under a single commander. The organisation is happily elastic. It has been a good deal perfected in recent times and it may develop into something larger in the future. I am not including in this League China and the other great Allied States who are not directly represented at Paris. These two Leagues embrace within their ambit something like 700,000,000 people, or about two-fifths of the human race. It is quite true that those Leagues have been designed for the prosecution of the War, but it may be that in the last resort they may be useful for the maintenance of peace. I concur in the observation that if the larger scheme in which we are all interested fails to materialise, here, at any rate, is a nucleus from which it may be possible to proceed.

The noble viscount pointed out that there are a great many schemes in existence to constitute a League of Nations. In so far as these contemplate a more consistent application of the recognised rules of international law in ordinary international disputes, they are merely an extension of the principle of arbitration which has already made such progress during the last 20 or 30 years. For that kind of work no sanction is required, and it does not much matter if you are merely going to extend the principle of arbitration whether you appoint a new tribunal for the purpose or whether you have an ad hoc tribunal for individual cases as they arise, or whether you continue your references to the Tribunal at the Hague.

But I agree that we want now and henceforward to go further than arbitration. We want to deal with cases and with the constitution of a tribunal that may not merely settle disputes when they arise, but that as far as possible may render war, if not impossible, at any rate more difficult and more risky in the future. That we shall not do in all probability

merely by measures of persuasion or of arbitration. In the last resort you must contemplate the use of force, in other words, you must contemplate having some sort of sanction in the background. That is the new element in the situation which differentiates these proposals from earlier schemes for an extended settlement of international dispute by arbitration alone. The kind of cases for which you want this new body are the cases which the noble viscount described to us—the kind of case which there is no existing law to decide, which is outside the scope of international jurisprudence as laid down in definite rules, the kind of cases in which the honour or sentiment or the political ambition of a State are engaged, and which have in history, as we all know, been the most prolific sources of war. In these schemes I find a general concurrence in certain features. Firstly in the institution of a court or conference or tribunal, to which all the signatory parties pledge themselves to refer their disputes before going to war; secondly the imposition of a moratorium for delay pending decision, during which no hostilities are to be permitted and any Power commencing or continuing hostilities is to be regarded as an offending party; and thirdly, the existence of a sanction for enforcing the decrees of the supreme body.

Mr Balfour gives the same general support, though in his speech in the House of Commons he was chiefly concerned in reminding the enthusiastic supporters of the bill, of the many difficulties in the actual creation of such a League of Nations. The following passage confirms this:

I am one of those who, while keenly alive to the difficulties of the subject, are most convinced that something of the sort must be done, and that civilisation will be bankrupt, will have proved itself utterly incompetent to carry out the duties which it recognises itself are its duties, unless it can within a measurable time evolve some methods which will prevent a repetition of the world catastrophe under which we are all groaning. Therefore I am one of those who are

prepared vehemently to preach, and to the best of my ability I have preached, the doctrine of the League of Nations.

In the same debate Sir Mark Sykes has most forcibly impressed the urgency of the world's need for such a body:

Colonel Sir Mark Sykes said, that if the civilised world was to continue to develop it was an absolute necessity that some machinery should be found to prevent wars. Quite apart from ideals, if he was the grossest epicurean he would say the same thing. Comparing the devastation wrought by the Frederick-the-Great wars with the Napoleonic wars, and that of the Napoleonic wars with the American Civil War, and comparing the destruction of that war with that of the present war, it would be seen that a war 50 years hence would not merely shake the fabric of civilisation but would bring it to an end, and unless some device was discovered to prevent the catastrophe we should sink not merely into spiritual barbarism but into material barbarism and the grass would grow in our streets. Therefore, if the League of Nations was the machinery to prevent war, then the idea would have the good wishes of the whole of the civilised world.

In considering their criticisms, however, I must at once insist on a most important point in our favour, namely, *that most of the objections raised hold against the League of Nations; but would not hold against the Supernational Court backed by Power.*

The first and most general objection raised by Lord Curzon concerns the question of sovereignty with which we have already dealt.

"Some people," he says, "seem to imagine that you can set up an International Court with an International Police. It is supposed that the Powers in general are to represent only such forces as the Court may decree, and that the whole of such forces are to be at the disposal of the Court to deal with any offending nation. I doubt very much whether Sovereign

States would submit to this restriction, almost derogation, of their sovereignty."

Mr Balfour puts the objection in a different form:

It was said that the business of a League of Nations was to enforce treaties and prevent wars. For that purpose it was hoped to see established a kind of supernational High Court of Justice in relation to the various nations as the various states in America are to the Supreme Court of America, and that this Court would secure the enforcement of contracts between nation and nation and prevent wars, just as the Courts of law in civilised countries enforced contracts between citizens and prevented recourse to the methods of personal violence by the use of the legal methods carried out by the police. That is just where the parallel actually breaks down. The right hon. gentleman who made the suggestion did not tell us where the international police were to be found which would enforce contracts between one nation and another. A scheme for enforcing contracts between nations failed when it lacked the basis on which the enforcement of contracts depended—namely, the power that lay behind the decision of the Court.

The question is one of fact, as to what the peoples of the civilised world would or would not do. I venture at least to doubt whether, if there were a referendum or *plebiscite* of the peoples of the civilised world, it might not yield unexpected results as to their readiness to curtail national sovereignty. If it can be proved that such a Supernational Court with power to enforce its enactments were the only means of assuring peace to the world, and if it is conceded that peace *must* in the future be assured, such a court and such supernational power must be accepted by the world.

The next difficulty, pointed out by Lord Curzon as well as by Mr Balfour, regards the constitution of such a

league and the question, whether it is to consist of all the Powers, including the smaller Powers, or only of the Great Powers? In the latter case is Germany to be included or not? As I have maintained above, the introduction of the question with regard to Germany is premature and needless. The Germany that has brought about this war and the Germany that is now carrying on this war with its actual methods and future aims cannot be included. Unless the militaristic disturber of the world's peace is removed from the family of nations, it is useless to speculate on anything of the nature of a League of Nations at all. It is also useless to speculate on the nature of the Germany which will emerge from the ruins of this war and out of the victory of the Allied Powers who stand for the securing of the world's peace in the future.

Now, it is important to remember that our international or supernational supreme Court will in no way be analogous to any one of the greater or lesser Powers and States actually in existence; but will, in fact, only be a court dealing with the international relations of civilised States and only with the international aspects of such relations. The Supernational Court will be chiefly a court of equity, more than a court of law; and the members of the Court will in no way be chosen exclusively among jurists, however important their presence may be within such a body. These members will not sit as representatives of the several nations great or small; and will, above all, not approach their judicial duties with any mandate to represent the interests of their own nation or State. He would indeed be bold who would come before the world with a fully matured, cut and dry, system for the selection and organisation of the Court itself. But I may nevertheless be allowed to remark that

the difficulties presented by this problem are in no way insuperable; that the several civilised States, as well as self-governing Colonies, can each be represented on the ground of the percentage of their inhabitants counted by the million. The real difficulty arises when Mr Balfour points to the fallacious reasoning on the part of those who see a parallel between the several courts of law in civilised countries, whose enactments are carried out by their own police, and that of such an international court. He maintains that a scheme for enforcing contracts between nations fails when it lacks the basis on which such a contract depends, namely—the power which lies behind the decision of the court.

I admit that all depends upon the nature of this international police. If the force behind the League or the Court consists of the whole or the majority of the several national armies and navies combined against a recalcitrant culprit, the whole scheme is in danger of falling to the ground and the door is opened to all the usual rivalries, intrigues, and fortuitous combinations with which history is familiar in the past in the form of holy or unholy alliances. Moreover the intrusion of outside authority, from wheresoever it may come, into the government of independent nations as they now exist, and the direct ordering of their military and naval forces, would indeed be an intolerable incursion into national sovereignty. But such is not our conception of the supernational police-force. It is to form an independent international force, military, naval and aerial, whose sole duty and business it is to carry out the orders of the supreme court. Nor, in our conception, is this force to be a motley congeries of national units. The national quotas are all to be merged together into a military

unit obeying the orders of its leaders. The armies of the Middle Ages and even later ones furnish abundant evidence that such forces will obey the orders of their superiors. And we may even venture to suggest that the consciousness that they are fighting for the world's justice and the supreme sovereignty above all nations will furnish a moral groundwork leading to conviction and favouring the birth and growth of enthusiasm and devotion.

But here we come upon another fundamental difficulty referred to by Lord Curzon and many other critics, namely the question of the limitation of armaments. Though, no doubt, every State must maintain forces to ensure law and order within its boundaries—in one word a police-force—and though this may have to be extended in the form of a relatively small army and navy, the existence of the supreme supernational court with its own army and navy would imply the practical disarmament of all nations with regard to the forces as now conceived for purposes of international war. This may indeed be considered a fantastic or Utopian condition. But it is not so. The days are not far removed when, practically, all citizens carried arms. This is now illegal in most civilised countries, and the prohibitory law is carried into effect with comparative efficiency. We maintain, with sober and in no way visionary conviction, that it will be easier to disarm nations than it is individuals, as also it will be easier to prevent quarrels and transgressions of the law leading to murder in the mass-murder of war than it is in private assassination or manslaughter. In the latter the law can only act in a deterrent direction by the punishment of the crime when it has already been committed; in the case of nations war can be prevented by adequate forces before it has been

initiated, or at least before it has progressed in its criminal nefariousness. Such efficient prohibition can even be effective as regards the modern applications of scientific discovery to the instruments of destruction in warfare to which Lord Curzon refers as an insuperable difficulty for the realisation of an effective League of Nations to prevent war. For while land-motors and aeroplanes will develop in the future to a degree which cannot be anticipated by the present imagination, and while such improved instruments of transportation might, when war ensues, be adapted to belligerent purposes, it would be illegal to construct such instruments of war, except directly to increase the belligerent power of the *supernational* police. Whatever may be done in secret, and whatever evasions may be practised by an ill-disposed nation, it is extremely unlikely that means will not be found to neutralise their effect.

As regards disarmament, it must furthermore be borne in mind that the economical aspect of this question was before the war considered the chief argument in favour of securing international peace. The impossibility of continuing to bear the burdens of the ever increasing armaments in those days caused most nations to cry "halt." The stupendous—almost incredible—economic sacrifices which have been made by all belligerents during the war, and the prospect of still further developments after the war (unless peace is absolutely assured) will of themselves force all nations to pronounce their veto. The whole tendency of modern commerce and industry in the direction of pooling expenditure and output shows the way to the production of international armaments and military forces to secure peace and justice¹. All nations great and small, beyond

¹ See *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 153 seq.

the present belligerents, are concerned and directly interested in such a consummation and would, or should, be prepared to bring it about. But here comes the definite and not unimportant question: What is to become of all the valuable material for armies and navies possessed, especially by the Great Powers now at war? Is this all to be lost or annihilated? To this not unimportant problem the Supernational Army offers a solution—the only solution. Each one of the Powers is to be credited with the value it contributes to the Supernational Military Forces. The present neutral Powers, including the smaller Powers (not now possessed of such armaments) will be debited with their share of direct financial contribution to the Supernational Court in partial payment of the contribution which the Great Powers have in part made in kind in the form of armaments. There would be no injustice in such an arrangement, as the neutral and smaller Powers would receive the same protection as the Great Powers without any expenditure in armaments, in armies and navies.

Finally, Lord Curzon has undoubtedly revealed one of the greatest difficulties of all, as Mr Balfour and others have also put the pertinent question, whether the several States as international units are to be definitely fixed in the form of the *status quo* as it existed before this war, or in the form in which they will be placed after the war, in which so much will depend upon the final and complete victory of the Allies. In the establishment of the terms of peace it will be an essential task to fix the geographical and ethnological limits of the several States so as to avoid injustice and just causes for complaint as regards the future. This will be one of the most difficult problems presented to the peace-makers. Beyond this, however,

there arises the indubitable fact that nations cannot be stereotyped in their existence, that they are organic entities with the essential attribute of growth and development in their very existence. As Lord Curzon has put it:

Whatever the result of the present war may be, it is quite clear that the map of Europe, and, to a large extent, the map of the world will be rearranged. Nothing will be quite like what it was before. You must provide for legitimate territorial expansion and rearrangement in the future. You cannot stereotype existing conditions of affairs. You cannot, to repeat the famous phrase, "set bounds to the march of nations."

No one in his senses will deny or underestimate the difficulty of the problem here presented. It is of all, perhaps the most potent cause of war. All the greater becomes the need to modify it by the infusion of justice. The most important safeguard for the future in regulating the organic development of nations possessed of vitality and therefore of internal and external movement and change, is to be found in what in a modern phrase is called "self-determination of nationality." The claims of such self-determination can best be decided by a neutral and perfectly impartial court of equity. No doubt it is here that the functions and duties of such a court become most complicated and difficult, and that the safeguarding of the legitimate sovereignty of each State will constantly present most important problems for equitable solution. For we can readily perceive how international settlement of national law and practice with regard to the foreign traveller or resident in the several countries, even perhaps the fixing of the conditions for naturalisation and the mutual rights and duties of the naturalised citizen, though undoubtedly and distinctly within the authority of each State fashioning

its own laws, may frequently lead to complications between the several nations and to a final appeal for equitable adjustment. One of the prominent aims for which the Allies have been fighting—namely the claims of the weak nationalities—as well as the natural and justified suspicion and repression of the “foreign” elements within the several nationalities, shows a tendency towards a recrudescence of the narrowest and most aggressive “national and Chauvinistic spirit” even in the most liberal States. In so far as this development of “nationalism” is undoubtedly opposed to the firmer establishment and growth of the international spirit, we must repeat, that if there is a genuine and all-surpassing need and desire to prevent war in the future, the appeal to a supreme and impartial court of equity can, in this case, be the only condition to avoid or to mitigate causes of friction and the appeal to force in war.

The difficulties produced in this department of national and international life become still more pointed and active in the region of “Colonial expansion.” The whole question assumes its most acute and immediate form, especially in the view of the distribution of raw material, above all from tropical regions. Here, again, if war is to be prevented, there is the greatest need for international adjustment by means of supreme equity in the form of a commercial department in the activities of such a supreme international court. As I have ventured to maintain above and on a previous occasion¹, the effective organisation of such a court of commercial and financial arbitration may, from the very nature of things and events, be one of the first departments which it will be found necessary to establish

¹ Above p. 158 and also *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, 1st American edition and 2nd English edition, pp. xviii seq.

as a direct outcome of the peace negotiations following upon this war.

THE FUNCTIONS AND THE LOCAL HABITATION OF THE SUPERNATIONAL COURT¹

As we have said before this Supernational Court backed by Power, as we conceive it, will not be of the nature of any one of the existing States. The nearest approach to it, as a recognisable political body with a definite local habitation, is the capital of the United States in the district of Columbia. This legislative, judicial and administrative centre for the whole American Federation is, however, in no way confined to its purely judicial functions. Though our supreme court would have its local habitation (let us assume, in the Channel Isles) this local habitation, though administered quasi-municipally as the district of Columbia is administered, would, like the latter, in no way form a separate State by itself in relation to other nationalities, not even a State within the federation of the United States. On the other hand, though like the Federal capital of America it would be the central seat whence issue the authority and the command for the military and naval forces, it would differ from it in that this international

¹ I had long ago endeavoured to sketch out the actual conditions under which such a court would function in a definite local habitation in my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, published in 1899, pp. 110 seq., and again in *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 154 seq. In my first sketch on the subject for the local habitation, I suggested one of the islands such as the Azores, Bermudas, Madeira, or the Canaries; in my second, one or more of the Channel Isles.

police would in its main body¹ be centred and housed on the land of these islands with naval harbours, aerodromes and submarine bases. On the other hand it would not be the seat for the Federal Parliament, the Senate and the Congress; nor would it be the effective federal centre for federal administration, postal service and all the other federal departments of government which make this the true centre of national and not only the international life of the United States. Still less would it become the seat of the distinct national unity as differentiated from, or eventually even opposed to, other definite nations.

In its main essence this would merely be a habitation for the international court of justice; and the administration of this limited district itself would in no way form the essential business of the supreme body, as little as the regulation of the homestead or house in which we dwell constitutes the essential business of the ordinary bread-winner. The business of this body would always be essentially international, in the direct preservation of the peace of nations, including arbitration, adjudication, and international legislation. But in so far as departments and developments of modern life are essentially international the judiciary functions would naturally increase and extend and develop with the growth, sanction and power of internationality over the whole civilised world. It would be useless as well as unwise to attempt to forecast this extension and development in the future; but we must already recognise that there are certain practical and pressing needs in the life and activities of every civilised

¹ As mentioned above, p. 158, there would be minor local centres for the secure policing of the world by land, sea and air forces, distributed over the world, especially in the more remote districts.

nation which are essentially international in character or at least have a tendency to become so. Such for instance are the important departments of patents and copyrights which, from their very nature, tend towards internationality. A still more important, though less manifest and tangible, development of modern life, is that of publicity especially as developed in modern journalism. I have elsewhere endeavoured to emphasise the need for the regulation of this powerful modern development of public and private life as regards the safe-guarding of Truth¹. For Truth, which directly produces confidence, ensures peace, is, when maintained, one of the greatest practical and indispensable assets of modern existence, as its destruction or insecurity is not only the source of material loss and individual unhappiness, but also the ruin of peace, national and international. Had it been possible to enforce upon the civilised world the clear apprehension of the actual facts and conditions and actions which led to this war, the war could never have taken place. Now, we maintain that it ought to be one of the fundamental and inalienable rights and duties of this international body to publish throughout the whole civilised world its findings, decisions, and enactments, and it ought to be one of the fundamental conditions of the sanction of the constituent States founding the international League, that the actual publication and distribution of the findings of this international court be not prevented or impeded in any part of this civilised world. As a logical consequence it may even be that a department of the tribunal be directly concerned with the adjustment of litigation concerning statements made

¹ For further elucidation of this question see *Truth, an Essay on Moral Reconstruction.*

through the existing channels of publicity, and that the jurisdiction be even extended beyond mere "matters of state"; so that ultimately this supreme court may be the final instance of appeal for cases of "slander and libel," private as well as public. In contradistinction to the nature of the laws of libel as they now exist in most countries, in which material loss is made one of the essential conditions for establishing a claim, the direct and supreme aim of this supreme court will be the establishment and maintenance of Truth itself in its most theoretical and spiritual aspect.

It is also probable that this supreme court might be authoritatively appealed to by States, by nationalities, perhaps even by oppressed minorities within a State or community, for an opinion or for arbitration in cases of dispute, without any request for a final decision and, still less, for the enforcement of such a decision. In such a case the mere academic pronouncement of equitable opinion, carrying great moral weight, may be of the greatest use in the intermediary help furnished by such a supreme body.

But we must take timely warning and must remind ourselves that our impulse to call in the help of imagination, though in no way divorced from sobriety and experience, and to illustrate the practicability of such a scheme, should not carry us too far. Suffice it again to state that this court will only be concerned in matters in so far as they essentially partake of an international character.

The habitation of this supreme court will also be of a distinctly international character, as would naturally be the case from the international character of the judicial body ruling there. It would therefore tend to become

the centre of the spiritual and intellectual life of the whole civilised world. Libraries, Universities, Art-academies, Museums, would naturally find here their most prominent and most representative home. It would be the seat for all great international exhibitions, all scientific and learned congresses, and, so far from obliterating the national personality and individuality of the several peoples, it would bring these to full expression and fruition, as it would also lead to the sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the differing national individuality of character and genius among the peoples of all nations. It would be the central home of all progress, of all individuality, and of all tolerance.

Finally, one of the great needs of the world, and at the same time one of the most immediate needs for the practical working of such an international court, would no doubt ultimately be satisfied in the more or less gradual evolution or the immediate and definite acceptance of some universal language. For, as I have maintained elsewhere¹,

I fully realise that there is one great stumbling-block to this advance in civilisation and substantiation of the unity of such international effort and power. This is to be found in the question of language: "It is typified by the Tower of Babel." The ancient Hebrews were led by a correct instinct when they attempted to erect such a tower. But we all know that they failed in this endeavour. Languages will always unite or separate, and difference of language may prevent complete understanding between the peoples. In so far it will prevent complete international understanding and international fusion. On the other hand, as I insisted upon the desirability of developing and maintaining individuality throughout the nations—which of itself would in no way

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 163 seq.

suffer from wider federation—so I do not think that it would in any way be desirable to check the expression of national individuality by obliterating national language. Still less could it be ever contemplated to deprive ourselves of the treasures of human thought and art which have taken actual form in the national literature of each people. But we cannot doubt that the need of one common language for all civilised peoples remains. Even the Hague Convention has been enabled to do its work in spite of the great divergencies in the languages of its representatives. More and more as time goes on, and the more real the need and the feeling for a great international confederation becomes, until finally we attain to its realisation in such an International Court endowed with the power to coerce all nations into conformity with its supreme decrees, the necessity for one common language, co-existing with all other national languages, will make itself felt.

Whether this linguistic unity is to be found in the accepted dominance of one of the existing modern languages or of a new language like Esperanto, or of an ancient language, especially Latin in a revived form, it is impossible and needless to predict. It may not come at all. But the fact remains that in the interests of universal peace, as well as of the progress of the world, it is highly desirable that an international language be introduced among the civilised peoples. I have ventured to plead for the revival of Latin which commends itself on so many grounds¹:

The Middle Ages, or rather the beginnings of the Renaissance, prove the value and the efficiency of such a dominating language. In this case it was the property of the lettered or learned, or of the superior classes, beginning with the clerks who held in their hands the all-powerful factor in life, namely, the education of the young. Moreover, they had, as a substratum of such international unity, the organisation of the Catholic Church spread over the whole civilised world. Be-

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 164-167.

ginning with the Church and its priests, however, the knowledge of this common language extended to a considerable degree among the ruling classes. The result was—to take but one type of most definite and direct influence on the national mind throughout the whole world by one man or a group of men, the bearers of great thought—the result was, that Erasmus could travel, converse and lecture throughout the whole of Europe, occupy a chair in the University of Cambridge, influence the leaders of thought, at one with him in his great endeavour of world reform (not only or chiefly, reform of sectarian religion), in his native Holland, in Germany, in Switzerland, and in Italy, directly affecting by his thought and his teaching people of every class in all these countries, and finally fixing and perpetuating this influence in laying down in his books what he had to say in a language intelligible to the readers of all nations. He and the Oxford reformers realised this international power and cherished international aims not very distant from those which we cherish at this moment. He and his fellow-militants also realised fully the power for good which was vested in a Church that was catholic—i.e., universal, international, human. But his chief object was to use it for the humanising of humanity, not the vicious confirmation of separatism, whether nationalistic or sectarian, in religion. The supreme aim of these great men was to humanise and to educate the clerks who were the teachers of the rising generations and, through them, ultimately to raise mankind. So clear and strong was the faith of these men in this final mission, that More really sacrificed his life, because he was opposed to nationalism, to Chauvinism which threatened to rob humanism of its catholic and universal effectiveness, to dehumanise the spirit of refining love in mankind, and to give full sway to the spread of national and local hatred, ending, as it did, in endless wars throughout the world.

Erasmus and his followers possessed the one great asset of a common international language, which, though it was not destined to help them directly and completely to realise their great and beneficent aims, did undoubtedly contribute to what may perhaps be the greatest advance in civilisation

which the world has yet seen since the days of ancient Hellas.

Is it quite impracticable and utterly unrealisable to restore the Latin language to life, and, after spreading it throughout the whole world in the education of the young, to leave it in the course of actual evolution to widen out and modify itself in this process of life, so that it should adapt itself to all the needs of modern intercourse and thus contribute a most powerful element to the realisation of our final ideals?

It cannot be a disadvantage that Latin was the disseminator of great ideas throughout the Middle Ages, and the vehicle of expression of the whole of the Christian civilisation; that it was the linguistic expression of the widest diffusion of civilisation through the greatest organised instrument of civilisation, namely, the Roman Empire. Nor can it even be a disadvantage that it should, to a certain extent, contain and reflect in itself—sometimes only the shadow instead of the reality—the highest spirit of Hellenism. Personally, I confess that I should have preferred Greek to Latin, because I deem those elements of higher culture embodied in the term Hellenism more important for humanity than are to be found in other language. But a moment's thought will tell us that practically this would be impossible. The mere fact of such a difference of alphabet between Greek and Latin would be of the greatest practical effect as regards the comparative facilities of introducing either. But the Latin alphabet and the Latin script have penetrated throughout the whole of the civilised world and must be acquired by every schoolboy and schoolgirl to whatever nation they may belong. It was not merely pedantry or theatrical romanticism which led Bismarck to attempt to drive out the Latin alphabet from writing and printing—as far as he was able to do so—in Germany, and to restore Gothic characters. It was not merely meant to be an aid internally to consolidate Germanenthum: but it was already a direct anticipation of the dreams of the present Alldtsche party, to force Pan-Germanism upon the whole civilised world; first, by blood and iron; then by gold and commercial concessions and promotions; and finally by

the forcible supremacy of the German Kultur, which even a Nietzsche considered inferior to that of the Latin races. In spite of his efforts, no German who can read and write is unacquainted with Latin script. Surely we need not construct a modern language in our study when for countless ages and in the present day the ancient Latin language, never for one moment dead in European history, is still with us, and though asleep, still lives, and can readily be aroused from its slumbers and assist in the great and peaceful battle which will lead to the final victory of civilised humanity.

I have ventured in the foregoing to justify the conviction, which many of us share, that the peace of the world in the future will only be fully secured when a Supreme International, a Supernational Court backed by Power, is established, and is placed in a position to enforce its decisions upon the world. Nothing short of this will ensure peace. Nor can we even approach in any form, even the most inadequate, the solution of this international problem, until this war ends in the complete victory of the Allies and the destruction for all time of Prussian Militarism, which dominates the political and social life of the German nation as it now is.

After such a victory the courses open to the Allies, in order to secure peace, are the following: Either "nothing is done"; and then war is bound to recur within the lapse of a short time. If however "something is done," it may merely be the confirmation and further formulation of the present alliances into a league to secure peace by means of common consent and treaties. Or a League of Nations, in the form of a voluntary confederation of all civilised nations, with or without Germany, is established and organised with cogent binding agreements and concessions. Or, finally the great and difficult task of establishing a

Supernational Court backed by Power upon the lines we have indicated is boldly undertaken at once.

Now, we should welcome any one of these attempts, and give our loyal support to its realisation, feeling confident that the tendency, the natural evolution of such an idea and purpose will be towards the more complete establishment of such international, juridical power. But we also venture to believe that the full and definite result will not be obtained until the complete form of safeguarding peace in the direction we have indicated is attained. We also think it probable that, before this is attained, the numerous causes of divergence of interests and opinions inherent in all other forms and, especially, the conflict between those who raise national sovereignty to a degree of absolute supremacy, whose conception of common action does not go further than confederacy and will not admit of complete federation, may in all probability lead to a conflict—the next and last war—which will coerce the “secessionists of the world” into the acceptance of the complete and truly lasting Federation of the Civilised World.

In any case we venture to believe that it is of some use to formulate and to make public the highest and most complete form of such a union of all states to ensure peace, to prepare the consciousness of civilised men for the problem and the solution of such matters which lie before them now, even though it may only lead in the immediate future to a less perfect organisation of this union of all democratic peoples.

V

LEAGUE OF DREAMS OR LEAGUE
OF REALITIES?

A SUPERNATIONAL JURY AND POLICE FORCE
(THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER
FEBRUARY 1919)



LEAGUE OF DREAMS OR LEAGUE OF REALITIES ?

A SUPERNATIONAL JURY AND POLICE FORCE¹

SIR HERBERT STEPHEN, in his article entitled "The League of Dreams" (in the January number of this *Review*), has detected and exposed with incisive directness the heel of Achilles in the armour of argument with which Lord Robert Cecil defends the League of Nations against the assaults of its critics. Lord Robert Cecil apparently renounces all claim to coercive enforcement of the decisions of such a League; limits its power of preventing war in the future to an agreement or treaty among the members of the League to delay their decision to go to war until the *casus belli* has been submitted to arbitration; and relies

¹ For a fuller exposition of the scheme advocated for a League of Nations I must refer to the following publications: *The Next War, Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism*, with An Open Letter to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, published by the Cambridge University Press, October, 1918; also *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, London and New York, 1916. At a still earlier date the same scheme was put forward and upheld in *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, London and New York, 1899. In this book was published my address on "The English-Speaking Brotherhood" (delivered at the Imperial Institute, London, 1898, Lord Rosebery in the chair) which was designed to bring the United States and Great Britain more closely together as the immediate centre for a wider League of Nations to follow.

ultimately upon "organised and concentrated international public opinion" to take the place of force in carrying out the decrees of the League. Sir Herbert Stephen rightly maintains that if public opinion represents in the body politic the mind, the court of law represents the hand; and that there must be force to back the decisions of the court:

The resort to physical force is the "ultimate sanction" of the decree alike of law and of public opinion. If so much be admitted, we come next to the essential and, I think, insuperable difficulty of the League of Nations. Granted that you have the wisest and most dignified court of law imaginable, supported to the utmost by public opinion of the most enlightened kind, they are powerless unless the decrees of the court can be carried out, if necessary, by physical force. . . . The international court of law is not a real court of law; the mind of the League of Nations has got to do without a hand.

On the ground of these objections, Sir Herbert comes to the following conclusion:

There is every reason to think that, unless mankind and their most profound emotions change into something quite different from what they have hitherto been, the League of Nations, if it ever exists, will fail to prevent the occurrence of war. We are asked to sacrifice the best things we have in order to obtain a remote and exceedingly improbable advantage. Our only wise course is to recognise the truth at once, and destroy an insane project by plainly and openly refusing to have anything to do with it.

To my mind, there is no valid ground for such a counsel of despair with regard to the powerful movement throughout the whole civilised world, summarised under the phrase the League of Nations. Sir Herbert Stephen's writings and pronouncements have the initial advantage, and owe to

it their constraining power in argument, of directness and honesty, still more of a manifest opposition to all cant and false sentiment. They appear to be the mouthpiece of the healthy body of men who uphold British common sense, the strength and sobriety of established law marshalled against the exotic host engaged in theory-mongering, in visionary philanthropy and irresponsible sentimentality. But in this case it is he who is tilting at windmills with heavy armour. In the question before us, Sir Herbert and those who think as he does, do not represent common sense, either British or foreign. They ignore the world of facts as opposed to the world of theory; the world of theory in this case being the absolute supremacy of the law and the legal mind over the needs of modern man and the practical mind of civilised society. Historical instances and analogies are of no use in this case; the Holy Alliance and the body of Sovereigns and statesmen who produced it furnish no parallel. Nor do the various Revolutions of the past and the popular upheavals against established authority furnish any analogy, as little as the wild theories and the rhetorical pronouncements of the Bolsheviks of our own day represent this popular movement of civilised society throughout the world. Sir Herbert must realise that, to use a popular phrase, we are "up against" facts of universal and restraining validity and urgency which cannot be ignored. No amount of legal theory and precedent and the arguments based upon them can remove these facts and their constraining forcefulness on the present issues. Sovereigns and statesmen, soldiers and civilians, rich and poor, capital and labour, are all agreed that war must cease. The grounds for this decision, moreover, are not merely spiritual, religious, philosophical, intellectual

and philanthropic, but are eminently material as well: they are economical, based upon the essential interests of capital and labour together. Moreover, they are based upon the most fundamental material fact of life, that is, self-preservation. The mass of the people throughout the world will refuse to sacrifice a life for effete and unsubstantial ideas such as national glorification. It is more than a mere boast or rhetorical phrase that the peoples of the United States fought to defend the world against Prussian Militarism and to stop war in the future. This is a great fact and not a theory. This is the common sense of the world. All classes, the governing and the governed, the soldiers and civilians, are agreed on this point. There is no analogy in history for such a universal movement and determination. All the subtle arguments—legal and diplomatic, historical and biological, national and Chauvinistic and romantic—are swept to the winds in the face of this all-constraining need of modern society. Apart from theory and philosophy, logic and morality, which confirm and justify the determination of civilised common sense and of popular need, the material facts must carry this movement to a successful accomplishment.

Now in the criticisms of Sir Herbert Stephen and in the objections raised by most of the critics and even many of the upholders of the League of Nations, one of the many schemes (the one I am about to put forward) that are now before us has not been considered or has been ignored; and this scheme will answer the essential objections to the central argument advanced by Sir Herbert as well as by other pronounced opponents and half-hearted supporters.

Admitting that all attempts to prevent war in the future will fail, unless the international or supernational tribunal

or court of law or jury be provided with physical force to carry its decisions into effect, the question must be considered whether it be not practicable, even absolutely necessary, to create such a tribunal in the future. Those who think as I do, maintain that this is possible, in fact that it is the only solution of the problem; and that, step by step, all the individual and immediate problems with which the Peace Conference will now be occupied will of themselves tend to produce such a condition. There are three essential facts to be borne in mind:

First, that this Supernational Tribunal or jury will not constitute a Supernational State, with supernational executive and legislative as well as judicative powers, and that, even as regards its judicative function, it will be strictly limited to the decisions concerning the purely international aspect of matters on which litigation arises;

Second, that it will not even be a directly legislative body, but only judicative;

Third, that this international body must have direct control of its own international police-force receiving, through one great act of the League of Nations assembled at their Peace Conference, the international sanction for the creation of such a force under the direct control of the court.

As regards the first condition, a closer study of the apparent difficulties in realising any scheme to enforce peace, and the ensuing criticisms and objections, will reveal this fact of supreme central importance: that all critics assume in their minds the creation of a Supernational State, be it in the form of federation or confederacy. The tribunal is conceived to be a "Parliament of Nations" with more or less absolute executive control as well as

legislative function, placed over and above the constituent States and nationalities forming the League. The representative members forming this federal or confederate League are assumed directly to represent the several States by whom they are thus delegated with an avowed or implied mandate to represent each separate State. It must at once be evident to even the most superficial inquirer that the action of such a body will frequently, if not always, constitute a direct encroachment on the sovereignty of each State and nation, and will, according to our present conception of nationality and policy, be intolerable. It will open the door to innumerable complications and conflicts. This direct interference with national sovereignty and independence would reach a climax in the eventuality when the Supernational Tribunal should order the separate States to send forward their armies and navies to coerce a recalcitrant offender against the decisions of the court, and would be reduced to practical absurdity when its own military force had to be directed against the offending State itself. I may at once anticipate the explanation which constitutes the third condition, that the international police-force which we contemplate will not consist of separate national armies and navies, nor even of a congeries of such national quotas combined as separate units into one international police-force. The judges or jurors of this Supernational Court will, in the first place, have no national mandate. They will, for the time being, as regards their international office and function, have dropped their nationality, as our national judges must ignore their local origin within each State, and all personal and local interests with which they have been associated, in carrying out their judicial functions.

The Supernational Court will in no way constitute a State exercising all the functions of a modern State; perhaps it ought not even to be a court of law composed of judges; but merely a jury to ensure equity: and before this jury the litigants will present their several claims for final adjudication.

When this supreme body to enforce peace is thus conceived, most of the objections raised by Sir Herbert Stephen fall to the ground. The same applies to the very able disquisition by Professor A. F. Pollard on *The League of Nations, an Historical Argument*, recently published by the Oxford Press. His objections to a Supernational Court backed by power appear to me all to rest on the assumption that such a court implies the creation of a Supernational State. If, as I venture to believe, his conclusions suffer from an exaggeration of the constraining validity of historical arguments applied to the present and future needs of modern society, as those of other critics suffer from the dominant attitude of mind of the jurist, the statesman, the Chauvinist and Romanticist, I am far from underestimating the great value of his historical contributions to the problem. Among these I would single out the illuminating passages (pp. 52-58) on the enactment of the writ *de pace habenda* by Henry the Second, which he adduces as an analogy to the present conditions of international litigation. He has shown how this writ led by natural social evolution to the establishment of the jury, without doctrinaire "paper enactments" forcing new legal procedure upon the body of recalcitrant freemen, and how this formed a groundwork for the solid edifice of English Common Law and legal procedure. But we must remind him that, though Henry the Second did not enforce a

fixed and complete system of jurisdiction upon the people, he still had behind him all the power of the State to enforce the decisions of the jury. The limitations of the Supernational Court, as we conceive it, are completely analogous to those of the juries to whom the writ *de pace habenda* applied. Moreover, we may suggest that the process of social and historical evolution which in our *national* life led to the firm establishment of English Common Law in those early days, may *internationally* lead ultimately to the full establishment of a complete and organic federation of States, to the dominance of a Super-State of the civilised world. But for the present we must distinctly limit ourselves to the establishment of a Supernational Court or jury, which, on its part, limits itself, in the first instance, to the enforcement of peace and the settlement of purely international differences. I should also venture to remind Professor Pollard that if, by means of a treaty, the several Powers can of their free will establish a league to delay war or make any effective alliance for any purpose, they can make a treaty, enact and establish a Supernational Court or jury, and provide it with a police-force of its own to enforce its decisions. Only this one free act of the several independent States is needed to avoid all future encroachments upon the sovereignty of the several States.

We now come to the second essential point. If this international court is in no sense to be an administrative body (except to administer the actual *Domus* or residence of the court and its own international police to enforce its decisions), it will not even be a legislative body. It will thus differ essentially from the Parliaments of the several States and even from the Hague Convention of the past,

which set itself the task of discussing problems of prospective international differences, as a prophylactic against dissension and war. The Hague Convention thus was an anomalous organisation, without complete sanction and binding authority from all the participants, but practically in a position to legislate in international law. The body, as we conceive it, for the enforcement of peace in the future, will not directly have the function of drafting and establishing laws, still less of producing a code of international law; but will have the definite task of deciding the individual cases of controversy before it in the spirit of equity, which in no way excludes the consideration of the body of international law as it now exists without binding sanction and authority from the independent civilised States of the world. Its function will thus correspond more to that of a jury than to that of a court of justice, though it would probably be presided over and directed by one eminently conversant with legal procedure. The members of this jury would not necessarily be jurists or parliamentarians. They would be men of the highest intellectuality, character and distinction, deputed from each nation to uphold the cause of justice. This would be their duty and no other. They would have no further mandate from their several nations. They would solemnly declare, on taking office, that they will perform this duty irrespective of all other interests, personal or national. The world could trust them to carry out this task as civilised nations now trust their judges to be impartial. Lawyers and statesmen would argue their cases before them with all the force of their trained intellects, with the knowledge of international law as it exists, and with command of all legal technicalities; but the duty of the jury would simply be to discover the

right and to enforce it when it had been sanctioned by their own solemn convictions. They might individually fail from incompetence and fall or glide into dishonour. No counsel of perfection can be expected in this world of ours. But they will bring us as near to, and help us as easily through, the narrow gates of truth and justice as any conceivable body of men or human institution can do.

We need not enter into the question of how and in what proportion the several States are to be represented. This is a problem of comparatively simple solution. Perhaps the simplest method will be on the basis of the number of inhabitants counted by the million. In the first instance, the nations represented will only be those who have attained a high standard in civilisation and self-government. But eligibility will not be fixed for all times; and, with the process of social and historical evolution, new nations will be admitted into the League and send their representatives. Such a body will once and for all meet the inept and constantly repeated "practical" objection, that Great Britain might, under certain eventualities, find herself in a minority in the court compared with the majority of her national competitors or enemies; and that, in such a case, it is against all reason and human nature to expect a nation to abide by the decisions of such a court and to fight against its own just interests. It is even conceivable that in some cases the representative or representatives of one great nation will vote with the majority against the interests of their own State, while those of their rivals or enemies may vote in the minority.

Thus, though not a legislative body in the literal acceptation of that term, every one of its decisions and enactments will become precedents for future decisions and will collec-

tively, as is the case in English Common Law, form a kind of Corpus to guide the administration of the law in the future.

The third and last essential condition is, that the police-force be under the direct control of the Supernational Court and constitute a complete military force (army, navy and aerial service), not composed of separate national quotas or detachments from the several States in any way maintaining their national separateness, but, as a force, merging their original nationality into new supernational solidarity.

Common sense and recent experience (if such were required) will amply justify all the objections which have been raised against the suggestion that the separate States within the League will be willing (or always able even if they should so determine) to transport their own forces to distant parts of the world in order to fight the army of a recalcitrant State because of an issue in which they are in no way directly interested or concerned. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, the direct request or order issued by a supernational body for the mobilisation of the forces of an independent State will constitute an unbearable incursion on the sovereignty of the State. It is futile to reply by pointing to the constraining power of treaties and to the definite and most recent examples of the effect which the breach of Belgian neutrality on the part of Germany had in inducing Great Britain to enter the War, or of the yet more ideal and abstract motives which led the United States to enter the conflict. Great Britain was directly interested in preserving Belgian neutrality; and the United States ultimately determined to declare war because of indiscriminate U-boat destruction, including the

loss of life and property of her own citizens—not to mention more remote, though none the less vital, national interests of her own. As regards a supernational police-force, composed of independent quotas from the several States, it has been rightly maintained that critical, if not disastrous, conditions might arise when such a national unit is ordered to fight against its own State and its own people.

No, the supernational force to carry into effect the decisions of the Supernational Court must consist of a fresh body of men who (like the judges) have, for the duration of their service, dropped their nationality. It must be an entirely new and separate body. The mercenary armies (literally, the "soldiers") of the Middle Ages, and of later times, constitute an argument in fact that the creation of such a force is not only possible, but is in conformity with past events and human nature. The difference between such a new force and the mercenary armies of the past will be of a moral nature, the importance and effectiveness of which can hardly be overestimated. They will not fight simply to obey the commands of their masters in any cause, good or bad, without question or conviction; but they will always be conscious of the essential fact, that they are fighting in the cause of justice and at the behest of justice, and that they form an important part of that great and supreme body which guards justice in the world and the rights of humanity.

These are not philosophic or philanthropic shibboleths, but hard and simple facts of common sense which move and constrain every normal civilised human being, to whatever nationality or class he belongs. I can here cut short the arguments in answer to the criticism of Sir Herbert Stephen and those who agree with him. But I desire to

repeat with emphasis what I have already stated elsewhere¹, that until such an International Court backed by power is finally and effectively established (which necessarily includes comparative disarmament), the several nations, and especially the British Empire, will have effectually to guard themselves against actual or potential enemies who threaten peace as well as their own self-preservation; that Great Britain must retain full "command of the sea" and keep her military forces of every class in efficient readiness and must protect herself against German "commercial penetration." However, if not through the wisdom of those assembled in the great Peace Conference at this most auspicious moment in the history of civilisation, such supernational power to enforce peace is prepared or carried into effect, then economic necessity will in the future, on its part, force the civilised world to take such action, let us hope not at the cost of much intervening suffering to mankind.

In conclusion I desire to repeat, what I have maintained elsewhere, that, should the discussions of this issue at the Peace Conference merely result in the confirmation, and the more deliberate organisation, of the present alliance of the States opposed to the Central Powers, with the chief object of preventing war in the future, those who think as I do will gratefully accept this result as a most important step in the right direction. Even if the only truly positive result were to be a solemn treaty between Great Britain and the United States mutually to keep the peace and to combine in enforcing peace throughout the world, this would be a world-achievement almost worth the sacrifices of the Great War. In 1898 (in my address on "The English-

¹ *The Next War, etc.*

Speaking Brotherhood" at the Imperial Institute¹) I argued that such a closer union between Great Britain and the United States and of the whole English-speaking world might form the nucleus for a wider League of Nations and secure the World's Peace by natural and historic evolution of ideas, facts and necessities. No doubt an "economic boycott" on the part of a League or of two great Allies must not be undervalued as a weapon to arrest the warlike aggression of any recalcitrant Power. On the other hand, guided by the experience of the immediate past, we must look into the future and realise how difficult it will be to carry out any effective commercial blockade and financial boycott with the development of submarine and aerial navigation and of wireless telegraphy. Means may be devised by scheming, mercenary and selfish people without "patriotism" to evade all restrictions; while such action on their part and the various steps taken by the government to prevent such transgressions will tend to the demoralisation of their own national life. No, the simplest, most rational and most just means of securing peace is by the establishment of a Supernational Court or Jury together with its own Police-Force, such as I have suggested, and it distinctly lies within the province of the Peace Conference now sitting to create this by one act of concerted legislation.

¹ Embodied in my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, 1899.

THE END

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